LIBRARY  ^ 

UNIVERSITY  Of       I 
CALIFORNIA  I 

SAN  OICSO         j 


2 


I^S^ 


INTERNATIONAL  SERIES,  No.  3 

KDITED    HY 

CAPTAIN  ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER, 

Sixth  Infantry,  U.  S.  Army;   Instructor  in  the  Art  of  War  at  the  V.  S. 
Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 

TACTICAL  STUDII<:S 

ON  THE 

Battles  Around  Plevna, 

By  THILO  VON  TROTHA, 

Captain  of  the   Grenadier  Regiment   P'rederick   William    IV.     Attached). 


WITH     ONE     MAP. 


Translated  by  Carl  Reichmann, 

First  Lieutenant  gth   Infantry,  U.   S.   Army. 


lyH-,. 

HUDSON-KIMUKKI.Y   rrBI.lSIllNC.  COMTANY. 

lOH  lOlti  WvANHorrF.  Strekt. 

KANSAS  CITY.  MO. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1896, 

By  HUDSON-KIMBKRLY  PUBLISHING  CO., 

In   the  OflSce  of  the  Librarian  of  Congrsss,  Washington,  D.  C. 


EDITOR'S  PREFACE. 

Among  the  many  books  on  the  Turko-Russian  war  of 
1877  8,  two  works  stand  out  prominently;  namely,  Greene's 
"Russian  Campaigns  in  Turkey,"  which  is  universally  recog- 
nized as  a  military  classic,  and  Von  Trotha's  able  work, 
which,  though  long  and  favorably  known  in  Germany,  is 
here  presented  in  English  for  the  first  time.  Of  the  latter 
work  it  is  perhaps  sufficient  to  say  that,  in  its  full  and  care- 
ful consideration  of  tactical  matters,  it  forms  a  worthy  sup- 
plement to  the  former,  and  as  such  it  will  doubtless  prove 
welcome  to  American  and  English  readers. 
U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  May  1,  1896. 


INDEX. 

Ammunition  supply,  52. 

Archangel  Regiment,  at  Plevna  on  July  19th,  43;  inaction  on  July  20th, 

46;  losses  on  July  29th,  49;  criticised,  .52;  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  57; 

at  second  battle'of  Plevna,  105;  at  the  last  sortie,  185. 
Armament  of  the  opposing  infantry,  212. 
Arnoldi,  General,  supersedes  Kryloff  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  155; 

at  Dolni  Dubnik,  167. 
Artillery,  comments  on,  221. 

Astrachan  Dragoons,  ordered  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  134. 
Babakonak  pass,  37. 

Bashi-bozouks,  mentioned,  22,  77;  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  141. 
Bazaine,  Marshal,  his  action  at  Metz,  discussed,  196. 
Berdan  rifles  used  at  Plevna  by  Russians,  117,  211. 
Biskupski,  makes  a  reconnaissance  on  July  29th,  68. 
Bug  Lancers,  ordered  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  141. 
Caucasian  Cossacks,  action  on  night  of  1.5th-16th  July,  43;  at  Plevna 

on  July  19th,  43;  in  action  July  20th,  48;  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  83; 

at   second   battle   of  Plevna,  94;    on  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  142;  at 

Gorni  Dubnik.  160;  at  Telis,  169. 
Cavalry,  comments,  215. 

Charkof  Lancers,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  145. 
Charles   of   Roumania,   15;    commands  Roumanian  Army,  27;   orders 

final  dispositions  at  Plevna,  184. 
Chasseur  regiments,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  163;  at  Telis,  165. 
Chefket  Pasha,  reenforces  the  army  at  Plevna,  153;  attempts  to  succor 

the  "etappen"  posts,  169. 
Chifsi  Pasha,  commanding  the   fortified  posts  in  rear  of  Plevna,  154; 

surrenders,  164. 
Coast  Arm}',  mentioned,  9. 
Combat,  character  of,  2"3. 
Czarowitz,  mentioned,  13,  15 
Daniloff,  General,  at  the  last  sortie,  186. 
Danube  campaign,  review  of,  9. 

Dismounted  fighting,  criticised  in  the  Russian  Army,  219. 
Dobrovolski,  General,  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  84;  at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  100;  killed,  126. 
Dobrudja,  mentioned,  12. 
Don  Cossacks,  before  Plevna  on  July  19th,  43;    in  action  of  July  20th, 

45;  criticised,  51;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,   94;    ordered  to  the 

left  bank  of  the  Vid,  134;  numbers,  216. 
DoTobanzes  regiments,  at  sortie  of  August  31st,  76;    at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  105;  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  139. 
Dragoon  regiments,  at  sortie  of  August  31st,  76;    on  the  left  bank  of 

the  Vid,  138;  at  Telis,  165;  at  Dolni  Dubnik,  168;  at  investment  of 

Plevna,  182. 
Ellis,  General,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  159. 
Entrenching  tools,  212. 
Estland   Regiment,    at   capture   of   Lovtcha,    87;    at  second   battle  of 

Plevna,  98. 


Inaex.  5 

Finland  Regiment,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  162. 

Fire  of  masses,  203. 

Formak,  General,  commanding  militia  brigade,  157. 

Fortresses  and  field  entrenchments,  225. 

Galitz  Regiment,  in  action  of  July  20th,  47;  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  57; 

at  sortie  of  August  31st,  76;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  94. 
Ganetzki,  General,  commands  a  sector  of  the  line  of  investment,  182; 

at  last  sortie,  189;  receives  the  surrender,  191. 
Gorni  Dubnik,  use  of  artillery  at,  224. 
Gortaloff,  Major,  killed,  125. 
Gourko,  General,  mentioned,  13,  15;  in   rear   of  Plevna,   155;  captures 

Gorni  Dubnik,  162;  seizes  the  passes  over  the  Balkans,  183. 
Grand  Headquarters,  mentioned,  13,  15. 
"Green  Hills"  of  Plevna,  mentioned,  39;  attacked,  98. 
Grenadiers,  arrive  from  Russia,  31;  defeat  the  final  sortie  of  the  Turks, 

33,  185;    at   Gorni   Dubnik,   159;    at  Telis,   167;    at   investment  of 

Plevna,  182. 
Grivitza  redoubt,  mentioned,  30,  97. 
Guard  corps,  arrival  from  Russia,  31,  154;  in  actions  in  rear  of  Plevna, 

174. 
Haki  Pasha,  surrenders  at  Telis,  170. 
Hussar  regiments,  at  sortie  of  August  31st,  75;  on  the  left  bank   of  the 

Vid,  143;    at  Telis,   165;    at  Dolni  Dubnik,  168;    at  investment  of 

Plevna,  182. 
Imeretinski,    General,   arrives    from    Lovtcha,    29;    ordered  to  attack 

Lovtcha,  83;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  94. 
Infantry,  comments  on,  209. 

Ingermanland  Regiment,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  132. 
Ismailof  Regiment  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  163. 
Jablonitza  pass,  mentioned,  92. 
Jaroslof  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  62;  losses,  65;    at  sortie  of 

August  31st,  76;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  108. 
Kalarashi  regiments,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  138. 
Kaluga    Regiment,    at   capture   of   Lovtcha,    86;    at   second   battle  of 

Plevna,  98. 
Kataley,  General,  commands  a  sector  of  the  investment,  182. 
Kazan  Dragoons,  ordered  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  134. 
Kazan  Regiment,  position  on  August  31st,  76;    at  capture  of  Lovtcha, 

83;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  108. 
Kerim  Pasha,  his  secret  plan,  10,  2D2. 
Kieff  Regiment,  at  the  second  battle  of  Plevna,  94. 
Koloma  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  59;  losses,  65;  assigned  to 

the  left  wing,  73;  at  sortie  on  August  31st,  76;    at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  108. 
Kosloff  Regiment,   at   first  battle  of   Plevna,  56;    at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  108. 
Kostroma  Regiment,  arrives  before  Plevna,  July  19th,  43;  in  the  action 

of  July  20th,  47;  losses,  49;  criticised,  -52. 
Kourloff,  General,  at  the  last  sortie,  189. 
Krenk  rifles,  used  by  Russians,  117,  211. 
Krishin  redoubt,  attacked,  98. 
Kriidener,  General,  mentioned,  14;  orders  the  occupation   of  Plevna, 

24;    reinforced,  25;   defeated,  26;    at  the  first  battle  of  Plevna,  56; 

criticised,  67;    at  the  second  battle  of  Plevna,  93;    commanding  a 

sector  of  the  investment,  181. 


i5  Index. 

Kryloff,  General,  commanding  cavalry  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  31; 
commanding  the  Fourth  Corps,  75;  at  the  second  battle  of  Plevna, 
93;  commanding  the  "combined  cavalry  corps,"  142;  driven  back 
by  Turkish  relief  troops,  153. 

Kuban  Regiment,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  146;  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  161. 

Kuropatkin,  Captain,  at  capture  of  Lo\i:cha,  89;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna,  113;  wounded,  123. 

Kursk  Regiment,  at  battle  of  Plevna,  55;  losses,  65. 

Lancer  regiments,  at  sortie  of  August  31st,  75;  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Vid,  135;  at  Dolni  Dubnik,  168;  at  Telis,  170;  at  investment  of 
Plevna,  182. 

Leontieff,  General,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  94. 

Levis,  Colonel,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  145;  driven  back  by  relief 
troops,  154. 

Libau  Regiment,  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  86;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna,  100. 

Loshkareff,  General,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  31,  134;  at  the  first 
battle  of  Plevna,  55;  at  the  second  battle  of  Plevna,  94;  ordered  to 
Bogot,  142. 

Lovtcha,  mentioned,  83;  advance  on,  19,  83;  arrangements  for  capture 
of,  84;  action  on  right  bank  of  the  Osma,  85;  action  on  the  left 
bank,  87;  losses,  88;  attempts  to  relieve,  88;  comments,  89. 

Mariopul  Hussars,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  145. 

Mariopul  Regiment,  at  the  second  battle  of  Plevna,  94. 

Mehemed  Ali  Pasha,  mentioned,  15,17;  at  Sophia,  32. 

Midhat  Pasha,  governor  of  the  Danube  province,  35. 

Moscow  Regiment,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  159. 

Moszewoi,  Colonel,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  115. 

Muravieff,  General,  at  investment  of  Kars,  192. 

Mustahafiz,  mentioned,  11. 

National  Guard,  mentioned,  11. 

Nicholas,  Grand  Duke,  mentioned,  9. 

Orloff,  Colonel,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  121. 

Osman  Pasha,  mentioned,  10,  11,  14;  starts  from  Widdin,  23;  sortie  of 
August  31st,  28;  surrenders,  34,  191;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna, 
119;  supplies  his  army,  154;  attempts  to  break  the  investment,  183. 

Pawlof  Regiment,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  162. 

Peabody-Martini  rifles,  used  by  the  Turks,  211. 

Pelisha't,  sortie  of  August  31st,  28,  75. 

Penza  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  57;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna,  108. 

Plans  of  operations,  19-^. 

Plevna,  review  of  operations  around,  22;  geographical  conditions,  35; 
topographical  conditions,  38;  fortifications,  40;  advance  on  July 
19th,  43;  attack  on  July  20th,  14,  45;  losses  on  July  20th,  49,  battle 
of  July  30th,  54;  position  of  troops  on  July  29th,  54;  dispositions  for 
July  30th,  55;  events  up  to  2:30  p.  m.  July  30th,  .56;  Russian  right 
attack  July  30th,  57;  Russian  left  attack  Ju  y  30th,  60;  Skobeleff's 
attack  July  30th,  62;  losses  on  July  30th,  65;'  panic  at  Sistova,  65; 
comments  on  battle  of  July  30th,  67;  artillery  attack  on  Septem- 
ber 7th-10th,  93;  comments  on  artillery  attack,  101;  battles  on 
September  11th  andl2th,  10:^;  dispositions  on  September  11th,  103; 
attack  on  the  Grivitza  works,  105;  attack  on  the  Radischevo  works, 
107;    attack  on  the  Krishin  works,  109;    losses   in  second  battle  of 


Index.  7 

Plevna,  125;  comments  on  second  battle  of  Plevna,  127;  cavalrv  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  134;  cavalry  under  Loshkareff,  134;  cavalry 
under  Kryloff,  142;  comments,  148;  investment  from  the  west,  153, 
communications  to  the  rear,  153;  Gourko's  task  and  dispositions, 
154;  capture  of  Gorni  Dubnik,  158;  events  at  Telis  on  October 
24th,  165;  events  at  Dolni  Dubnik  on  October  24th,  167;  capture  of 
Telis  on  October  28th,  168;  losses  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  173; 
comments  on  events  in  rear  of  Plevna,  ^74;  the  fall  of,  181;  gen- 
eral measures  for  the  investment,  181;  signs  of  the  Turkish  at- 
tempt to  break  out,  183;  Russian  dispositions  for  December  10th, 
183,  events  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  185;  events  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Vid,  189;  the  surrender,  191;  losses,  191;  comments,  192. 

Pokof  Regiment,  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  87. 

Radischevo  redoubt,  attack  of,  97;  "Red  Hill"  at  Lovtcha,  85. 

Reaf  Pasha,  mentioned,  11. 

Reval  Regiment,  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  86;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna.  109. 

Richter,  General,  commanding  bridge  at  Sistova,  66. 

Rifle  battalions,  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  85;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna, 
100;  in  rear  of  Plevna,  15  ;  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  161;  at  investment  of 
Plevna,  182. 

Rifle-trenches,  203 

Rodionof,  General,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  106;  wounded,  126. 

Rosalita  pass,  37. 

Roschiori,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  135. 

Rosenbach,  General,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  159. 

Roumanian  Army,  mentioned,  10,  11,  16;  joins  the  Russians,  27,  29; 
at  the  investment  of  Plevna,  181. 

Roumanian  troops,  at  sortie  of  August  31st,  78;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna,  94;  ordered  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  134;  at  Dolni  Dub- 
nik, 168;  at  the  last  sortie,  185. 

Rykatschef,  Colonel,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  107. 

Rylsk  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  60;  losses,  65. 

Schilder-Schuldner,  General,  mentioned,  2+;  ordered  to  advance,  43; 
criticised,  50;  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  57. 

Schnitnikoff,  General,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  108;  commands  the 
fifth  sector  of  the  investment,  184. 

Serpuchoff  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  59;  losses,  65,  in  sup- 
port of  left  wing,  73;  at  sortie  of  August  31st,  76;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna,  108. 

Shakofskoi,  General,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  55. 

Shernosuboff,  General,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  141. 

Shestakoff,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  114. 

Shipka  pass,  mentioned,   13,  17,  38. 

Shuja  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  61;  losses,  65;  at  sortie  of 
August  31st,  75;  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  83;  at  second  battle  of 
Plevna,  108. 

Skobeleff,  General,  attacks  the  "Green  Hills,"  30;  at  first  battle  of 
Plevna,  55;  his  use  of  the  three  arms,  74;  at  capture  of  Lovtcha,  83; 
at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  98;  commands  a  sector  of  the  invest- 
ment, 182;  at  the  last  .sortie,  189;  his  handling  of  artillery,  223. 

Snider  rifles,  used  by  the  Turks,  211. 

South  Army,  mentioned,  9. 

btalkenberg,  Colonel,  mentioned,  143. 


8  Index. 

Sulienian  Pasha,  mentioned,  11,  17. 

Susdal    Regiment,  at    sortie  on  August  31st,  75;    at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  101. 
Tamboff  Regiment,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  57;    at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  108. 
Tcherkass,  Colonel,  mentioned,  147. 
Tcherkesses,  mentioned,  11,  22;   on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  1.37;    at 

Gorni  Dubnik,  161;  at  Telis,  169;  numbers  of,  215. 
Tchermat,  General,  commander-in-chief  of  the  Roumanian  Army,  46; 

commanding  a  sector  of  the  line  of  investment,  181. 
Tebjanik,  General,  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  114;   wounded,  123. 
Telis,  use  of  artiller\'  at,  223. 
Tetewen  pass,  mentioned,  92. 
"Three  Wells,"  mentioned,  95. 

Todleben,   General,    "assistant"  to  the  commander-in-chief,  154;  pre- 
pares the  investment  of  Plevna,  181. 
Trajan's  wall,  mentioned,  12. 
Trojan  pass,  mentioned,  37. 

Turkish  Army,  mentioned,  10;  strength  at  the  end  of  August,  10,  81. 
Turkish  cavalry  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  136. 
Tutolmin,  Colonel,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  63;    on   the  left  bank  of 

the  Vid,  143. 
Uglitz   Regiment,   at   sortie   on   August   31st,  75;   at   second  battle  of 

Plevna,  108. 
Vladi  Caucasian  Regiment,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  145. 
Vladimir  Regiment,   at  sortie  of  August  31st,  76;  at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  109. 
West  Army,  strength  of  Russian,  30;  strength  at  end  of  August,  81. 
Widdin,  mentioned,  23. 

Wilhelminoff,  General,  at  first  battle  of  Plevna,  55 
Wologda  Regiment,  before  Plevna  on  July  19th,  43;    in  action  of  July 

20th,  46;    losses  on  July  20th.  49;    criticised,  52;    at  first  battle  of 

Plevna,  57;  supports  attack,  71;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  106;  at 

the  last  sortie,  185. 
Woronesh  Regiment,  at  first   battle  of  Plevna,  60;  at  second  battle  of 

Plevna,  108. 
Zeddeler,  General,  at  Gorni  Dubnik,  159. 
Zgalevitza,  sortie  on  August  31st,  28,  75;  position  of  troops  before,  75; 

Turkish  attack  on,  76;  Turkish  repulse  at,  78;   Russian  pursuit,  79; 

losses  at,  80;  comments,  80. 
Zimmerman,  General,  mentioned,  12. 
Zotoff,  General,  commmands  the  Russian  West  Army,  27;    at  sortie  of 

August  31 9t,  76;  chief  of  staff,  100;  at  second  battle  of  Plevna,  121; 

commands  a  sector  of  the  investment,  182. 


The  Damihe  Canijmif/v. 


PART    I. 

IXTKODUCTORY  REVIEW  OF  THE   DANUBE 
CAMPAIGN. 

The  army  designated  to  operate  against  European  Tur- 
key, and  called  the  Army  of  the  South,  was  commanded  by 
the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  and  consisted  of  the  YIIL,  IX.,  XI., 
and  XII.  Corps  of  t\v(>  infantry  and  one  cayalry  diyision 
each,  of  the  4th  Rifle  Brigade,  a  combined  Cossack  diyision, 
and  a.  number  of  separate  Cossack  regiments  attached  to  the 
corps  and  diyisions.  On  April  24th  the  Army  began  to 
cross  Mie  Roumanian  frontier,  and  (•omi)leted  its  strategic 
deployment  along  the  Danube  during  the  ensuing  month, 
mostly  by  marching  and  to  a  smaller  extent  l)y  the  use  of 
the  railroad,  which  was  largely  occupied  hj  the  transport  of 
the  heayy  artillery,  the  pontoon  ])arks,  and  other  stores  of 
munitions  and  proyisions. 

^^'hile  the  greater  part  of  the  cayalry  held  the  line  of 
the  Danube  from  the  mouth  of  the  Aluta  downward,  the 
main  body  of  the  army  stood  toward  the  end  of  May  in  the 
yicinity  of  Bucharest,  the  right  wing  at  Slatina  on  the 
Aluta,  the  left  wing  at  Oltenitza  on  the  Danube,  On  the 
lower  Danube  was  one  diyision  of  the  XI.  Corps,  strength- 
ened by  a.  detachment  of  the  ^'II.  Corps,  which  latter,  to- 
gether with  the  X.  Corps,  constituted  the  Coast  Army  for 
the  pi'otection  of  the  northern  shores  of  the  Black  !r>ea. 


10         T<i<-tic<il  Shidiix  oil  the  lidfth s  Around  I'lcina. 

Of  three  other  corps  also  mobilized  and  assigned  to  the 
fiekl  army,  the  XIV.  Corps  was  directed  to-  advance  to  the 
lower  Danube  and  relieve  there  the  division  of  the  XL  Corps 
wiiich  was  to  rejoin  the  main  army,  while  the  IV.  and  XIIL 
Corps  were  to  join  tlit^  main  army  directly.  Political  reasons 
preventedtlieRonmanian  Army  fr;)m  active  i)articipati()n  in 
the  campaiji'n.  This  force  consisted  of  four  divisions  posted 
in  Lesser  Wallachia,  and  in  a  certain  sense  constituted  the 
right  fltuik  guard  of'  the  Russian  deployment  in  Greater 
Wallachia. 

On  account  of  the  complete  absence  of  any  fixed  organi- 
zation of  the  Turkish  army,  and  on  account  of  the  unsettled 
state  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  the  strength,  distribution,  and 
special  formation  of  the  Turkish  troops  can  not  be  given  with 
comx>lete  accuracy,  although  the  following  round  figures 
may  be  approximately  correct.  At  the  time  of  the  Russiaji 
passage  of  the  Danube  there  w^ere: 

1.  In  the  (]u ad ri lateral  Shumla — Varna — Silistria — 
Rustehuk,  the  main  (East)  army  under  Kerim  Pasha,  100,000 
strcmg,  of  which  about  00,000  men  may  be  considered  avail- 
able for  field  operations; 

2.  In  the  Dobrudja,  about  10,000  to  15,000  men ; 

'A.  In  Nikopolis,  Sistova,  and  Tirnova,  about  10,000 
men ; 

4.  At  Widdin,  the  Western  Army  under  Osman  Pasha, 
50,000  strong,  of  which  about  40,000  men  probably  marched 
toward  Plevna  at  the  end  of  June ; 

5.  At  Sophia,  about  20,000  men,  a.  sort  of  reserve  army, 


The  JJ(titiih(   <  '(niijKii(/ii.  11 

for  the  most  pai't  a,lso  niaitliin^'  to  Plevna  to  join  Osnian 
Pasha; 

G.  South  of  the  Balkans,  on  the  line  Philii)i>opolis — 
Adi'ia.n(>i)le,  sonu^  10,000  to  15,000  uwu  iindtM-  Ivcui'  I'aslui, 
will)  (lid  not  assnnu'  actual  conunand  until  aftci-  thr  tirst 
passages  of  the  I^alkans  by  tlu^  Russians; 

7.  About  30,000  men  under  Suleiman  I'asha,  which  had 
been  put  in  motion  towai-<l  Kounudia  from  the  theater  of  war 
in  ^NIontenegTO ; 

S.  The  reinforcements  of  regular  troo]»s  from  Constan- 
tinople, fr(un  distant  provinces,  and  from  new  organizations 
which  had  been  formed  with  considerable  zeal  and  skill,  are 
estimated  at  not  h^ss  than  40,000  nn^n.  Most  nf  tlu^se  were 
scmt  to  Suleiman  Pa.sha.'s  army. 

The  Tcherkesses,a.n  irregular  but  excellent  light  cavalry, 
numbering  about  20,000  men,  are  included  in  the  above  data. 
The  Mustahaiiz  or  National  Guard  are  not  included,  as  their 
militai'y  value  is  doubtful  and  has  not  yet  been  tested  in 
actual  conflict  Avitli  Russian  troops. 

On  the  side  of  the  Russians  the  infantry  divisions  may  be 
put  down  at  10,000  men,  the  cavalry  divisions  at  2,'M)  horses, 
the Cotssack  regiments  at  500  horses;  the  entire  tield  army  of 
seren  coiq^s  is  therefore  to  be  estimated  at  about  150,000  in- 
fantry, 25,000  cavalry,  20,000  special  troops,  and  800  field 
guns;  in.  a<l<li1ion  there  was  a.  siege  jtarlc  of  ."MO  hea\y  and 
medium  guns. 

The  R(Minianian  Army,  so  far  as  lit  for  the  held.  ina>-  be 
estimated  at  40,000  men. 


12         Tdclival  l^ludie-'i  on  (he  Batilvs  AroumI  Plrnia. 

Active  pperations  suffered  a  further  poslponemeut  of 
four  weeks  through  the  unusually  high  and  long-continued 
rise  of  tJie  Danube;  the  delay  in  the  arrival  of  the  large 
masses  of  bridging  material  required,  due  to  defective  or- 
ganization of  the  Roumanian  railways;  and  the  necessity  of 
rendering  the  Turkish  monitor  flotilla  on  the  Danube  harm- 
less by  the  use  of  batteries  and  torpedoes. 

On  the  21st  of  June  General  Zimmermann  crossed  the 
Danube  at  Galatz  with  the  head  of  his  (XIV.)  corps,  and  es- 
tablished himself  on  the  opposite  bank  after  a  brisk  engage- 
ment. The  remainder  of  his  corps  followed  during  the  next 
few  days,  and  was  subsequently  joined  by  a.  part  of  the  VII. 
Corps ;  the  whole  constituted  the  so-called  ^'Column  of  the 
Lower  Danube,"  which  advanced  through  the  Dobrudja, 
meeting  insignificant  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
and  reached  Kustendje  and  Trajan's  Wall  about  the  middle 
€f  July.  None  but  small  reconnoitering  parties  crossed  this 
line.  Unfavorable  sanitary  conditions,  difficulties  of  sup- 
ply and  the  duty  of  guarding  the  shore  line,  caused  the 
larger  portion  of  the  column  of  30,000  men  to  remain  inactive 
in  the  Dobrudja  and  to  exercise  no  influence  whatever  on  the 
operations  in  Bulgaria  beyond.  The  opposing  Turkish 
troops  appear  to  have  been  greatly  inferior. 

We  now  turn  to  the  main  army.  On  the  27th  of  June 
the  VIII.  Corps  crossed  the  Danube  at  Zimnitza  under  a 
sharp  engagement  with  a  Turkish  brigade  posted  at  Sistova ; 
by  the  5th  of  July  the  IX.  and  Xni.  Corps,  the  4th  Rifle  Bri- 
gade,  the   Bulgarian   Legion,   and   the   combined   Cossa<:'k 


Tlic  Ddinihc  ('(nup(ii(/ii.  13 

division  had  also  completed  their  passage  at  this  point. 
Anticipatino-  somewhat,  we  note  here  that  by  the  middh'  of 
July  the  XL,  XII.,  and  IV.  Corps  were  also  brought  to  the 
right  bank. 

The  Yantra  bridge  at  Biela  having  fallen  into  the  hands 
of  the  Russians  on  the  3d  of  July,  General  Gourko  occupied 
Tirnova  on  the  8th  of  July  v^dth  a  mixed  advance  guard, 
crossed  the  Balkans  from  here  by  the  trail  to  the  east  of  the 
Shipka  pass,  reached  the  village  of  Hankioi  at  the  southern 
foot  of  the  mountains  on  the  14th,  and  turned  westward,  took 
Kazanlyk  <m  July  ITlh,  whn-c  lir  found  liimsolf  in  tli<'  rear 
of  the  Shipka  pass,  which  was  unsuccessfully  attacked  on 
the  same  day  by  a  detachment  of  the  VIII.  Corps  coming 
from  Gabrova.  The  appearance  of  Gourko  in  rear  of  their 
position  caused  the  weak  Turkish  garrison  to  evacuate  the 
pass  on  the  19th  without  resistance,  and  to  i-ctreat  by  side 
paths.  One  of  the  principal  l.alkau  passes  was  thus  in 
Russian  hands. 

Grand  Headquai'ters  was  moved  from  Sistova  to  Biela 
on  the  8th  of  July,  and  thence  to  TirnoA'a  on  the  17th. 

Tlie  passage  of  the  Balkans  divided  the  Russian  army  of 
operation  in  Bulgaria  into  three  separate  groups:  the  cen- 
ter, consisting  of  th(^  N'lII.  Coips  ;ind  Goui-ki)"s  mixed  ad- 
vance guard,  operated  in  the  P.alkiUis  and  f«»r  sonic  linio  also 
to  the  south  of  them;  the  loft  wing,  ronsistiiig  <»f  the  XII. 
and  XIII.  Corps,  charged  with  the  investment  and  siege  of 
Rustchuk  and  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  Czarowitz, 
extended  along  the  Lorn  from  the  Danube  to  Osman-Bazar, 


14  Tdcticdl  Sftnlics  on  the  lUtttki^  Around  I'lcrna. 

Willi  headquarters  at  Kadikioi.  The  ri<iht  winj?,  consisting 
of  the  IX,  Corps,  under  (xeneral  Ivrudeiier,\vas  cliarged  in 
the  first  ])lace  with  takinjr  Nikopolis,  j^niarding  the  line 
Nikopolis — Phmia. — Lo^'tcha,  and  establishinj;  eomniunica- 
tion  from  the  latter  place  with  the  center  in  the  Balkans, 
The  IV.  and  XI.  Corps  were  at  this  time  in  the  act  of  c.ross- 
ing:  the  Danube. 

Meanwhile  General  Kriidener  with  the  IX.  Cwps  had 
moved  on  Nikopolis.  On  the  loth  of  July  the  commandinji' 
and  strong^ly  fortified  positions  in  front  of  the  x>l^ce  were 
taken  by  assault,  and  ol  the  Kith  the  o^arrison  capitulated. 

(>sman  Pasha,  who  marched  from  Widdin  with  his 
oorx)S  about  the  end  of  June,  had  in  the  meantime-  reached 
Plevna  without  being  discovered  by  the  Russians.  A  weak 
detacliment  of  the  IX,  Corjis  dispatched  against  this  place 
on  the  20th  of  July  was  repulsed  with  considerable  loss. 

The  un<'xpected  api>earance  of  this  strong  Turkish  army 
in  the  space  between  the  \\(l  and  the  Osma  caused  a  com- 
plete change  in  tlie  situation. 

Kriidener,  with  the  IX,  Corps  reinforced  by  a  brigade  of 
the  XI,  and  a  division  of  the  I^",  Corps,  attacked  Plevna  on 
the  30th  of  July  and  sutfered  a  heavy  defeat, 

Osman  Pasha  ^'a.s  pre■^'ented,  probably  by  the  deficient 
character  of  his  army,  from  acting  on  the  offensive  and  reap- 
ing the  fruits  of  his  victory,  and  the  Russian  communica- 
tions by  way  of  Sistova,  senously  menaced  at  first,  remained 
undisturbed,  XeverthelesS(  the  Russian  offensive  had  not 
only  been  checked  for  the  present,  but  the  Russians  were 


The  Duniihe  Ca»}piii(/ii.  15 

obliged  to  make  retrograde  raovemeuts  in  the  center  and  on 
both,  flanks. 

On  the  left  the  Czaro\\itz.  whose  forces  had  been 
angmented  by  a.  part  of  the  XI.  Corps,  raised  th<'  invest- 
iinent  of  Knstchuk  and  took  a  defensive  position  along  the 
Black  Lorn  against  the  Tnrkish  army  assembling  in  his 
front.  After  his  snccessful  passage  of  the  Balkans,  (Jonrko 
extended  his  troops  in  the  Tundja  valley,  called  the  Bul- 
garians to  arms,  spread  terror  and  confusion  as  far  as  IMiil- 
ippopolis  and  Adrianople.  He  was  defeated  at  Eski-Zagra  on 
the  31st  of  July  and  compelled  to  retreat  to  Kazaulyk.  by 
Suleiman  I'asha.,  who  had  brought  his  corx)s,  heretofore  em- 
ployed against  ^Montenegro,  by  water  from  Antivari  to  Ded- 
eag  at  the  mouth  of  the  Maritza,  thence  by  rail  to  Adriano- 
ple, and  had  advanced  from  the  latter  ]»la('e  norllnvard  by 
forced  marches.  The  ^'ITI.  Corps,  originally  designated  to 
follow  Gourko  across  the  Balkans,  could  no  longer  be  em- 
ployed in  the  hitter's  support,  on  account  of  the  unfavorable 
situation  north  of  the  Balkans.  He  therefore  evacuated 
Kazanlyk  on  the  6th  of  August  and  withdrew  into  the  Bal- 
kan pasises,  w'here  he  entrenched  himself. 

Cri'and  Headquarters  was  moved  back  from  Tiriio\a  to 
l>iela..  The  unfavoi'abh'  situation  liad  dcinoiisiralcd  to  the 
Russian  leaders  that  the  forces  employed  were  une(iual  to 
the  task,  and  the  attempt  was  made  to  remedy  this  evil  in 
two  ways:  ftret.,  reinforcements  of  ten  infantry  divisions 
(five  Line,  three  Guard,  two  Grenadier)  and  two  cavalry 
di\isions   (Gua.rd)    were   ordered    from    Kussia;     second,    a 


16         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

treaty  (lieretofore  refused  by  Russia)  was  concluded  with 
Roumauia,  which  made  the  Roumanian  army  available  for 
use  in  active  operations.  The  West  Army,  consisting  of  the 
I\\  and  IX,  Corps,  was  augmented  by  the  entire  Roumanian 
army  and  the  Guards  and  Grenadiers  which  arrived  later, 
and  the  command  w^as  conferred  on  Prince  Charles  of  Rou- 
mania.  The  remaining  three  Russian  infantry  divisions 
were  assignedtothe  East  Army  under  the  Czarowitz,  as  also 
those  parts  of  the  XI.  Corpsnotheretoforesoassigned.  Gen- 
eral Radetzki,  with  part  of  the  former  advance  guard  and 
the  VIII.  Corps,  foi'med  the  center  in  the  Balkans  and  con- 
nected the  two  rtank  aniiies,  which  were  ijosted  with  their 
backs  toward  each  other. 

For  the  present  the  West  Army  left  one  Roumanian 
division,  and  the  East  Army  left  several  Russian  bodies,  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Danube  opposite  the  Turkish  fort- 
resses. 

The  reinforcements  ordered  had  not  arrived  when  at 
the  beginning  of  August  the  three  Turkish  armies — the  West 
Army  under  Osman  Pasha  at  Plevna,  the  South  Army  under 
Suleiman  Pashaat  Kazanly  k,  the  East  Army  under  Mehemed 
Ali  Pasha  on  the  line  Razgrad — Osman-Bazar — were  in 
readiness  to  advance  to  a  concentric  attack.  The  Russian 
Army,  which  was  posted  between  the  Osma,  the  Lom,  and 
the  Balkansin  the  triangle  Xikopolis — Gabrova^ — Rustchuk, 
was  shaken  by  its  reverses,  and  in  an  undoubted  critical  po- 
sition, having  to  rely  for  weeks,  until  the  arrival  of  consider- 
able reinforcements,  on  its  own  strength,  which  had  been 
recognized  as  insufficient. 


Thv  Danuhe  Canipaifju.  17 

Even  the  splendid  bravery  manifested  by  the  Russian 
troops  on  ever}-  occasion  would  hardly  have  saved  the  aiiuy 
from  heavy  reverses,  had  not  a  certain  unwieldiness  of  the 
Turkish  Army  in  offensive  movements,  as  well  as  lack  of  har- 
mony, and  even  open  enmity,  between  the  Turkish  leaders, 
acted  in  favor  of  the  Russians. 

Instead  of  utilizin<i-  the  open  ])asses  to  the  east  of 
Shipka  and  advancing-  with  the  nuiin  body  of  his  army, 
consisting-  of  battle-tried  elite  battalions,  against  the  line 
Osman-Bazar — Tirn<iva  in  cooiteiation  with  tlu^  P]ast  Ai-uiy, 
Suleiman  Pasha  wasted  his  strength  for  six  days  in  heroic 
but  useless  attacks  against  the  position  in  the  Shipka  pass, 
which  was  defended  by  an  opponent  equally  heroic,  though 
much  infeiior  in  strength.  His  heavy  losses  (more  tlian 
15,000  men,  according  to  Turkish  statements)  rendered 
SuleimaJi's  amiy  unfit  for  active  operations,  at  least  foi'  the 
presemt.  It  was  not  until  September  17th,  and  after  com- 
plete reorganization  of  his  troops  and  considerable  acces- 
sions of  reinforcements,  that  he  undertook  another'  unex- 
I>ected  attack  on  the  Shipka  pass,  which,  though  successful 
at  first,  was  repulsed  in  the  end. 

During  this  time  MelicuKMl  Ali  advanced  from  Razgrad 
against  the  Russian  position  on  the  Kara  Lom. 

After  several  small  engagements,  a  detachment  of  the 
Russian  center  was  defeated  at  Kara-Hassan kioi  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Kara.  Lom  on  the  -Slst  of  August,  another 
was  beaten  at  Kazeljewo  on  the  5tli  of  September  and  ])nslied 
over  the  Lom,  whose  right  bank  was  completely  in  the  hands 


18         Tactical  t<tudics  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

of  the  Turks  on  Se])tembei"  7tli.  To  defend  tlie  line  of  the 
Jjintrji.  tJie  Russian  East  Anny  took  j)osition  on  the  right 
banlc  of  tlie  stream  on  the  phiteau  between  tlie  Jantra  and 
the  Bajiizka  Lorn  (left  brajich  of  the  Kara.  Loni).  On  the 
13th  of  September  Mehemed  Ali  crossed  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Kara  Lorn,  defeated  a  Russian  detachment  at  Sinaiikioi 
on  the  14th,  and  on  September  21st  made  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  force  a  pasisage  oyer  the  Banizka  Lom  at  Tschir- 
kowna.  Repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  Mehemed  Ali  re- 
crossed  the  Kara  Lom,  whose  pasisages  from  Kazeljewo 
downward  as  far  a-s  Pyrgos  were  reoccupied  by  the  Russians 
by  the  middle  of  October. 

Osman  Pasha's  inactivity  throughout  is  surprising.  By 
his  unexpected  approach  from  Vk'iddin  and  his  tactical  skill 
in  the  defensive  actions  during  July  he  had  made  his  appear- 
ance on  the  field  of  war  in  splendid  manner,  and  decisive 
action  might  have  been  expected  on  his  part.  An  insignifi- 
cant advance  from  IMevna  westward  on  the  14th  of  August 
and  another  feeble  unsuccessful  attack  from  Lovtcha 
against  Selvi  on  the  21st  and  22d  of  August  are  not  to  be 
taken  for  seriously  contemplated  aggressive  movements. 
Still  the  coincidence  in  time  of  the  latter  attack  with  the  be- 
ginning of  the  great  attack  on  the  Shipka.  pass  by  Suleinuui 
Pasha,  as  well  as  with  the  advance  of  Mehemed  Ali  against 
the  upper  Lom,  is  worth  noting.  More  seriously  contem- 
plated and  more  vigorously  carried  out  was  Osman  Pasha's 
attack  against  the  Russian  positions  at  Zgalevitza  and  Pel- 
ishat  on  the  31st  of  August;   but  this  attack  was  likewise 


Tlw  Ddiiuhe  C(nni)<ii(/ii.  19 

undertaken  with  but  half  of  the  avaihible  forces,  and  is  not 
to  be  considered  as  a  last  struggle  for  final  decision.  Coin- 
cident again  with  Osmaii's  attack  was  Mehemed  Ali's  ad- 
vance against  the  middle  Loni,  while  Suleiman  was  still  en- 
gaged in  reorganizing  his  army,  which  was  shattered  and  un- 
able to  cooijerate  with  the  aggressive  movements  of  the  two 
flank  armies. 

^Vhile  tile  Kussians  were  restricting  themselves  in  the 
Balkans  and  on  the  Lorn  to  the  defense  of  their  partly  main- 
tained and  reoccupied  positions,  tlie  West  Army,  reinforced 
by  two  Russian  infantry  divisions  and  the  Roumanians,  jiro- 
ceeded  to  the  serious  attack  on  IMevna, 

After  the  capture  of  Lovtcha  on  the  3d  of  September, 
the  great  artillery  attack  against  Plevna  opened  on  the  7th, 
and  continued  for  some  time  after  the  great  assault  on  the 
lltli  of  September,  which,  though  in  part  successful,  must 
be  accounted  a  failure. 

The  attempt  to  deprive  the  Army  of  Plevna  of  its  com- 
munications with  Widdin  and  Sophia,  l)y  ]>osting  a  strong 
cavalry  corps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  was  without  result 
for  a  tinia  Reinforcements  with  considerable  supplies  of 
provisions  and  munitions  repeatedl}'  broke  through  the 
weak  line  of  investment  on  the  left  bank,  and  succeeded  in 
getting  int(>  Plevna.  The  investnicnl  of  Plcxiia  did  not  be- 
come effective  and  make  itself  felt  until  after  General 
Gourko  assumed  command  of  the  corps  of  imcslnicnt  (tn 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  with  trooi>s  of  the  (Juard,  and  had 
established  himself  on  the  line  of  communication  and  retreat 


20         Tacticdl  Sttidivx  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

of  tlie  Ai'iny  of  Plevna.  After  the  capture  b}^  assault  of  tlie 
fortified  station  of  Gorni  Dubnik,  provisions  and  ammunition 
ran  short  in  Plevna. 

Russian  detachments  which  were  pushed  into  the 
mountains  along  the  Isker  and  Vid  cut  off  Mehemed  Ali's 
reserve  army  assembling  at  Sophia  and  compelled  it  to  be 
more  solicitous  of  its  own  defense  than  of  the  relief  of 
Plevna.    • 

Deprived  of  hope  of  assistance  from  without  and 
pressed  by  the  daily  increasing  difficulties  of  his  position, 
Osman  Pasha  attempted  to  break  through  the  Russian  line 
of  investment  westward  on  the  10th  of  December;  the  at- 
tempt failed,  and  Osman  Pasha  and  his  entire  army  sur- 
I'endered  as  prisoners  of  war. 

It  remains  to  cast  a  brief  glance  at  the  coincident  events 
on  the  Lom.  where  the  Russian  East  Army,  after  reoccupy- 
ing  the  line  of  the  Kara  Lom,  remained  strictly  on  the 
defensive. 

Suleiman  Pasha,  who  had  assumed  command  of  the 
Turkish  East  Army  about  the  middle  of  October,  in  place  of 
Mehenled  Ali  Pasha,  attempted  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
Russians  to  their  own  left  flank  by  attacking  the  lower  Lom 
on  the  19th  and  26th  of  Xovember,  and  seriously  and  unex- 
pectedly attacked  the  extreme  right  of  the  Russian  position 
in  the  mountains  at  Maren  and  Elena,  on  the  4th  of  Decem- 
ber, with  .30,000  men.  The  feeble  Russian  detachment  was 
driven  ba;Ck  with  severe  loss  in  men  and  guns,  but  in  rear 
of  Elena  the  Turkish  advance  came  to  a  stop,  and  on  receipt 


The  Danube  Campaign.  21 

of  the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Plevna  the  Turkish  corps 
withdrew  toward  Achmedli  on  the  14th  of  December.  On 
December  12th  the  Turlcs  suffered  a  bloody  repulse  at  Met- 
schka  on  the  lower  Loni.  where  they  made  a  vigorous  at- 
tack. With  the  fall  of  Plevna,  almost  coincident  Avith  the 
end  of  the  year,  the  campaign  on  the  Danube  terminated ;  all 
subsequent  events  on  the  various  portions  of  the  theater  of 
war  pertain  to  a  new  period,  the  campaign  of  Adrianople. 


22         Tactical  Studies  oii  the  Battles  Around  PUvna. 


PART    n. 

REVIEW  OF  THE  OPERATIONS  AROUND  PLEVNA. 

The  opevatious  of  the  IX.  Corps,  wliich  constituted  the 
nucleus  of  the  su'bsequently  formed  West  Army,  began 
July  IStli  with  the  assault  on  the  heights  commanding 
Nikopolis  and  the  surrender  of  the  fortress  on  the  16th. 

Dur-ing  the  struggle  at  Nikopolis  the  Caucasian  Cos- 
sack .Brigade  was  pushed  into  the  space  between  the  Osma 
and  Vid,  to  cover  the  IX.  Coi*ps  against  anj^  hostile  enter- 
prises from  Rah  ova  and  Plevna;  according  to  the  statements 
of  prisoners,  the  garrison  of  Nikopolis  did  in  fact  expect 
relief  from  tiie  west. 

During  the  night  of  the  IStli-lGth  the  Cossack  Brigade 
had  an  action  with  a  detacJmient  of  Turkish  infantry  which 
seemed  to  belong  to  the  garrison  of  Nikopolis  and  to  have 
escaped  from  the  impending  capitulation.  No  hostile 
bodies  made  their  appearance  from  the  west  in  these  days. 

But  on  the  17th  one  of  the  recounoitering  parties  dis- 
patched to  tlie  south  encountered  at  Selvi  a  detachment 
of  about  1,000  men,  consisting  of  Tcherkesses  and  Bashi- 
bozouks  "s\ith  some  infantin,  which  retired  on  Lovtcha.  (^n 
the  evening  of  the  same  day  reports  ai'rived  at  Grand  Head- 
quarters, from  the  (Cossack  pati'ols  scouting  along  the  '^^id, 
of  the  approach  of  sti-ong  hostile  detachme<nt.s  from  the 


Operations  Aronitd  Phviui-  23 

west,  marching  iii  the  direction  of  IMevmi.  It  seems  that 
the  commander-in-chief  phiced  little  imjjortance  on  these 
reports,  and  certainly  did  not  believt^  in  the  presence  of 
strong  masses  of  the  eni^nv  in  tluit  direction;  the  only 
measure  taken  in  this  respect  was  an  order  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  IX.  (''ori)s  to  occupy  Plevna  with  a.  detach- 
ment and  to  clear  the  vicinity  of  such  bodies  of  the  eni^my  as 
might  be  there. 

The  fact  that  the  Head(pia.rters    rested    in    such    fa.ls(^ 
security  as  regards  the  danger  threatening  from  West  r>nl 
garia    does    not    throw    favorable    light   on   the   organiza- 
tion and  direction  of  the  service  of  information.     An  entire 
army  was  assembled  at  Plevna  by  this  tim(\ 

The  date  when  Osman  I*asha  started  from  \\'iddin  with 
the  main  body  of  tJie  West  Bulgai'ian  Army  can  not  be  ac- 
curately ascertained.  Su]>posing  the  movement  from  Wid- 
diu  to  have  begiui  when  the  passage  of  the  l)anul>e  b.\  the 
Russians  became  known.  Osman  Pasha's  army  would  have 
consumed  about  twenty  days  in  traversing  the  disTanci-  of 
about  125  miles  from  Widdin  to  Plevna.  The  heads  of  these 
columns  were  the  troo])s  whose  presence  on  the  Vid  was 
reported  on  the  17tli  of  July  by  the  Cossacks  scouting  there. 
In  addition,  a  part  of  the  i-eserve  army  at  Soj)hia  was  or- 
dered to  join  Osnuui.  aJid  it  is  ])robablc  that  this  c(»rps  took 
the  great  road  through  Orkhanie.  and  thence  eitliei*  the  load 
leading  from  Ttdis  to  rievua  or  from  .labloni/.a  ahmg  the 
northern  foot  of  the  Balkans  to  Plevna;  in  the  foi-mer  ca.s<^ 
the  troops  with  whom  the  Russians  came  in  touch  at  Relvi 


24  Tdcticdl  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Pl(  ritd. 

(Ill  the  ITth  may  be  considerd  as  the  right  flank  guard,  aud 
iu  the  hitter  case  as  the  advance  guard  of  the  corps  ap- 
proaching from  Sophia. 

Nothing  is  Icnown  with  certainty  of  the  phm  on  whicli 
Osman's  march  was  originally  based;  had  he  arrived  on  the 
banks  of  the  Vid  a  few^  days  earlier,  the  capture  of  Nikopolis 
by  the  Russian  IX.  Corps  would  hardly  have  been  possible. 

^^'e  now  again  turn  to  the  operations  of  the  Russian 
Army. 

Pursuant  to  instructions  from  the  Headquarters,  Gen- 
eral Kriidener  on  the  18th  of  July  ordered  the  commander 
of  the  .5th  Infantry  Division,  Lieutenant-General  Schilder- 
Schuldner,  to  move  with  the  1st  Brigade  of  his  division,  4 
batteries,  and  the  9th  Don  Cossack  Regiment  from  Mkopolis 
to  Plevna,  and  to  occupy  the  place.  The  troops  already  be- 
yond the  Osma  and  along  the  highroad  from  Bulgareni  to 
Plevna — the  Kostroma  Regiment  of  the  .5th  Division  with 
a  battery  and  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade — were  ordered 
to  cooperate  in  the  enterprise  and  placed  under  the  orders  of 
Lieutenant-General  Schilder-Schuldner. 

The  latter  permitted  the  two  detachments  to  advance 
separately  from  north  and  east  against  Plevna,  where  mean- 
w'hile  a  large  part  of  Osman's  armj^,  probably  not  less  than 
20.000  to  25,000  men,  had  arrived,  and  he  suffered  a  bloody 
defeat  on  the  20th  of  July,  the  three  infantry  regiments 
losing  .3,000  men,  one-third  of  their  proper  strength. 

The  vigorous  sign  of  life  given  by  the  hitherto  neglected 
arnw  of  Osman  made  a  very  unpleasant  impression  at  Head- 


Oixrailons  Around  Plevna-  25 

quarters,  occupied  at  tins  moment  bv  Gourko's  surprisingly 
successful  passage  of  tlie  Balkans,  and  probably  engaged  in 
plans  of  an  immediate  advance  on  Adrianople.  The  un- 
favorable impression  produced  by  the  defeat  at  Plevna  was 
to  be  wiped  out  as  quickly  as  possible  by  overpowering  the 
troublesome  opponent.  General  Kriidener  received  consid- 
erable reinforcements  from  the  corps  recently  brought  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  was  enjoined  to  attack 
Plevna  vigorously. 

General  Kriidener  had  meanwhile  been  concentrating 
his  IX.  Corps  at  P.resljaniza;  but  one  regiment  Avas  left  at 
Nikopolis,  which  place  received  a  Roumanian  garrison  in 
addition. 

Up  to  July  2Gth  Kriidener  received  the  following  rein- 
forcements: the  1st  Brigade  of  the  32d  Infantry  Division 
and  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  11th  Cavalry  Division,  both  of  the 
XL  Corps  and  under  the  personal  command  of  Prince  Sha- 
kofskoi,  the  corps  commander;  also  the  30th  Infantry  Di- 
vision of  the  IV.  Corps. 

Lovtcha,  temporarily  occupied  by  a  Russian  detachment, 
was  recovered  by  the  Turks  on  July  2Gth,  whO'  at  this  jioint 
were  distant  50  miles  from  the  headquarters  at  Tirnova 
and  37  from  Gabrova  at  the  northern  issue  of  the  Shipka 
pass. 

Kriidener's  total  strength,  including  the  reinforce- 
ments and  deducting  losses,  amounted  to  about  30,000  men 
with  170  gun's.  He  had  some  hesitation  in  attacking  the 
enemv  a.t  IMevna,  belicvinir  his  own  forces  insufficient  in 


26         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

view  of  the  enemy's  stroiio-  positiou  and  large  force,  for  b}' 
the  end  of  Jul^'  Osmau  Pasha  must  have  had  more  than 
40,000  men  with  about  80  guns  at  Plevna.  Reiterated  or- 
ders from  Headquarters  prompted  him  finally  to  jjroceed 
to  the  attack  on  the  30th  of  July.  The  battle  was  contested 
on  both  sides  with  great  bravery,  but  terminated  in  a  heavy 
defeat  of  the  Russians,  who  lost  7,500  men  in  killed  and 
wounded,  which  was  one-fourth  of  their  effectives. 

Strange  to  say,  there  was  no  pursuit  on  the  i^art  of  the 
Turks;  thereby  the  Russian  troops,  which  were  much  de- 
moralized immediately  after  the  unsuccessful  termination 
of  the  struggle,  gained  time  to  make  front  in  good  condition 
on  the  line  Trestenik — Poradim,  bareh'  13  miles  from  the 
battle-field. 

A  pause  now-  ensued  in  front  of  Plevna.  Prevented  by 
some  cause — probably  by  the  defective  character  of  his  army 
— from  turning  his  victory  to  full  account  by  a  vigorous 
attack  on  the  Russian  communications,  Osman  Pasha  occu- 
pied himself  with  strengthening  his  position  by  means  of 
fortifications  and  converted  it  into  a  spacious,  extremely 
strong,  entrenched  camp,  to  which  it  seems  a  number  of 
heavy  guns  of  position  w^ere  en  route  from  Widdin.  The 
only  sign  of  life  given  by  the  Turkish  army  at  Plevna  was  a 
feeble  reconnaissance  westw^ard  on  the  lltli  of  August, 
which  was  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  Russian  guns,  and  a 
movement  from  Lovtcha  on  Selvi,  which  was  undertaken  on 
the  21st  and  22d  of  August  with  small  forces,  without  en- 
ergy, and  therefore  without  result. 


Operations  Around  Plevna.  27 

The  Eussiaas  passed  tlie  entire  mouth  of  August  iu  a 
waiting  attitude;  the  arrival  of  the  reinforcements  ordered 
Mas  awaited  with  impatience,  and  it  was  a  matter  of  grati- 
fication that  the  Turks  did  not  proceed  from  Plevna  to  the 
attack  of  the  line  of  the  Jantra,  The  portion  of  the  XI. 
Corps  which  had  been  present  before  Plevna  since  the  end  of 
Juh'  was  detached  from  the  West  Ami}-  and  employed 
farther  to  the  east;  in  its  place  the  entire  IV,  Corps  and  the 
4th  Roumanian  Division  were  assigned  to'  this  army,  now 
commanded  by  General  Zototf,  the  commander  of  the  IV. 
Corps  and  senior  general  present;  the  4th  Roumanian 
Division,  which  rested  on  the  Vid  at  Riben,  formed  the  right 
wing,  the  IX.  Corps  nor-th  of  the  highroad  to  Bulgareni 
formed  the  center,  and  the  IV,  Corps  south  of  the  highroad 
formed  the  left  wing  of  the  position. 

After  the  completion  of  the  diplomatic  formalities  and 
military  agreements,  the  main  body  of  tlie  RoumaJiiau  Anuy 
(i.  €.,  the  2d  and  3d  Divisions)  crossed  the  Danube  at  Kora- 
bia  (22  miles  above  Xikopolis)  during  the  last  days  of  August. 
The  1st  Division  remained  opposite  Widdin.  The  selection 
of  the  point  of  crossing  raises  the  presumption  that  the  Rou- 
manians were  to  operate  on  the  left  bank  of  the  \Ui  and  to 
invest  Plevna  from  the  west,  but  after  a  few  days  the  two 
Roumanian  divisions  were  brought  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
Vid.  The  Roumanian  Army  of  three  divisions  now  consti- 
tuted the  right  wing  of  the  ^^'est  Army,  over  which  Prince 
Charles  of  Roumania  assumed  command,  the  previous  com- 
mander, Geaieral  Zototf,  becoming  his  chief  of  staff. 


28         Taciicfil  ^^liidics:  o))  the  Jintths  Aroiiiid  Plcnid. 

On  the  31st  of  August,  previous  to  the  arrival  of  the 
Roumanian  Army  on  the  right  banlc  of  the  Vid,  Osman 
Pasha  made  a  vigorous  attack,  south  of  the  Bulgareni  road, 
with  some  25,000  men,  against  the  left  of  the  Russian  posi- 
tions at  Zgalevitza  and  Telisliat.  He  was  rejtulsed  after  a 
long  and  doubtful  struggle,  with  a  loss  of  several  thousand 
killed  and  wounded;  the  Russians  lost  1,000  men. 

The  period  from  the  beginning  of  August  to  the  begin- 
ning of  September,  which,  aside  from  the  action  of  Pelishat, 
was  broken  by  no  noteworthy  event,  was  utilized  by  the 
Russians  for  various  preparations  for  the  great  attack  con- 
templated upon  the  arrival  of  reinforcements. 

The  first  of  these  measures  was  a  thorough  reconnais- 
sance of  the  ground,  which  was  ver^-  much  broken  and  well 
covered  by  the  fire  of  the  Turks.  But  an  accurate  survey 
on  the  scale  of  three  inches  to  the  mile  was  nevertheless 
made,  and  the  resulting  map  was  manifolded  and  distrib- 
uted among  the  troops. 

Fascines,  gabions,  and  scaling  ladders  were  also  pre- 
pared, and  the  troops  practiced  in  escalade;  approaches  to 
the  enemy's  position  as  well  as  lateral  communications 
M'ere  built;  many  large  and  small  bridges  were  repaired  or 
newly  constructed;  the  existing  wells  were  cleaned  and  a 
number  of  ninv  (uies  sunk.particuiarlv  at  suchpointsas  v.i're 
designed  tO'  serve  as  future  dressing  stations;  lastly,  a 
number  of  siege  guns  were  brought  uj),  ]»artly  iu.  order  lo 
employ  heavy  calibers  against  the  Turkish  position,  partly 
to  give  a  moral  support  to  the  troops,  which  had  lost  confi- 


Operntioiis  Aroiin<]  PIciiki.  29 

dejioe  ill  the  field  artillery  iii  the  uctioii  against  the  Turkish 
works. 

At  the  begiiiiiing  of  September  the  long-expected  rein- 
forcements arrived.  They  consisted  of  the  main  body  of 
the  Roumanian  Army,  which  was  posted  on  the  right;  part 
of  the  cavalry  of  Gourko's  former  advance  guard,  two  Dra- 
goon regiments,  oiie  Hussar  regiment,  and  twO'  Don  Cossack 
regiments;  the  siege  artillery  of  20  tw^enty-four-pounders; 
lastly,  on  the  5th  of  September  General  Prince  Imeretinski, 
with  the  2d  Infantry  Division  and  the  3d  Rifle  Brigade,  ar- 
rived from  Lovtcha,  which  he  had  taken  by  assault  on  Sep- 
tember 3d,  after  an  obstinate  and  bloody  struggle,  which 
severed  the  communications  of  Plevna  to  the  southeast;  his 
detachment  for  the  present  took  position  in  rear  of  the  left 
of  the  IV.  Corps. 

The  Rnssian  army  before  IMevna  now  numbered  five 
infantry  divisions  and  one  ritle  brigade,  a  total  of  sixty-four 
battalions.  But  it  may  be  safely  assumed  tliat  the  battal- 
ions crossed  the  Danube  witli  not  more  than  800  elfectives, 
and  it  is  not  probable  that  the  ranks  could  have  been  filled 
with  recruits  by  the  beginning  of  September.  The  losses 
of  the  loth,  20th,  and  30th  of  July  and  31st  of  August  and 
at  Lovtcha  amounted  to  some  12,000  men,  wLih;  the  loss 
from  sickness  dnriug  .July  and  Augusl  must  at  a  mod(n*ate 
calciilalion  l)e  jiIactMl  at  several  thousiuid  men,  so  tliat  the 
number  of  elfectives  of  the  Russian  infantry  before  IMevna 
could  hardly  have  been  more  than  35,000  and  certainly  not 
more  than  40,000  men.     If  we  add  the  artillery,  cavalry,  and 


30         Tacticul  ^hidks  on  the  Battles  Around  Plcrna. 

engineer  troops,  the  total  of  the  Russian  West  Army  was  at 
the  most  50,000  ell'ectives,  to  which  some  25,000  Roumanians 
should  be  added. 

The  number  of  effectives  of  the  Turkish,  army  assembled 
at  Plevna  was  probably  about  50,000  men,  after  making 
allowance  for  the  losses  suffered  in  July  and  August  and 
counting  reinforcements. 

During  the  night  of  the  6th-7th  of  September  the  Rus- 
sian troops  approached  in  deep  silence  mthin  gun-shot  of 
the  Turkish  works  and  threw  up  entrenchments  for  their 
artillery  and  covei'  for  part  of  the  infantry.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  7th  fire  was  opened  on  the  Turkish  positions  and 
continued  until  noon  of  the  11th — almost  without  any  effect 
whateA-er,  as  will  be  seen  later  on.  On  the  left  General 
Skobeleff  began  kis  assault  on  the  "Green  Hills"  on  the  8th, 
and  made  himself  master  of  the  southern  portion  of  that 
irapoi'tant  point  in  a  bloody  struggle  of  three  days.  At 
3  p.  m.  on  the  11th  of  September  a  general  assault  was  made; 
on  the  right  by  the  Roumanians  and  the  IX.  Corps  against 
the  Grivitza  works,  in  the  center  by  the  IV.  Corps  against 
the  Radischevo  works,  on  the  left  by  Skobeleff's  combined 
corps  against  the  Krishin  works. 

The  attack  in  the  center  was  repulsed;  on  the' right  the 
most  advanced  Grivitza.  redoubt,  on  the  left  the  nortliern 
portion  o^f  the  "Green  Hills"  and  two  redoubts  of  the 
Krishin  works,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 

The  Grivitza  redoubt  was  the  only  one,  however,  that 
remained  in  Russian  liands;    after  a  furious  struggle  and 


Operations  Anmml  Plevna.  31 

under  great  losses  ou  both  sides,  the  Turks  made  a  counter- 
stroke  in  force,  regained  the  redoubts  on  the  left,  and  also 
drove  the  Russians  from  the  "Green  Hills." 

As  it  soon  became  clear  that  the  captured  redoubt, 
which  had  been  considered  the  key  point  of  the  hostile  posi- 
tion, was  completely  overlooked  by  the  works  hing  farther 
to  the  rear,  the  assault,  which  cost  the  Russians  about 
12,500  and  the  Roumanians  about  3,000  men,  may  be  consid- 
ered a  total  failure. 

Ujjon  the  unsuccessful  and  costly  issue  of  this  assault 
the  Russians  abandoned  the  idea  of  taking  Plevna  by 
assault,  and  decided  upon  the  conquest  of  Osman  Pasha's 
army  by  means  of  investment  and  starvation.  The  center 
of  gravity  of  the  events  was  thus  shifted  from  the  right  to 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vid. 

On  the  8th  of  September  General  Loshkaretf  crossed  to 
the  left  ba.nk  with  eight  regiments  of  lUissian  and  Rou- 
manian cavalry  and  made  sevea\al  scouting  expeditions.  On 
the  10th  General  Krylotf  took  command  of  all  cavalry  corps 
on  the  left  bank,  but  was  unablei  to  effectually  check  the 
march  of  Turkish  trains  and  reinforcements  from  Sophia 
on  the  road  Orkha.nic^ — Telis — Gonii  Dnbnik.and  the  whole 
attempt  to  invest  Plevna  from  the  west  is  to  be  accounted 
a.  complete  failure. 

In  this  quarter  the  investment  did  n;)t  become  effective 
until  the  arrival  of  the  Guards  and  Grenadiers,  which  for 
the  greater  part  were  assigned  to  the  ojxM'ations  on  the  west 
side.     On  the  24th  of  October  General  Gonrko  willi  greatly 


32         Tdrficdl  »S7//f//('.s'  OH  the  Btifflcs  Around  Plcrim. 

superior  foiccs  nssMulted  and  took  Gorni  Uubuik,  a  sti-ongiy 
fortified  point  on  the  line  of  communications  which,  was 
bravely  defended  by  a  few  thousand  men.  Tells  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  Russians  on  October  2Sth,  after  a  slight  en- 
gagement, and  Dolui  Dubnik  on  November  1st,  without  re- 
sistance. The  line  of  investment  on  the  west  of  Plevna  was 
then  completed  by  the  building  of  a  series  of  stron;4  en- 
trenchments. 

All  communications  of  the  army  in  Plevna  were  now 
severed;  moreover,  to  deprive  it  of  any  hope  of  relief  by 
Mehemed  All's  army,  which  was  assembling  at  Sophia  and 
whose  advance  guard  had  reached  Orkhanie,  strong  Eussian 
detachments  were  pushed  to  the  west  and  south. 

Toward  the  west  A'ratza  was  taken  on  the  9th  of  Novem- 
ber, Rahova  on  the  22d,  and  Lom-Palanka  on  the  30th.  On 
December  1st,  Hying  detachments  advanced  toward  the  di- 
rect line  of  ctmimnnication  with  the  Servians. 

Toward  the  south  Teteven  (on  the  upper  Vid)  was  occu- 
pied on  the  2d  and  the  Rosalita  pass  (on  the  upper  Osma)  on 
the  17th  of  November;  on  the  23d  strong  detachments  took 
Prawez,  between  Orkhanie  and  Etropol,  and  on  the  24:th  the 
latter  place  itself,  whereupon  the  Turkish  advance  guard 
at  Orlvhanie  fell  back  on  the  main  body  at  Sophia. 

Reverting  now  to  the  events  on  the  east  front  of  Plevna, 
we  have  stated  above  that  no  decisive  importance  attaches 
to  tliem  after  the  middle  of  September;  the  question  here 
for  the  Russians  was  partly  one  of  holding  their  positions, 
partly  of  gradually  advancing  the  line  of  investment  so  as 
to  shorten  it  somewhat. 


Ojxrdtioiis  AiokikI  l^hrim.  '6'A 

On  the  17tb  of  September  a.u  attempt  ou  the  part  ef  the 
Turks  to  retake  the  "first"  Orivitza  redoubt  was  repulsed; 
on  the  following-  day  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Kouma- 
nians  to  take  the  so-called  ^'second''  Grivitza  redoubt  also 
failed,  whereupon  trenches  were  resorted  to  for  the  approach 
on  the  Turkish  positions,  the  artillery  meanwhile  maintain- 
ing a  slow  fire,  which  failed  to  elicit  any  reply  from  the  Turks. 

After  pushing-  their  trenches  to  within  thirty  yards  of 
the  enemy's  redoubt,  the  Roumanians  made  a  dash  at  it  on 
the  19th  of  October,  but  were  flung  back  with  great  loss. 

On  the  left  General  Skobeleff  occupied  the  village  of 
Brestovetz  on  the  night  of  November  Ith-oth,  seized  the 
"first  knoir'  of  the  "Green  Hills''  on  November  !)tli.  and 
maintained  himself  in  the  rapidly  entrenched  position 
against  two  hostile  assiiults  launched  against  it  by  the 
Turks  on  the  12th  and  15th  of  November.  The  complete 
investment  of  Plevna  meanwhile  made  itself  felt ;  munitions 
and  provisions  began  to  fail,  and  disease  made  great  rav- 
ages auumg  the  troops,  which  were  poorly  fed,  clothed,  and 
housed.  The  hope  of  relief  from  without  diminished  more 
and  more,  and  Osman  Pasha  was  at  last  compelled  to  relin- 
quish his  stout  and  prdtracted  resistance. 

The  attem]»t  undertaken  with  great  l)ravei*y  on  Decem- 
ber 10th,  of  breaking  through  the  Russian  line  (»f  iuvt^st- 
ment  on  the  west  where  it  was  held  by  two  Grenadier  divis- 
ions, seemed  to  be  without  hope  of  success  and  merely  for 
the  sake  of  sji.ving  tJie  luMior  of  the  Turkish  arms.  Ou  the 
I'a.ilure  of  the  attack,  and  after  the  loss  of  the  pai-tly  aliaJi- 


34        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

doued  and  weakl}-  held  works  on  the  east,  Osman  Pasha 
surrendered  uncouditionally  with  his  entire  army,  whose 
effectives  may  still  have  numbered  some  40,000  men,  not 
counting  some  20,000  sick  and  wounded. 

For  nearly  five  months  Osman^  Pasha  and  his  army 
maintained  themselves  against  a  constantly  increasing  oj)- 
ponent  and  under  the  apparently  overwhelming  fire  of 
a  formidable  artillery.  The  entire  situation  was  altered 
by  this  obstinate  resistance,  and  the  decision  of  the  cam- 
paign, which  at  one  time  seemed  to  become  ripe  dm'ing  the 
year  of  1877,  w^as  staved  off  until  1878.  The  results  gained 
by  Osman  Pasha  and  his  army  may  therefore  be  justly  re- 
garded as  surpassing  their  own  expectations. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  cannet  be  denied  that  the  re- 
peated reverses  suffered  at  Plevna  helped  toward  the  Rus- 
sian final  success.  Timely  attention  was  called  to  the  de- 
fective character  of  the  -whole  Russian  plan  of  operation, 
and  much  greater  forces  than  originally  contemplated  were 
brought  to  the  theater  of  war,  which  rendered  a.  subsequent 
successful  and  decisive  conduct  of  the  war  possible. 

Had  the  Russian  Army  succeeded  in  reaching  Adrian- 
ople  in  August,  1877,  without  the  interlude  of  Plevna,  peace 
might  have  been  made  under  stipulations  much  more  ac- 
ceptable to  Turkey  than  those  now  to  be  expected. 


Plevna.  35 


PART   in. 


PLEVNA. 


1.     Geographical  Conditions. 

Plevna  is  situated  in  the  center  of  a  great  agricultural 
district  on  the  great  road  from  Sophia  to  Rustchuk,  in  the 
valley  of  the  Tutchenitza  brook,  a  right  branch  of  the  Vid. 
From  here  radiate  important  roads  to  Nikopolis  in  the  north, 
Widdin  in  the  west,  to  Orkhanie  and  Sophia  in  the  south- 
west, to  Lovtcha  and  Trojan  in  the  south,  to  Selvi  and  Tir- 
nova  in  the  southeast,  and  lai^tly,  as  previously  stated,  to 
Biela  and  Rustchuk  in  the  east. 

Appreciating  the  importance  of  Plevna  as  an  industrial 
and  commercial  center,  Midhat  Pasha,  the  former  Governor- 
General  of  the  Danube  Province  (Tuna-Vilajet),  decided  to 
connect  the  town  with  the  Danube  by  railway. 

Nikopolis  was  at  first  intended  to  be  the  terminus  of  the 
I'oad;  but  closer  examination  showed  this  place  unsuited 
for  a  commercial  depot  and  the  requisite  harbor  construc- 
tion, and  Midhat  decided  to  establish  a  new  commercial 
center,  to  be  named  'Tort  Sultanie,"  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Osma,  west  of  Nikopolis.  From  this  latter  place  the  road 
was  to  ascend  the  valley  of  the  Osma  for  some  distance  and 
reach  Plevna  by  way  of  Metchka,  Kojulowza,  and  Griv- 
itza.     For  the  construction  of  the  road-bed.  which  consisted 


30         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

for  liie  most  part  of  fillings,  Midhat  Pasha  collected  some 
20,000  Bulgarian  laborers;  the  requisite  timber  was  taken 
from  the  forests  at  the  foot  of  the  Balkans. 

4 

Soon  afterward  Midhat  was  recalled  from  his  position, 
the  enterprise  was  allowed  to  lapse,  and  few  vestiges  of  the 
work  remain. 

We  will  now  examine  the  communications  radiating 
from  I'levna: 

(a)  From  Plevna  to  Nikopolls,  25  miles,  by  way  of  Caly- 
sovat  and  Bresljaniza. 

(6)  From  Plevna  to  Widdin. — The  road  from  Plevna  to 
Rahova  is  35  miles  across  the  deep  valleys  of  the  Isker  and 
its  branches. 

Rahova  is  a  Bulgarian  commercial  town,  situated  in 
a  narrow,  level  valley  between  receding  mountains.  The 
Turks  had  constructed  some  redoubts  on  the  surrounding 
heights  in  order  to  make  it  serve  as  a  poist  on  the  communi- 
cations betvN'een  Plevna  and  Widdin.  The  distance  from 
Rahova  to  Lom-Palanka  on  the  Danube  is  35  miles,  and  from 
there  is  Widdin  is  also  35  miles. 

A  good  road  leads  southward  from  Rahova  to  Vratza 
(40  miles);  from  Yratza  there  is  a  direct  road  to  Plevna 
(60  miles),  which  crosses  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Isker  and  fol- 
lows that  stream  in  its  further  course.  All  the  roads  named, 
except  thehighroad  Rahova — Vratza,  are  country  roads  which 
cross  the  deep-cut  valleys  of  the  Ogost,  Isker,  and  Skit  at 
various  points. 

(c)    The  Great  Road  from  Plevna  to  Orhhanie  and  Sophia 


Plevna.  37 

was  built  during  Midbat  Paslia's  governorsliip.  and  sui- 
passes  most  of  the  Turkish  roads  in  being  well  paved  and 
wide  enough  to  permit  two  four-horse  wagons  to  pass  each 
otheratany  point;  a  telegraph  line  follows  the  road  through- 
out its  lengih. 

From  Plevna  the  road  runs  westward,  crosses  the  Md 
(3  miles),  runs  southwesterly  across  undulating  ground  to 
Dolni  (Lower)  Dubnik  (0  miles)  and  Telis  (10  miles).  sMitli- 
ward  to  Lukovitza  (9  miles)  and  Jablonitza  (12  miles),  west- 
ward to  Orkhanie  (20  miles),  then  soutJnvard  to  the  Balkan 
pass  of  Babakonak  (12  miles),  and  from  here  westward  to 
Sophia  (30  miles). 

{(!)  From  Plevna  to  Lovtcha  and  Trojan. — From  Ple\na 
to  Lo^'tcha  (elevation  000  feet)  20  miles,  from  here  upstream 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Osma  to  Trojan  (elevation  1,100 
feetj  also  20  miles.  Trojan  is  situated  at  the  junction  of  the 
Balabanka  with  the  Osma  and  numbers  GOO  houses  with 
3,500  inhabitants  in  a  dislT^^'ict  almost  exclusively  inhabited 
by  Bulgarians.  South  of  Trojan  is  the  wealthy  liulgarian 
monastery  which  was  the  center  of  the  Bulgarian  insurrec- 
tion of  1807.  From  Ti-ojan  the  road  leads  to  the  pass  of 
Trojan,  which  has  an  eleA'ation  of  5,000  feet. 

(e)  Fi-07n  Plevna  to  Lovtcha  and  Tirnova. — A  highroad 
runs  the  entire  distance:  from  IMcvna  to  Lovtcha.  on  the 
Osma  20  miles,  from  there  to  Selvi  on  the  Rusitza  (left  branch 
■  of  the  Jantra)  20  miles,  thence  to  Tirnova  on  the  Jantra  25 
miles.  From  Selvi  a  road  leads  southward  to  the  Rosalita 
pass,  whicli  has  aji  elevation  of  L400  feet  and  is  distant 


38        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

from  Selvi  30  miles,  and  6  miles  north,  of  Kalifer.       Tlie 
Rosalita  pass  is  25  miles  to  the  west  of  the  Shipka  pass. 

(/)  Frojn  Plevna  to  Rustchnk. — From  Plevna  the  great 
road  (prolongation  of  the  Sophia  road)  leads  to  Bulgareni  on 
the  Osma  (25  miles),  thence  to  Biela  on  the  Jantra  (30  miles), 
and  lastly  to  Rustchuk  (25  miles). 

2.     TopograpMcal  Conditions. 

Plevna  was  a  well-built  town  of  17,000  inhabitants,  one- 
half  of  whom  were  Mohammedans,  with  3,100  houses,  18 
mosques,  and  2  Christian  churches.  It  is  situated  on  the 
Tutchenitza  brook,  3  miles  above  its  junction  with  the  river 
Vid.  Higher  up  on  the  brook  lies  the  village  of  Tutchenitza, 
from  which  the  brook  derives  its  name. 

Just  below  Plevna  the  Tutchenitza  brook  is  joined  by 
the  Grivitza  brook,  which  comes  from  the  eaist  and  is  so 
called  from  the  village  of  GriWtza  on  its  upper  course. 

The  entire  country  surrounding  Plevna  on  the  east 
may  be  divided  into  three  sections :  the  section  north  of  the 
Grivitza  brook,  the  ijiiddle  section  between  Grivitza  and 
Tutchenitza  brooks,  the  section  between  Tutchenitza  brook 
and  the  Vid  river. 

The  heights  skirting  the  right  bank  of  the  Vid  closely 
approach  the  river  at  Bivolar  and  Opanetz  in  the  nortliern 
and  at  Oltschages  in  the  southern  section;  above  Plevna 
the  valley  of  the  Tutchenitzia  is  a  steep,  narrow  ravine,  but 
expands  below  the  town  and  forms  a  broad  plain  enclosed 
by  mountains  .on  the  north  and  south. 

In  the  northern  section  the  great  road  Plevna — Bui- 


Plevna.  39 

gareni — Biela  follows  the  northern  bank  of  the  Grivitza. 
The  heights  which  form  the  northern  edge  of  the  Grivitza 
amd  Tutchenitza  brooks,  and  whose  southern  slopes  are 
very  abrupt,  ai-e  divided  by  the  ravine  of  Bukova  into  a 
western  and  eastern  portion,  the  former  lying  between  the 
ravine  named  and  the  Vid  river,  the  latter  between  the 
ravine  of  Bukova  and  another  ravine  extending  northward 
from  Grivitza. 

The  plateau  forming  the  section  between  the  Grivitza 
and  Tutchenitza  brooks  is  furrowed  by  three  smaller  ra- 
vines: from  Grivitza  southward  extends  the  ''southern 
Grivitza  ravine,"  from  the  Tutchenitza  valley  eastward  the 
"Radischevo  ravine,"  and,  between  the  two,  from  Plevna 
Boutheastward,  the  "middle  ravine."  The  eastern  edge  of 
the  southern  Grivitza  ravine  and  the  northern  edge  of  the 
Radischevo  ravine  were  covered  with  brush  and  gr()u])s  of 
trees;  the  slopes  of  the  steep  and  deep  Tutchenitza  ravine 
\v  ere  covered  for  the  most  part  with  vineyards. 

The  southern  portion  of  the  southern  section  has  be- 
come known  as  the  "Green  Hills,"  and  was  thickly  covered 
with  trees,  vines,  and  high  corn-flelds;  to  the  east  it  forms 
three  sharply  separated  knolls,  which'  are  designated  from 
south  to  north  as  "first,"  "second,"  and  "third"  knoll; 
the  two  depressions  inten-ening  between  the  knolls  open 
into  the  Tutchenitza  ravine.  The  Lovtcha  road  follows  the 
western  edge  of  the  latter  ravine  and  crosses  the  "Green 
Hills."  The  noHhern  part  of  this  section  between  Plevna 
and  the  Vid  river,  and  separated  from  the  "Green  Hills"  by 


-iu         Tdclicdl  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  I'lvrnd. 

a  depression  running:  east  and  west,  seems  to  overtop  the 
entire  country  around  Plevna. 

From  Plevna  tlie  great  road  to  Sophia  follows  the  left 
bank  of  the  Tutohenitza  to  the  Vid  and  crosses  that  river  on 
a  well-constructed  wooden  bridge,  which  is  140  paces  in 
length  and  rests  on  stone  piers. 

S.  Fortifivdtions. 
At  the  beginning  of  July  Plevna  was  without  any  forti- 
fication whatever;  about  the  middle  of  July,  at  the  time  of 
the  first  attack,  probably  but  few  points  of  the  town  itself 
were  prepared  for  defense,  as  the  monastery  at  the  east- 
ern exit  of  the  town.  Toward  the  end  of  July  the  con- 
struction of  works  on  the  surrounding  heights  was  taken 
in  hand  with  great  energy;  at  the  time  of  the  great  attack 
on  July  .30th  most  of  the  commanding  points  in  the  vicinity 
were  entrenched,  and  subsequently  the  whole  position  was 
thoroughly  fortified,  partly  by  the  erection  of  new  works, 
partly  by  completing  and  strengthening  those  already  in 
existence.  To  the  west  of  the  Bukova  ravine  was  the 
Bukova  redoubt  (a) ;  east  of  the  Bukova.  ravine  the  so-called 
second  Grivitza  redoubt  (6);  close  in  front  of  Grivitza 
the  first  Grivitza  redoubt,  also  called  Abdul  Kerim 
Tabia  (c);  to  the  southwest  of  the  last  was  the  eastern  Rad- 
ischevo  redoubt,  also  called  Central  redoubt  or  Haflz  Bey 
Tabia  (d);  further  to  the  west  on  the  edge  of  the  Tutchenitza 
ravine  the  western  Radischevo  redoubt  or  Tutchenitza 
redoubt  (e);  lastly,  north  of  the  *'Green  Hills"  the  Krishin 
redoubt    [f).     All  these    works    were    very    large,    of    very 


Plevna.  41 

strong  profile,  and  provided  in  the  interior  witli  large  hol- 
low traverses  prepared  for  artillery  defense;  in  front  and 
on  the  sides  of  the  redoubts  were  several  lines  of  rifle- 
trenches,  which,  partly  by  the  use  of  the  natural  slopes  and 
partly  by  artificial  construction,  rendered  a  defense  by  tiers 
of  rifle  fire  possible  on  a  large  scale. 

In  second  line  were  a  number  of  smaller  works  to  guard 
communication  between  those  works  and  with  the  town. 

Between  the  Krishiu  redoubt  and  the  town  two  re- 
doubts were  subsequently  built,  which  were  taken  and  again 
lost  b}'  Skobeleft"  on  the  11th  and  12th  of  September;  in 
rear  of  the  Krishin  redoubt  was  the  camp  of  the  Turkish 
reserves,  protected  by  a  number  of  works. 

On  the  west  bank  of  the  Vid  a  sort  of  bridge-head  was 
constructed  in  front  of  the  bridge;  the  space  from  there 
northward  to  the  mouth  of  the  Netropolie  brook  was  covered 
by  two  additional  works. 

Lastly  let  us  quote  here  a  brief  description  of  the  exter- 
nal aspect  of  the  Turkish  works  as  given  by  an  eye-witness. 
at  the  beginning  of  September: 

"As  viewed  from  the  Russian  batteries,  the  surround- 
ings of  Plevna  appeared  as  a  hilly  plateau  about  5  miles  in 
width,  bounded  on  the  right  .and  left  by  continuous  ridges 
(the  Grivitza  heights  and  tJie  "Gr^en  Hills");  in  the  back- 
ground, hidden  in  a  depression,  was  Plevna.  On  first  sight 
the  entire  plateau  offered  nothing  unusual  to  the  eye;  on 
closer  observation,  however,  a  series  of  entrenchments 
might  be  seen  which  looked  like  yellowish  bands  on  the  gen- 


42         Tactical  Stmlies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

eral  green  ground.  Even  with  the  aid  of  tlie  field-glass, 
details  could  not  be  distinguished;  most  conspicuous  were 
the  three  foremost  redoubts — on  Lhe  right  the  Grivitza  Re- 
doubt, on  the  left  the  Radischevo  woncs,  and  farther  in  rear 
an  entrenched  camp." 


The  Action  <if  I'ltriia.  ^3 


PART    IV. 

THE  AC^TION  AT  PLEVNA  ON  JULY  20TR 

1.     Adranrc  on  Plcriia  on  Jiilj/  ]t)tJi. 

On  July  IStli  Lieutenant-General  Schilder-Sclnilduer, 
commander  of  the  V.  Infantry  Division,  received  orders  from 
General  Kriidener  to  advance  with  two  regiments  (Arch- 
angel, No.  17,  and  Wologda,  No.  18)  of  his  division,  four 
batteries,  and  the  9th  Don  Cossacks,  from  Nikopolis  on 
Plevna  and  to  take  possession  of  that  place.  Additional 
troops  from  beyond  the  Osma  were  also  placed  under  his 
orders;  at  Bulgareni,  25  miles  from  Nikopolis,  ten  sotnias* 
of  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade  with  a  battery,  also  one 
battalion  of  the  Kostroma  Regiment,  number  10 ;  at  Poradim, 
12  miles  nearer  Plevna,  the  remainder  of  the  19th  Regiment, 
a  battery,  and  two  sotnias  of  Cossacks. 

Oeneral  Schilder-Schuldner  gave  directions  to  the  Kos- 
troma Regiment  to  assemble  at  Poradim,  and  then  to  march 
to  Zgalevitza,  arriving  at  2  p.  m.  July  19th.  The  Cossack 
iBrigade  was  ordered  to  nuirch  to  Tutchenitza. 

During  the  night  of  -Inly  18tli-l!Mli  Liciitcnant-General 
Schilder-Schuldner  bivouacked  with  tlic  infantry  brigade 
and  artillerv  at  the  moulh  of  the  Osnia,  and  arrived  on  the 


"The  sotnia  is  the  squadron  of  the  Cossacks.     'I'lit  word  means  "a  hiitidred," 
but  the  sotnia  varies  from  100  to  200  men. — A.  h.  W. 


■14         Tactical  Sttidies  on  the  Battles  Around  PIcrna. 

afternoon  of  the  19th  before  Plevna  (21  miles).  Finding 
the  place  occupied  by  the  Turks,  he  opened  fire  from  his 
guns  and  continued  the  cannonade  until  dark,  and  then  went 
into  bivouac  in  front  of  the  town. 

The  9th  Don  Cossacks  had  started  toward  Plevna  sepa- 
rately from  the  infantry,  bivouacked  at  Riben  on  ihe  night 
of  the  18th-19th,  and  seem  to  have  remained  there  during 
theforenoonof  the  19th.  While  they  were  cooking,  the  sound 
of  guns  was  heard  fr.om  Plevna  (10  miles)  about  3  p.m.  The 
camp-kettles  were  emptied  at  once,  and  the  regiment  marched 
to  within  '1^  miles  of  Plevna,  where  a  small  Turkish  infantry 
detachment  was  encountered.  Half  a  sotnia  dismounted 
and  began  a  fight,  which  lasted;  until  dark.  Covered  by  a 
chain  of  outposts  consisting  of  two  sotnias,  the  regiment 
bivouacked  in  view  of  Plevna, 

The  Kostroma  Eegiment  with  the  battery  and  the  two 
attached  sotnias  reached  Zgalevitza  at  the  designated  hour 
and  sent  both  sotnias  forward  to  reconnoiter  toward  Plevna, 
In.  rear  of  the  village  of  Grivitza  a  hostile  camp  was  discov- 
ered, from  which  about  three  hundred  men,  one  infantry 
battalion,  and  two  guns  started  to  meet  the  Cossacks,  who 
fell  back  on  their  infantry. 

On  tlie  evening  of  the  19th  the  troops  of  Schilder-Schuld- 
ner  were  posted  in  four  separate  groups  as  follows: 

The  9th  Don  Cossacks — 6  sotnias — on  the  extreme  right 
north  of  Plevna. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  5th  Division— 6  battalions,  32 
guns — to  the  northeast  of  Plevna. 


The  Acf ion  at  Pinna.  45 

The  Kostroma  Regiment — 3  battalions,  2  sotnias,  S  guns 
— southeast  of  rievna  at  Zgalevitza. 

The  Cossack  Brigade — 10  sotnias,  6  gun» — south  of 
Plevna  at  Tutchenitza. 

The  whole  detachment,  which  did  not  number  more  than 
9,000  men,  was  in  a  crescent-shaped  position  10  miles  in  ex- 
tent, facing  a  concentrated  enemy  at  least  twice  its  strength. 
Late  in  the  evening  Schilder-Schuldner  issued  orders  for  the 
attack  at  5  o'clock  on  the  next  morning;  the  Kostroma  Regi- 
ment received  the  order  at  2  a.  m. 

2.  The  Attack  on  Plevna  on  July  20th. 
At  4  a.  m.  Turkish  troops  advanced  from  Plevna  against 
the  9th  COiSsacks  and  opened  fire  with  artillery.  The  out- 
posts of  the  Cossacks  were  assembled,  dismounted,  and 
occupied  the  edge  of  a  wood  on  the  extreme  right.  As  the 
Turkish  infantry,  and  artillery  advanced  against  this  posi- 
tion, a  report  of  the  situation  was  dispatched  to  General 
Schilder-Schuldner,  who  sent  two  infantry  companies  and  a 
battery  to  support  the  regiment.  The  shrapnel  fire  of  this 
battery  soon  caused  the  Turks  to  seek  cover.  Without 
further  engagement  both  sides  remained  facing  each  oth(^r 
until  noon,  when  the  Cossack  regiment  was  ordered  to  cover 
the  withdrawal  of  the  infantry.  The  regiment,  which  had 
for  the  most  part  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot,  mounted  and 
moved  to  the  left  to  interpose  itself  between  the  withdraw- 
ing infantry  and  the  enemy;  a  Turkish  cavalry  detachment 
advancing  in  pursuit  was  driven  back.  At  0  ]>.  m.  the  regi- 
ment was  at  IJrvslan. 


•i<'>         Tdcticdl  Sfudir.s  on  the  Battles  Aroiiitd  Plevmi. 

The  maiu  body,  posted  aloug  the  road  from  Nikopolis  to 
Plevua,  bi'ou<'iit  three  batteries  into  action  at  4:45  a.  m. 
against  two  Turkish  batteries;  soon  afterward  the  brigade 
deployed  on  the  west  of  the  road  in  the  following  order:  to 
the  left  of  the  batteries  one  battalion  of  the  Archangel  Regi- 
ment, to  the  right  tw^o  battalions  of  the  Archangel  and  two 
battalions  of  the  Wologda  Regiment — all  live  battalions  in 
two  lines  of  company  columns.  The  rifle  company  (fifth  com- 
pany of  each  battalion)  was  deployed  in  front  as  skirmishers; 
one  Wologda  battalion  with  a  battery  formed  the  reserve, 
from  which  the  batter}^  and  two  companies  were  soon  after- 
ward dispatched  to  the  extreme  right  to  support  the 
Cossacks. 

In  front  of  the  Russian  position  was  a  ravine  which 
opened  into  the  Vid  valley  at  Riben;  the  further  edge  of  the 
ravine  was  covered  with  bushes  and  held  by  hostile  rifle- 
men; in  rear  of  the  ravine  w^ere  the  heights  on  which  the 
so-called  second  Grivitza  redoubt  and  the  Bukova  redoubts 
were  subsequently  built. 

At  5:30  a.  m.  the  Russians  advanced  to  the  attack 
all  along  the  line;  the  Archangel  Regiment  on  the  left  en- 
countered obstinate  resistance  and  did  not  make  much  head- 
way; the  Wologda  Regiment  on  the  right  and  the  nearest 
comiJanies  of  the  Archangel  Regiment  drove  the  hostile 
skirmishers  back  and  reached  the  town  itself,  where  furious 
street-fighting  began.  The  Turks  brought  forward  rein- 
forcement after  reinforcement  and  the  losses  of  the  Rus- 
sians increased  at  an  alarming  rate.     The  brigade  commander 


The  Action  at  Plevna.  47 

was  wounded,  the  commander  of  the  Wologda  Regiment 
was  killed,  and  the  commander  of  the  5th  Artillery  Brigade, 
as  the  senior  officer  present,  assumed  command;  the  posi- 
tion was  held  for  the  present. 

Up  to  9:30  a.  m.  (jeneral  Schiider-Schuldner  was  with- 
out any  information  of  the  doings  of  the  Kostroma  Regi- 
ment; at  that  time  he  received  a  report'tliat  the  commander 
of  the  Kostroma  Regiment  had  been  killed,  and  that  the 
attack  of  the  regiment  was  not  making  headway.  Receiving 
reports,  from  several  sides,  of  the  total  exhaustion  and  great 
losses  of  the  troops,  and  having  no  reserves  at  hand,  he  or- 
dered the  infantry  to  retire  at  11:30  a.  ni.,  the  9th  Cossack 
Regiment  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  infantry. 

Upon,  the  witlidrawal  of  the  Archangel  and  ^\'o]()g(la 
Regiments,  seventeen  ammunition  carts  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Turks,  partly  because  they  were  shot  to  pieces,  partly 
because  the  teams  were  killed.  The  retreating  brigade  was 
relieved  by  the  Galitz  Regiment  (of  same  division),  which 
was  coming  up  from  Nikopolis,  and  in  the  evening  botli 
bivouacked  at  Brysla.n. 

At  5  a.  m.,  after  a  brief  preparation  by  arHUery  lire,  the 
Kostroma  Regiment  advanced  to  the  attack,  along  ihe  high- 
road from  Plevna  to  Bulgareni,  against  the  height  on  which 
subsequently  the  first  Grivitza  redoubt  (Abdul  Kerini  Taliiai 
was  built.  The  regiment  deployed  the  2d  and  3d  battalions 
in  two  lines  of  companj^  columns,  the  two  rifle  companies  in 
front  as  skiraiishers,  the  1st  battalion  in  reserve;  the  two 
sotnias  were  on  the  i-iglit  flank. 


48         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Three  lines  of  rifle-trenches  were  taken  by  the  regiment 
one  after  tlie  other, and  linally  also  tlic  intreuchmeiits  on  the 
height  of  the  subsequent  Abdul  Kerim  Tabia;  the  assail- 
ants here  captured  a  gun  which  had  been  dismounted  by  the 
fire  of  the  Russian  artillery. 

Throw^n  back  to  the!  town,  the  Turks  offered  furious 
resistance  from  behind  hedges  and  walls.  The  losses  of  the 
Kostroma  Regiment  increased  from  minute  to  minute;  the 
regimental  commander,  three  field  officers,  most  of  the  other 
officers,  and  a  large  part  of  the  men  were  dead  or  wounded. 
The  ammunition  of  the  infantry  and  the  artillery,  which 
had  followed  the  assaulting  infantry  to  within  effective 
infantry  fire,  began  to  run  short.  For  these  reasons  the  regi- 
ment fell  back  at  9  a.  m.,  when  the  Turks  were  bringing  for- 
ward fresh  reserves  to  the  counter-attack.  In  order  to  ap- 
proach the  main  body,  the  retreat  was  made  in  a  different  di- 
rection from  that  of  the  attack,  and  the  men's  packs  which 
had  been  taken  ofl"  before  the  assault,  fell  into  the  enemy's 
hands. 

As  the  action  began,  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade 
moved  from  Tutchenitza  to  Radischevo. 

Since  the  ground  impeded  the  movements  of  the  cavalry 
and  as  the  mountain  battery  attached  to  the  brigade  could 
produce  no  effect  on  the  hostile  position,  owing  to  its  small 
caliber,  the  brigade  moved  more  to  the  right  to  connect  with 
the  Kostroma  Regiment.  At  10  a.  m.,  when  the  brigade 
reached  Grivitza,  the  Kostroma  Regiment  was  in  retreat,  in 
which  the  Cossack  Brigade  joined. 


The  Action  at  Plevna.  49 

The  Turkish  pursuit  did  not  extend  beyond  the  original 
foremost  Turkish  positions. 

3.     Losses. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  5th  Division  lost  1  general,  51 
field  and  company  officers,  and  1,878  men;  it  is  to  be  noted 
here  that  in  the  assault  on  Xikopolis.  a  few  days  before,  the 
Archangel  Eegiment  lost  12  men,  the  Wologda  Regiment 
6  officers  and  256  men ;  the  loss  of  the  brigade,  whose  effect- 
ive strength  can  hardly  have  been  more  than  5,000  men, 
therefore  amounts  to  almost  2,000  men  for  the  two  days  of 
the  15th  and  20th  of  July. 

On  July  20th  the  Kostroma  Regiment  (which  suffered 
no  losses  at  Nikopolis)  lost  at  Plevna  7  officers  and  359  men 
killed,  and  15  officers  and  534  men  wounded. 

The  losses  of  the  Cossacks  and  of  the  artillery  are  not 
stated,  but  they  can  not  have  amounted  to  much. 

The  Turks  claim  to  have  captured  a  Russian  gun  on 
that  day;  nothing  reliable  is  known  about  it;  it  may  have 
been  a  gun  of  the  5th  Battery  of  the  31st  Brigade,  since  this 
battery  accompanied  the  assaulting  Kostroma  Regiment  to 
within  range  of  infantry  fire. 

Comments. 
1.  That  the  supreme  command  attached  so  little  im- 
portance to  the  reports  which  reached  Tirnova  on  the  17th  of 
July  about  hostile  columns  approaching  the  Vid  from  the 
west,  and  that  it  treated  the  occupation  of  Plevna  as  of  in- 
ferior importance,  are  matters  which  can  be  commented  on 


50         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  AroKiid  Plcrna. 

only  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  idea  entertained  of  the 
whole  situation  at  that  time.  Why  was  not  a  strong  body 
of  cavalry,  a  division,  or  at  least  a.  brigade,  dispatched  to 
Plevna  in  the  middle  of  July  during  the  struggle  around 
Nikopolis?  Being  an  important  junction  point  of  roads, 
25  miles  from  Nikopolis  and  barely  43  from  the  point  of  pas- 
sage at  i^istova,  Plevna  was  well  worth  that  much  attention, 

2.  The  advance  of  General  Schilder-Schuldner's  weak 
detachment  in  two  widely  separated  columns  against  an 
enemy  of  unknown  strength  was  imprudent;  although,  in 
view  of  the  actual  positions  of  the  troops,  a  separation  could 
not  be  avoided,  an  attempt  should  have  been  made  to  unite 
the  two  detachments  before  proceeding  to  the  attack. 

The  march  of  the  Nikopolis  column  under  General 
Schilder-Schuldner,  when  considered  by  itself,  invites  un- 
favorable criticism.  Instead  of  sending  his  Cossack  Regi- 
ment forward  at  once  to  cover  his  march,  the  general  led  his 
infantry  directly  on  Plevna,  without  caring  for  the  where- 
abouts of  his  cavalry  and  without  having  given  it  specific 
instructional.  On  arri\'^l  before  the  town  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  19th  he  had  no  cavalry  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  in 
front  or  to  establish  communication  with  the  other  column; 
he  was  unable,  on  the  one  hand,  to  learn  anything  of  matters 
in  and  around  Plevna,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  he  seems  to 
have  been  uncertain  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  other  detach- 
ments. The  cannonade  opened  on  Plevna  appears  to  have 
been  a  cover  behind  which  he  hid  his  painful  perplexity,  but 
it  had  the  good  effect  of  informing  the  other  detachments  of 
the  whereabouts  of  the  main  column. 


The  Action  at  Pier ua.  51 

Some  time  after  the  beginning  of  the  cannonade,  the  9th 
Cossack  Kegiment  made  its  appearance;  not  only  had  it  not 
preceded  the  infantry  on  the  march  to  Plevna,  but  it  had  re- 
mained far  in  rear.  On  tlie  night  of  July  18th-19th  the 
bivouac  of  the  Cossack  Regiment  at  Riben  was  but  10  miles 
from  Plevna,  while  the  bivouac  of  the  infantry  on  the  same 
night  was  22  miles  from  that  place.  By  proper  management 
the  Cossacks  would  have  had  plenty  of  time  to  thoroughly 
reconnoiter  the  vicinity  of  Plevna  before  the  arrival  of  the 
infantry;  but  at  the  moment  when  the  infantry  arrived  and 
the  artillery  opened,  the  Cossacks  were  still  quietly  resting 
at  Riben  and  in  the  act  of  cooldng.  This  can  be  explained 
in  no  other  way  except  that  the  commander  of  the  Cossack 
Regiment  was  not  properly  informed  of  the  contemplated 
movement;  and  the  fact  that  this  infantry,  marching  at  ran- 
dom toward  the  enemy,  did  not  suffer  a  heavy  defeat  on  the 
19th,  is  probably  due  to  the  incredible  clumsiness  of  the 
Turkish  troops  in  offensive  movements. 

Turning  to  the  march  of  the  other  column,  we  lind  the 
infantry  provided  with  two  sotnias  of  Cossacks,  which  were 
properly  employed  in  reconnaissance.  However,  the  em- 
ployment of  the  Cossack  Brigade,  which  was  also  attached  to 
this  column,  can  not  be  considered  proper. 

The  brigade  marched  25  miles,  from  P>ulgareni  to  Tut- 
chenitza,  while  the  infantry  column,  which  marched  from 
Bulgareni  to  Zgalevitza,  covered  almost  an  equal  distance. 
It  is  true  that  small  patrols  were  sent  out  from  Tiitchenitza, 
but  complete  infoi-mation  Mt  llie  sit  nation   was  not   gained. 


52         Tactical  Sttidks  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

According  to  recent  ideas  on  the  employment  of  advanced 
bodies  of  cavalry  in  the  Russian  Army,  one  would  expect  the 
Cossack  Brigade  to  move  rapidly  on  Plevna,  reach  there 
about  noon,  make  a  feint  against  the  town  from  the  south 
under  cooperation  of  the  horse  artillery,  and  endeavor  to 
advance  with  several  sotnias  between  the  town  and  the  river 
against  the  bridge  over  the  Vid.  Whether  Plevna  was 
occupied  feebly  or  not  at  all,  in  any  event  sufficient  informa- 
tion would  have  been  gathered  without  exposing  the  brigade 
to  great  risk. 

3.  The  attack  of  the  two  regiments  of  Archangel  and 
Wologda.on  the  morning  of  July  20th  was  made  without 
sufficient  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  position  and  without 
any  preparation  by  the  fire  of  skirmishers ;  the  preparation 
of  the  attack  by  artillery  did  not  last  more  than  half  an  hour. 
From  the  very  beginning  five  of  the  six  available  battalions 
were  led  to  the  attack  against  the  wholly  unknown  position 
of  the  enemy;  the  only  battalion  kept  in  reserve  was  very 
soon  called  upon  to  detach  two  companies  to  the  right  to 
sn])port  the  Cossacks,  so  that  there  was  no  real  reserve  at  the 
disposal  of  the  leader  for  use  in  emergencies  or  after  clearer 
knowledge  of  the  situation. 

The  same  may  be  stated,  of  tlie  attack  of  the  Kostroma 
Regiment;  although  one-third  of  the  troops  was  nominally 
set  aside  as  reserve,  it  was  almost  as  soon  engaged  in  the  con- 
flict as  the  two  other  battalions. 

4.  The  expenditure  of  ammunition  in  the  six  hours  of 
this  action  seems  to  have  been  verv  great,  since  almost  all 


The  Action  at  Plevna.  53 

the  ammunition-carts  were  brought  up  and  emptied.  The 
Russian  infantry  carried  60  rounds  in  the  pouches,  and  in 
addition  each  company  was  provided  with  a  three-horse 
ammunition-cart.  More  than  one-half  of  the  ammunition- 
carts  of  the  1st  Brigade  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Turks. 


54         TacticKiI  ^^tiidics  on  the  Battles  Around  Flenia. 


PART    V. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  PLEVNA  ON  JULY  30TH. 

1.     Positio7i  of'  the  troo]))<  on  the  Evening  of  July  Wth. 

At  Bryslan,  9tli  Lancers,  9th  Don  Cossacks,  2d  Don*  Cos- 
sack Battery — 10  squadrons  and  6  guns. 

At  Koioulovtsij,  81st  lufantr}'  Division  (less  the  \Vov- 
onesh  (124)  Regiment  and  1  battery  at  Sistova) — 9  battal- 
ions and  40  guns. 

At  Tristenik,  5tli  Infantry  Division  (less  Kostroma  Regi- 
ment, No.  19,  and  1  battery  at  Nikopolis) — 9  battalions  and  40 
guns. 

At  JCaragatch,  2d  Brigade  of  the  30th  Infantry  Division, 
with  3  batteries — 6  battalions  and  24  guns. 

A.i  Poradiin,  1st  Brigade  of  the  30th  Infantry  Division, 
1st  Brigade  of  the  32d  Lifantry  Division,  6  foot  batteries,  1st 
Brigade  of  the  11th  Cavalry  Division,  and  1  horse  battery — 
12  battalions,  8  squadrons,  54  guns. 

At  Bogot,  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade  with  the  Sth 
Don  Cofesacks  and  the  mountain  horse  battery — 12  sotnias 
•  and  12  guns. 

Total,  36  battalions,  30  squadrons,  and  176  guns,  among 
which  were  80  nine-pounders,  72  four-pounders,  18  horse,  and 
0  mountain  guns. 

The  line  Brvslan — Poradim — Bogot  was  about  25  miles 


The  Batth  of  Plevixt.  55 

long  and  formed  an  arc  of  a  circle  whose  radius  was  about 
12  miles  and  whose  center  w^as  at  Plevna.  The  left  at  Bogot 
was  12  miles  from  Lovtcha,  w'hich  was  held  by  the  Turks; 
the  right  at  Brvslan  was  the  same  distance  from  Xii^opolis. 
The  distance  from  the  center  of  the  position  at  Poradim  to 
the  Osma  bridge  in  rear  at  Bulgareni  was  also  12  miles. 

2.     Dispositions  for  the  Battle. 

(a)  Right  flank  cavalry  detachment,  under  General  Losh- 
kareff,  to  start  at  0  a.  m.  from  Brvslan,  covered  the  right 
flank  and  observed  as  far  as  the  Vid. 

(&)  Right  King,  under  Lieutenant-Genera  1  Wilhelminoff 
(31st  and  oth  Infantry  Divisions),  to  attack  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion north  of  the  highroad — the  5th  Infantry  Division  in 
reserve. 

(c)  Left  u-ing.  under  Lieutenant-General  Prince  Shakof- 
skoi  (1st  Brigade  of  the  30th  Division  and  1st  Brigade  of  the 
32d  Division),  to  march  at  5  a.  m,  from  Poradim  and  attack 
the  position  between  Grivitza  and  Radischevo. 

(d)  Left  flank  cavalry  detachment,  under  Major-General 
Skobeleff,  to  march  at  5  a.  m.  from  Bogot,  take  position  on 
the  Lovtcha  road  and  watch  the  country,  particularly  in 
the  direction  of  Lovtcha.  Tlie  detachment  was  reinforced 
from  Prince  Sha.kofskoi's  command  by  the  3d  Battalion  of 
the  Kursk  Regiment,  No.  125,  and  4  guns. 

Both  cavalry  detachments  had  orders,  in  case  of  the  ene- 
my's retreat,  to  cross  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  and  bar  the 
enemy's  road  to  Sophia  if  possible. 

(f)  General  reserre.  under  personal  command  of  Lienten- 


56         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Flevna. 

ant-General  Kriidener  (2d  Brio;ade  of  the  30th  Infantry  Di- 
vision, 2  squadrons  each  of  the  11th  Dragoons,  and  11th 
Lancers,  1  horse  battery ;  total,  6  battalions,  4  squadrons,  and 
30  guns),  was  posted  with  the  infantry  at  Poradim  and  the 
cavalry  at  Pelishat. 

S.    Deployment  for  Battle  and  the  Artillery  Combat  up  to 
2:30  p.  m. 

The  right  icing  completed  its  deployment  by  7  a,  m.  The 
first  line  consisting  of  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  31st  Division 
with  6  battalions  and  24  guns,  in  second  line  the  Kosloff 
Regiment,  No.  123,  with  3  battalions  and  16  guns. 

About  10  o'clock  the  5th  Infantry  Division,  consisting  of 
9  battalions  and  24  guns,  was  posted  in  third  line. 

At  8:15  a.  m.  the  first  gun  was  fired  by  the  Turks;  the 
24  Russian  guns  in  first  line  directed  their  fire  on  the  flashes 
of  the  enemy's  guns,  the  fog  being  so  dense  that  the  enemy's 
position  could  not  be  seen;  all  that  could  be  observed  in 
front  was  a  wide  ravine  densely  covered  with  brush  and  hos- 
tile skirmishers  and  2  guns  at  its  further  edge. 

By  9  a,  m.  the  fog  had  settled  so  far  that  the  large 
Grivitza  redoubt  became  visible,  against  which  the  Russian 
guns,  reinforced  by  the  batteries  in  second  line,  now  directed 
their  fire.  The  ground  did  not  permit  of  placing  more  than 
40  guns  in  battery.  The  artillery  combat  thus  opened  was 
continued  until  2:40  p.  m. 

The  left  wing  occupied  the  village  of  Radischevo  by  9 
a.  m.  without  firing  a  shot;  the  1st  Brigade  (numbering  5 
battalions  and  28  guns  after  reinforcing  Skobelefif)  of  the 


The  Battle  of  Plevna.  57 

32d  Division  deployed  on  the  heights  to  the  east  and  north  of 
the  village;  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  30th  Division  was  kept  in 
reserve  and  posted  at  first  on  the  road  from  Pelishat  to 
Radischevo,  subsequently  nearer  to  Radisehevo. 

At  10  a.  m.  the  Turks  opened  the  artillery  combat,  which 
was  taken  up  by  the  Russians  and  continued  until  2:30  p. 
m.;  the  infantry  meanwhile  not  firing  a  shot.  In  the  course 
of  the  cannonade  two  Turkish  batteries  ceased  firing,  the 
redoubt  north  of  Radischevo  (Hafiz  Bey  Tabia)  had  suffered 
severe!}',  three  Russian  guns  were  rendered  unserviceable 
and  the  battery  had  to  be  relieved  from  the  reserve. 

4-     Attack  of  the  Russian  Right  Wing. 

At  2:40  p.  m.  Lieutena,nt-General  Knidi^ner  ordered 
Lieutenant-General  Wilhelminoff  to  proceed  to  the  attack  of 
the  Grivitza  redoubt  in  two  columns:  one  from  the  north 
and  one  from  the  east.  The  north  column  consisted  of  the 
Penza  Regiment  and  2d  and  3d  Battalions  of  the  Kozloff 
Regiment;  on  the  east  General  Wilhelminoff  himself  with  the 
Tamboft"  Regiment  and  1st  Battalion  of  the  Kozloff  Regi- 
ment; the  right  column  was  followed  by  a  reserve  of  G  bat- 
talions (Archangel  and  ^Yologda  Regiments),  the  left  by  3 
battalions  (Gfilitz  Regiment). 

The  1st  Penza  Battalion,  which  led  the  right  column, 
took  the  first  line  of  trenches  on  the  near  side  of  the  ravine, 
but  was  brought  to  a  halt  by  the  murderous  fire  from  a  sec- 
ond line  just  behind  it.  The  2d  Penza  Battalion  advajiced 
on  the  left  of  the  first,  carried  the  second  liiu^  of  ritlc- 
trenches.  crossed  the  ravine  with  the  retreating  Turks,  and 


68         Tactical  ^'<1ii(li('S  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

approached  the  redoubt.  The  third  line  of  trenches  in  front 
of  the  redoubt  was  also  taken,  the  assailants  ensconced 
themselves  in  it,  and  a  part  of  them  rushed  for  the  redoubt. 
After  the  commander  of  tlie  2d  Battalion,  who  had  placed 
himself  at  the  head  of  the  assailants,  was  killed  on  the  para- 
pet, the  attack  was  repulsed;  the  efforts  of  the  rest  of  the 
regiment  to  take  the  redoubt  were  equally  fruitless.  After 
losing  29  officers  and  1,000  men  by  the  murderous  infantry 
fire  from  the  redoubt  and  flanking  rifle-trenches,  the  Penza 
Eegiment  retreated  in  considerable  disorder. 

The  two  Kozlofi"  Battalions  of  this  column  then  ad- 
vanced to  the  attack,  penetrated  to  the  redoubt,  and  a  part 
reached  the  ditch,  where  the  regimental  commander  fell 
pierced  by  three  bullets.  The  assailants  did  not  succeed 
in  taking  the  breastwork,  but  maintained  themselves  in  the 
ditch,  both  sides  keeping  up  a  murderous  fire  at  short  range. 

At  this  time  Lieutenant-General  Schilder-Schuldner 
brought  up  from  the  right  the  last  reserves  of  the  column 
consisting  of  the  Archangel  and  Wologda  Regiments;  he 
crossed  the  ravine  and  took  the  trenches  on  the  side  from 
whence  up  to  this  time  the  Kozloff  Regiment  had  received 
flanking  fire;  but  the  attack  of  these  six  fresh  battalions 
on  the  redoubt  itself  also  failed. 

The  left  column  of  four  battalions  under  Lieutenant- 
General  Wilhelminoff,  which  moved  from  the  east  and  more 
in  the  direction  of  the  highroad,  came  under  such  severe  fire 
that  the  attack  was  stopped  without  reaching  the  redoubt. 


The  Bat  lie  of  I'Irnia.  £9 

the  men  openiuo-  what  s<'emed  to  be  a  verv  ineffective  lapid 
fire. 

The  Galitz  Re^dment,  which  formed  the  reserve  of  this 
column,  havinoalso  been  bronjilit  up, the  attack  was  renewed 
and  again  repulsed. 

At  6  p.  m.,  after  the  infantry  attack  had  lasted  over  three 
hours,  the  situation  of  the  rig^ht  wing  was  as  follows:  the 
three  battalions  of  the  Penza  Regiment,  almost  destroyed 
by  its  losses,  seem  to  have  withdrawn  from  the  fighting  line 
altogether;  the  remnants  of  fifteen  battalions,  shot  to  pieces 
and  badly  intermixed,  maintained  themselves  in  the  space 
between  the  redoubt  and  ravine,  partly  to  the  east,  partly  to 
the  north  of  the  former. 

As  early  as  4  p.  m.  the  whole  Koloma  Regiment  had  been 
drawn  from  the  general  resen^e  to  support  the  left  wing. 
At  0  p.  m.  one  battalion  of  the  Serpuchoff  Regiment,  with 
some  cavalry  and  artillery,  was  dispatclied  to  the  extreme 
right  to  check  the  retrograde  movement  beginning  there, 
leaving  but  two  fresh  battalions,  two  squadrons,  and  some 
artillery  as  general  reserve. 

Toward  sundown  Cxeneral  Kriidener  ordered  a  renewed 
attack,  to  support  which  he  sent  forward  three  companies 
of  the  reserve,  followed  subscMpiently  by  three  more  com- 
panies. Three  successive  assaults  were  repulsed;  in*  the 
last  the  commander  of  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  :i()th  Division 
was  wounded  within  100  paces  of  the  redoubt. 

Darkness  had  meanwhile  settled  down,  but  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  the  redoubt  a  wild  and  disorderly  conflict  was  con- 


60        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Flevna. 

tiiiued  with  uninterrupted  firing  and  cheering.  Under  these 
circumstances,  Kriidener  abandoned  all  hope  of  a  favorable 
turn  of  the  struggle  and  gave  the  order  to  retreat.  The  last 
Serpuchoff  Battalion  of  the  reserve,  the  Galitz  Regiment  of 
the  left  column,  which  had  suffered  least,  and  the  Woronesh 
Regiment,  which  had  just  arrived  on  the  field  from  Sistova, 
were  ordered  to  cover  the  retreat.  These  troops  took  up  the 
action,  under  cover  of  w^hich  the  wounded  were  collected 
bj  means  of  the  available  transportation. 

The  conflict  raged  around  the  redoubt  during  the  whole 
night;  at  daybreak  the  last  detachments  retreated  and  it 
was  not  until  11  a,  m.  on  July  31st  that  the  troops  of  the 
right  wing  were  assembled  at  Tristenik  and  Karagatch, 

No  pursuit  took  place. 

5.     The  Attack  of  the  Russian  Left  Winf/. 

At  2:30  p.  m.  Prince  Shakofskoi  sent  forward  the  Kursk 
and  Rylsk  Regiments  (five  battalions)  on  the  two  redoubts 
between  the  highroads  to  Lovtcha  and  Bulgareni.  In  front 
of  the  redoubts  three  and  four  lines  of  trenches  had  been 
constructed:  The  trenches  were  taken  after  a  furious  strug- 
gle and  the  Turks  thix)wn  back  on  the  redoubts,  whereupon 
the  Rylsk  Regiment  moved  on  the  eastern,  the  Kursk  Regi- 
ment on  the  western  redoubt.  The  eastern  redoubt  was  car- 
ried after  a  brief  struggle;  two  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  assailants,  the  Turks  succeeding  in  removing  ten  other 
guns  from  the  fortification  in  good  time. 

The  assault  on  the  western  redoubt  presented  greater 
difficulties.     On  advancing  against  this  redoubt  the  Kursk 


The  Battle  of  Flenia.  01 

Regiment  was  taken  in  left  fianlv  by  tlie  fire  of  a  battery  and 
skirmishers  in  action  on  the  edge  of  the  Tutchenitza  ravine, 
while  in  front  on  both  sides  of  the  redoubt  dense  lines  of 
closed  infantry  appeared  to  receive  the  assailants  with  a 
murflerous  fire  at  a  range  of  200  to  300  paces.  To  support 
the  attack,  some  companies  of  the  Rylsk  Regiment  advanced 
at  this  critical  moment  from  the  captured  eastern^redoubt 
and  the  1st  Shuja  Battalion  from  the  reserve  came  up  on 
the  left,  while  the  artillery  of  the  left  wing,  reinforced  by 
fresh  batteries  from  the  reserve,  advanced  at  the  same  time. 
The  attack  was  successful  and  the  western  redoubt  was  also 
taken,  but  the  losses  were  very  heavy.  The  commander  of 
the  Rylsk  Regiment,  although  wounded,  retained  command 
of  his  regiment;  the  commander  of  the  Shuja  Regiment, 
leading  his  first  battalion  in  person,  fell  mortally  wounded, 
but  ordered  the  soldiers,  who  wanted  to  carry  him  off,  to 
leave  him,  and  encouraged  his  men  to  advance.  Matters 
had  reached  this  stage  at  5  p.  m. 

Prince  Shakofskoi  received  from  General  Kriidener  the 
information  that  the  Koloma  Regiment  and  a  battery  from 
the  general  reserve  had  been  dispatched  in  support  of  the 
left  wing.  In  fact,  however,  the  regiment  did  not  reach  its 
destination,  but  became  embroiled  in  the  general  conflict  on 
the  extreme  right  of  the  left  wing  without  producing  a  visi- 
ble effect  on  the  course  of  the  action. 

As  the  Turks  were  proceeding  to  the  counter-attack  with 
fresh  forces,  Shakofskoi,  in  the  hope  of  using  the  Koloma 
Regiment  as  reserve,  brought  tlie  2d  and  3d  Shuja  Battalions 


62         Tact  leal  ><tudies  on  the  Battles  AioiiikJ  PIciiki. 

from  his  own  reserve  to  the  support  of  liis  right,  which  left 
him  but  three  fresh  battalions  of  the  Ja.roslof  Regiment  in 
reserve;  two  batteries  were  brought  forward  from  tlie  riglit 
of  the  artillery  position  and  posted  to  the  right  of  the  east- 
ern redoubt.  Soon  afterward  the  1st  Jaroslof  Battalioit  was 
ordered  forward  to  support  the  left. 

Wi^i  the  beginning  of  darkness  the  Turks  made  a  new 
counter-attack,  this  time  with  considerable  bodies  of  cavalry 
on  both  flanks,  endeavoring  to  turn  the  Russian  position.  To 
su])poi't  the  hard-pressed  left,  another  Jaroslof  battalion 
came  forward  from  the  reserve,  while  a  battery  advanced 
boldly  into  action  almost  on  the  flank  of  the  Turkish  attack 
and  took  it  under  efl'ective  fire. 

Shakofskoi  decided  to  retreat,  although  the  Turkish 
attack  was  repulsed;  ten  of  his  eleven  battalions  were  in 
action  and  reduced  by  severe  losses;  all  the  troops  were 
completeh^  exhausted  and  no  reinforcements  were  at  hand 
or  in  prospect  to  oppose  the  frequently  renewed  attacks  of 
the  Turks.  The  retreat  was  begun  in  good  order,  the  two 
captured  guns  having  to  be  left  behind;  the  troops  at  first 
took  up  the  position  on  the  heights  close  in  front  of  Rad- 
ischevo  which  they  had  in  the  morning,  and  passed  the  night 
there.     Next  morning  they  withdrew  to  Poradim  unmolested. 

6.     Attach  of  the  Left  Flank  Detachment. 

Meanwhile  General  Skobeleff  was  making  his  last  at- 
tack, presently  to  be  described,  thereby  rendering  the  posi- 
tion of  Shakofskoi's  left  less  difficult. 

Under  cover  of  the  dense  fog,  Skobeleff  had  moved  from 


The  Battle  of  Phrna.  (33 

Bogot  unmolested  to  Krishin,  where  he  halted  his  main  body 
and  advanced  in  person  with  two  sotnias  and  four  guns  to 
within  650  yards  of  the  edge  of  the  western  suburb  of  Plevna. 
From  this  point  he  observed  some  20,000  infantry  in  close 
reserve  formation  between  the  heights  of  the  Grivitza  re- 
doubt and  the  town,  while  cavahy  was  seen  in  rear  toward 
the  Vid. 

At  10  a.  m.  ^^hakofskoi's  guns  were  heard,  and  Skobeleff 
ordered  his  four  guns  to  open  fire,  which  was  at  once  replied 
to  by  six  Turkish  guns.  Shortly  afterward  quite  a  number 
of  Turkish  guns  took  up  the  fire,  and  infantrj^  columns  with 
skirmishers  in  front  and  cavalry  on  the  flanks  moved  to  the 
attack  of  Skobeleff. 

Before  this  overwhelming  attack  Skobeleff  withdrew  to 
his  main  position  at  Krishin  and  made  the  following  dis- 
positions: 

1.  Colonel  Tutolmin  with  three  sotnias  and  twelve 
horse  guns  remained  on  the  height  of  Krishin,  fronting  to- 
ward Lo'V'tcha  witli,  strong  Cossack  posts  i)ushed  out  beyond. 

2.  One  sotnia  was  sent  to  the  left  toward  the  Vid  in 
observation,  and  twenty  volunteers  under  an  officer  were 
charged  with  discovering  a.  ford  for  use  in  case  the  dctacli- 
ment  should  have  to  cross  to  the  left  bank  to  move  on  the  en- 
emy's communications.  The  detachment  of  volunteers  ac- 
complished its  object  to  Skobelelf's  complete  satisfaction. 

3.  One  sotnia  was  detached  to  the  liglit,  witli  orders 
to  keep  up  conimunicalion  with  Sliakofskoi.  from  wliose 
position  Skobeleff  was  separated  by  ilic  steep  and  nxky 


64        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Tutchenitza  ravine;  throughout  the  day  it  reported  all  that 
took  place  on  Shakofskoi's  side. 

Skobeleff  advanced  with  four  remaining  sotnias,  the  3d 
Kursk  Battalion,  and  the  four  foot  guns  toward  Plevna  to 
reoccupy  the  position  he  had  held  before  and  from  which  the 
Turks  might  direct  an  effective  fire  against  the  flank  of 
Shakofskoi's  troops. 

Skobeleff  at  first  moved  to  the  attack  with  one  and  a 
half  companies,  two  sotnias,  and  the  four  guns,  keeping  the 
rest  of  his  detachment  in  reserve  in  case  he  should  be  at- 
tacked from  the  direction  of  Lovtcha.  This  small  detach- 
ment occupied  the  commanding  height  close  in  front  of 
Plevna  and  maintained  itself  there  from  10  a.  m.  to  4  p.  m. 
against  eight  Tuirkisih  battalions  supported  by  artillery, 
which  made  repeated  attacks  against  the  Eussian  position. 
By  4  p.  m,  Skobeleff  had  become  convinced  that  no  danger 
was  impending  from  Lovtcha;  and  he  was  informed  that 
Shakofskoi  was  making  a  decisive  attack.  On  receipt  of 
this  information  he  left  but  half  a  company  in  reserve  and 
led  three  companies  forward  to  support  his  hard-pressed 
detachment.  When  within  a  few  paces  of  the  guns  the 
Turks  were  driven  back  as  far  as  the  edge  of  the  town  by 
a  sudden  bayonet  charge. 

■  Supported  by  the  four  guns,  the  Kursk  Battalion  with- 
stood for  two  hours  thei  repeated  attacks  of  the  Turks.  It 
was  only  at  dusk  that  Skobeleff  ordered  the  retreat.  To  cover 
the  withdrawal  of  the  infantry  and  guns  and  the  removal  of 
the  wounded,  the  Cossacks  advanced  repeatedly  to  the  at- 


The  Batik  of  Plevna.  65 

tack,  mounted  and  dismounted.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the  de- 
tachment at  Krishin  at  10  p.  m.  SkobelefE  received  Shakof- 
skoi's  order  to  withdraw  to  Bogot  and  Pelishat. 

7.     Losses. 
The  Russian  losses  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  are 
given  as  169  officers  and  7,136  men. 

Some  details  of  the  official  tables  of  losses  are  inter- 
esting. 

The  regiments  of  the  30th  Divsion  lost  in  killed  and 
wounded : 

Jaroslof,  No.  117 2.38  men. 

Shuja,  No.  118 114  men. 

Koloma,  No.  119 85  men. 

Serpuchoff,  No.  120 214  men. 

Details  of  the  losses  of  the  regiments  of  the  5th  and 
31st  Divisions  (IX.  Corps)  cannot  be  ascertained,  since  the 
losses  at  Nikopolis  and  in  the  two  battles  of  Plevna  are  not 
separately  given. 

The  losses  of  the  two  regiments  of  the  XL  Corps  on  the 
left  of  the  first  line,  which  captured  the  two  redoubts  north 
of  Radischevo,  were  quite  severe. 

Kursk  Regiment,  No.  125  (part  of  tlie  regi- 
ment was  in  action  under  Skobeleff). . . . 

336  men  killed. 

Rylsk  Regiment,  No.  126.  .725  men  killed. 

8.     The  Panic  at  Sistova. 
The  following  events,  although  very  slightly  connected 


6(i         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  A  round  Pleriin. 

with  the  battle  of  Plevna,  are  here  stated  as  forming  an  inter- 
esting contribution  to  the  history  of  confusion  created  by  a 
false  alarm. 

At  noon  on  July  31st  the  first  wounded  from  the  battle- 
field of  Plevna  reached  Sistova  from  Bulgareni,  saving  that 
the  battle  was  lost  and  that  it  was  rumored  that  a  transport 
of  wounded  while  en  route  had  been  attacked  by  Turkish  cav- 
alry and  cut  down.  The  statement  created  consternation 
among  the  inhabitants  of  Sistova  and  among  the  men  of  new 
Bulgarian  druschinas  which  were  being  formed  there;  a 
large  portion  of  these  men  started  for  the  pontoon  bridge 
below  the  town  with  the  cry,  ''The  Turks  are  coming!"  Here 
a  large  number  of  empty  provision-wagons  were  halting  on 
the  Bulgarian  bank,  their  destination  being  Zimnitza,  A 
drunken  Cossack  on  an  unsaddled  horse,  preceding  the  swarm 
of  fugitives,  galloped  toward  the  bridge  crying,  "The  Turks 
are  in  Sistova!''  whereupon  a.  terrible  confusion  ensued  in 
the  train,  all  the  wagons  trying  to  gain  the  bridge ;  the  swarm 
of  fugitives  from  Sistova  also  rushed  upon  the  bridge. 

The  commander  of  the  bridge  (General  Eichter,  of  the 
Engineers),  who  happened  to  be  on  the  north  bank  at  the 
time,  ordered  the  small  detachments  at  his  disposal  to  close 
the  bridge  by  force  of  arms  if  necessary;  through  his  ener- 
getic intervention  he  succeeded  in  restoring  order;  mean- 
while word  came  from  the  commander  of  Sistova  that  the 
report  was  false  and  that  no  Turks  were  in  sight  at  all.  To 
allay  the  uneasiness  of  the  inhabitants  the  Kussian  detach- 
ments stationed  in  the  town  had  meanwhile  taken  a  defen- 
sive position  in  front  of  the  town. 


The  Battk  of  Plevna.  07 

The  bridge  being  closed,  swarms  of  fugitives  crossed  tlie 
Danube  by  boat  (in  whicli  operation  several  i)ersons  were 
drowned);  they  soon  spread  tlie  false  alarm  in  Zimnitza: 
"The  Turks  have  taken  the  bridge!  The  Turks  are  march- 
ing on  Zimnitza !  The  Turks  are  crossing  from  the  right  to 
the  left  bank  on  four  steamers!" 

The  entire  population  and  a  large  part  of  the  wounded 
in  the  hospitals  began  to  fly;  after  much  trouble,  Cossack 
patrols  succeeded  in  bringing  the  fugitives  back  to  town. 
The  confusion  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  at  the  time  of 
the  arrival  of  the  first  alarming  news  a  detachment  of  Turks, 
captured  in  fonner  engagements,  happened  to  be  conducted 
through  Zimnitza.. 

Comments. 
1.  Greueral  Kriidener,  although  nominally  commander- 
in-chief,  seems  to  have  occupied  himself  chiefly  with  his  own 
(IX.)  corps,  which  formed  the  right  wing,  and  to  have  left 
the  conduct  of  the  left  wing  without  reservation  to  Prince 
Stiakofskoi,  commander  of  the  XI,  Corps.  This  fact  became 
evident  in  the  dispositions  made  by  Kriidener  for  tlu'  ])()si- 
tion  and  attack  of  the  IX.  Corps  (although  that  corps  had  an 
acting  commander  in  th(»  person  of  General  AN'ilhelminof), 
wiiile  he  left  these  details  on  the  other  w'ing  to  General 
Shakofskoi.  Moreover,  Kriidener  ordered  the  right  wing 
(with  which  he  remained  exclusively)  to  attack  at  2:40  p.  m., 
after  Shakofskoi  had  begun  the  attack  of  the  left  wing  at 
2:;>0  p.  m.  on  lijs  own  responsibility.     In  uniform  conduct 


6 8         Tactical  Studies  on  th e  Battles  Around  Plevna . 

of  the  baj;tle  by  a  common  superior,  General  Krudener  is 
therefore  out  of  the  question. 

2.  A  striking  point  in  the  disposition  is  the  weakness 
of  the  general  reserve  consisting  of  one-sixth  of  the  avail- 
able battalions.  The  disruption  of  the  unity  of  the  30th  In- 
fantry Division  is  also  surprising;  one  of  its  brigades  was 
combined  with  a  brigade  of  another  division  to  form  the  left 
wing,  while  the  other  brigade  of  the  former  division  was 
held  in  reserve;  the  reason  may  have  been  a  desire  of  plac- 
ing under  Prince  Shakofskoi's  orders  the  only  infantry  bri- 
gade of  his  corps  present  (1st  of  the  32d  Division). 

The  brigades  and  divisions  being  posted  in  lines  in  rear 
of  each  other  instead  of  abreast  caused  a  complete  disrup- 
tion of  the  larger  tactical  units  in  the  course  of  the  battle. 
This  was  particularly  noticeable  in  the  IX.  Corps,  where  it 
would  have  been  far  more  appropriate  to  have  fonned  each 
of  the  great  wing  columns  of  an  entire  division. 

3.  General  Kriidener  is  said  to  have  reconnoitered 
the  enemy's  position  in  person  on  the  day  preceding  the  bat- 
tle; the  same  was  done  by  Colonel  Biskupski,  chief  of  staff 
of  the  XI.  Corps,  in  the  portion  south  of  the  highroad  Bul- 
gareni — Plevna,  which  was  assigned  to  the  left  wing  as  its 
field  of  attack.  Both  reconnaissances  seem  to  have  been 
conducted  in  a  very  general  way.  For  several  days  the 
Eussians  had  been  in  comparatively  close  proximity  to  the 
enemy,  yet  a  thorough  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  position 
does  not  seem  to  have  taken  place;  sufficient  information 
had  not  been  gained  about  the  details  of  the  terrain  in  front, 


The  Battle  of  Plevna.  60 

or  about  the  fortifications  of  the  Turks.  Had  this  been  done, 
the  dense  fog  which  covered  the  field  during  the  first  hours  of 
the  artillery  combat,  and  which  was  not  favorable  to  the  eflB- 
cacy  of  the  Russian  artillery  fire,  might  have  been  turned  to 
good  account  by  the  Russians  in  maskingthe  advance  of  strong 
skirmish  lines  against  the  Turkish  position.  It  would  have 
been  possible,  for  instance,  to  capture  the  great  ravine  in 
front  of  the  Grivitza  redoubt  without  much  difficulty  and 
with  comparatively  small  loss,  thus  securing  from  the  be- 
ginning an  intermediate  position  favorable  to  subsequent 
attack  on  the  redoubt. 

Skobeleff's  bold  and  skillful  mode  of  proceeding  on  the 
extreme  left  demonstrates  that  the  fog  could  be  taken  advant- 
age of  for  reconnaissance  and  attack  of  the  enemy's  position. 

4.  Nowhere  was  the  Russian  attack  ushered  in  hj  the 
fire  of  skirmishers.  After  the  cannonade,  whose  effect  seems 
to  have  been  small,  the  Russian  infantry,  which  up  to  this 
time  had  not  fired  a  shot,  moved  in  dense  masses  to  the  at- 
tack, which  was  frontal  throughout  and  unaccompanied  by 
any  attempt  to  turn  the  enemy's  flank. 

The  chief  strength  of  the  Turkish  position  did  not  lie  in 
the  redoubts  which  have  attracted  the  most  attention,  but  in 
the  tiers  of  rifle-trenches  in  front  and  flank  of  the  redoubts. 
In  order  to  capture  a  position  entrenched  in  this  manner  it  is 
evidently  not  so  important  to  penetrate  into  the  redoubts  as 
to  carry  the  trenches  on  the  flanks,  in  which  case  the  redoubt 
would  be  isolated  and  unable  to  hold  out  for  any  length  of 
time. 


70         Tactical  IStndks  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

But  the  method  of  the  right  wing-  in  its  attaclc  is  not 
based  on  sucli  an  idea.  The  nine  battalions  in  the  first  line 
were  formed  in  two  columns  and  moved  from  north  and  east 
against  the  great  redoubt  in  rear  of  the  village  of  Grivitza; 
the  entire  second  line  was  attached  to  these  two  columns 
from  the  beginning  and  moved  off  with  them,  so  that,  prop- 
erly speaking,  all  of  the  eighteen  battalions  of  the  right 
wing  were  out  of  hand  of  the  leaders  from  the  very  begin- 
ning of  the  .attack. 

If  we  examine  the  details  of  the  action,  we  find  the  two 
columns  advancing  against  the  redoubt  on  a  narrow  front 
and  under  effective  flank  fire  from  some  rifie-trenches  at  the 
side. 

Of  the  right  column,  five  battalions  advanced  succes- 
sively on  the  redoubt;  each  battalion  reached  the  enemy 
when  the  preceding  battalion  had  been  used  up;  each  bat- 
talion lost  a  large  part  of  its  men  under  the  fire  from  the 
rifle-trenches  which  swept  the  approaches  to  the  redoubt; 
of  each  battalion  only  fragments  got  into  the  ditch  of  the 
redoubt,  where  they  maintained  a  hopeless  and  desperate 
struggle,  in  which  a  large  part  of  the  officers  and  the  brav- 
est of  the  men  found  their  death;  further  tactical  availabil- 
ity of  these  five  battalions  was  out  of  the  question. 

The  six  battalions  of  the  Archangel  and  Wologda  Regi- 
ments, brought  up  from  the  reserve  to  support  the  attack, 
at  last  turned  on  the  rifle-trenches,  the  gauntlet  of  whose  mur- 
derous fire  the  preceding  assailants  of  tht*  redoubt  had  run. 
These  rifle-trenches  were  taken  after  a  furious  struggle,  but 


The  Battle  of  Plevna.  71 

now  these  six  battalions  were  also  expended,  for  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that  these  battalions,  whose  strength  at  the 
beginning  of  July  w^as  probably  less  than  5,000  men,  had  lost 
more  than  2,000  men  and  the  greater  part  of  their  officers  in 
the  bloody  actions  of  the  loth  and  20th  of  July.  Attempts 
made  by  fractions  of  the  battalions  to  take  the  redoubt 
failed  and  added  to  the  losses,  and  henceforth  these  bat- 
talions were  likewise  no  longer  to  be  regarded  as  tactical 
bodies,  but  as  a  disorganized  mass  of  more  or  less  brave 
men  on  which  the  higher  leaders  could  no  longer  exert  any 
influence,  since  most  of  the  officers  were  dead  or  wounded. 
The  conditions  with  the  left  (east)  column  were  similar. 
Here  also  the  battalions  of  the  second  line  became  early  in- 
volved in  the  action;  all  frontal  attacks  against  the  redoubt 
were  repulsed  with  great  loss,  cliieflii  hi/  the  fire  from  the  rifle- 
trenehes,  which,  on  this  part  of  the  field,  were  not  captured 
at  all. 

All  available  troops  of  the  right  wing  (IS  battalions) 
were  expended  and  out  of  hand  before  the  Turkish  reserves 
moved  to  the  counter-attack. 

On  the  whole,  the  attack  of  the  Russian  left  wing  was 
conducted  more  correctly,  and  therefore  with  more  success. 
The  five  battalions  of  the  first  line  made  their  attack  without 
preparation  by  fire,  but  simultaneously  on  a  broad  front, 
and  supported  by  one  battali<»n  from  the  reserve  and  the  Are 
of  several  batteries  also  advancing  upon  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion. The  battalions  of  the  first  line  succeeded  in  capturing 
both  redoubfs  au<l  Wvo  rifle-treiiclics  in  fi-itnt  and  (in  1  lie  Hank, 


7^         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

wliilei  five  fresh  battalions  of  the  second  line  remained 
available. 

The  Turkish  counter-attack,  effectively  supported  by 
artillery  and  swarms  of  skirmishers  in  a  flanking  position 
along  the  Tutchenitza  ravine,  was  repulsed  with  the  aid  of 
three  battalions  gradualh'  brought  forward  from  the  sec- 
ond line. 

At  dusk  the  Turks  began  the  second  counter-attack 
with  fresh  forces;  it  was  repulsed,  it  is  true,  with  the  as- 
sistance of  another  battalion  from  the  second  line,  but  having 
a  single  fresh  battalion  left  to  him,  and  having  learned  of  the 
complete  failure  of  the  attack  on  the  right,  Shakofskoi  did 
not  wait  for  the  third  counter-attack  of  the  Turks,  and 
began  a  well-ordered  retreat,  covered  by  his  last  fresh 
battalion. 

The  course  of  the  action  was  thus  very  different  on  the 
two  wings;  on  the  right  Knidener's  eighteen  battalions 
failed  to  gain  possession  of  the  enemy's  position,  aud  in  this 
wing  the  Turks  were  not  obliged  to  use  their  reserves  at  all 
(in  consequence  of  which  almost  all  of  them  were  sent  against 
Shakofskoi),  and  in  order  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  bat- 
talions engaged,  the  last  troops  of  the  senselessly  squan- 
dered general  reserve  had  to  be  brought  forward.  On  the 
left  Shakofskoi's  first  line  succeeded  almost  single-handed 
in  capturing  the  enemy's  position,  and  the  second  line  was 
only  usedto  repulse  two  strong  counter-attacks  of  theTurkish 
reserves;  and  at  the  termination  of  this  furious  and  costly 
struggle  the  troops  possessed  a  certain  outward  cohesion. 


The  Battk  of  Plcvmt.  73 

which  rendered  tactical  action  and  leading;  possible.  It  can 
not  be  denied  that  the  left  wing  accomplished  much  more 
with  far  inferior  means  than  the  right. 

In  casting  a  parting  glance  at  the  employment  of  the 
"general  reserve,"  we  find  that  shortly  after  the  beginning 
of  the  infantry  attack  it  was  diverted  from  its  proper  pur- 
pose by  direct  orders  of  General  Kriidener  and  distributed 
among  both  wings  as  a  kind  of  special  reserve.  At  4  p.  m. 
the  Koloma  Regiment  was  detached  to  the  left  wing  (where 
it  became  engaged  in  the  general  action  without  plan  or 
effec^t),  and  the  Superchoff  Regiment  was  retained  in  sui)port 
of  the  right  wing.  From  the  moment  of  this  division  the  all- 
too-w^eak  reserve  was  no  longer  able  to  exert  a  decisive  influ- 
ence on  the  general  conflict;  how  the  Superchoff  Regiment 
was  subsequently  squandered  has  been  stated  above. 

Had  the  right  wing  gained  the  same  results  as  the  left, 
compelling  the  Turks  to  expend  part  of  their  reserves  against 
it,  then  a  general  advance  about  dusk  by  tlu*  reserve,  held 
in  hand  until  the  moment,  either  in  the  center  along  the  great 
highroad  or  on  either  flank,  might,  and  probably  would, 
have  produced  a  decisive  result  of  this  bloody  day  in  favor 
of  the  Russian  arms. 

5.  It  becomes  evident  from  the  above  descrijttion  that 
we  can  hardly  speak  of  a  cooperation  of  the  three  arms  in  the 
course  of  the  battle.  The  preparation  of  the  attack  was  left 
exclusively  to  the  artillery;  the  attack  of  the  infantry  re- 
ceived little  assistance  from  the  ai-tillcrv  on  the  left,  and  none 


74        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

at  all  on  the  right;  the  Kussian  cavalry'  took  no  active  part 
in  the  conflict  of  the  main  bodies. 

The  possihilitfj  of  cooperation  of  the  three  arms  in  un- 
favorable terrain  is  demonstrated  by  the  small  left  flank  de- 
tachment under  General  Skobeleff. 

The  conduct  of  the  action  by  this  general  shows  a  rare 
combinaton  of  prudence  and  rashness.  His  personal  and 
thorough  reconnaissance  of  the  ground;  his  careful  arrange- 
ments for  guarding  the  rear  of  his  detachment,  and  for  main- 
taining communication  with  the  main  army;  the  bold  ad- 
vance of  his  small  detachment  close  to  the  enemj'^s  position, 
attracting  disproportionately  large  forces  of  the  enemy 
and  rendering  the  attack  of  the  main  army  correspondingly 
easier;  his  stout  defensive  action,  in  which  infantry,  artil- 
lery, and  cavalry  (both  mounted  and  dismounted)  sup- 
ported one  another  with  great  skill ;  lastly,  upon  learning 
of  the  beginning  of  the  main  attack  on  the  part  of  Shakof- 
skoi's  troops,  his  energetic  offensive,  for  which  he  em- 
ployed his  heretofore  carefully  husbanded  small  infantry 
reserve,  and  the  skillful  and  successful  retreat  under  diffi- 
cult circumstances — are  certainly  worthy  of  great  consid- 
eration and  thorough  study. 


Battle  of  Zgahritza  <ind  PcU.shat.  75 


PART    VI. 

SORTIE  BATTLE  OF  ZOA'LEVITZA  AXL)   PELISHAT 
ON  THE  31ST  OF  AUGUST. 

1.     Position  of  the  West  Artnij  on  the  Morninf/  of  the  Slst 
of  August. 

The  right  of  the  aruiy  was  formed  by  the  4th  Roumanian 
DiYision,  which  was  posted  between  the  Vid  and  the  highroad 
to  Nitopolis ;  the  IX.  Corps  formed  the  center  between  the 
Nikopolis  and  Bulgareui  roads;  the  IV.  Corps  formed  the 
left  between  the  Bulgai*eni  and  Lovtcha  roads. 

The  IV.  Corps  was  commanded  by  General  Kryloff ,  in  the 
absence  of  General  Zotoflf,  who  was  acting  as  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  West  Army.  The  following  positions  were  occu- 
pied on  the  morning  of  the  31st  of  August: 

The  outposts  stood  on  the  line  Bogot — Tutchenitza — 
Radischevo — GrivitzadO  miles)  and  were  furnished  on  the  left 
by  2  squadrons  of  the  4th  Lancers,  on  the  right  by  2  si^uad- 
rons  of  the  4th  Hussars. 

The  corps  was  posted  as  follows:  On  the  left  at  Vv\- 
ishat,  the  regiments  Susdal,No.  02,Uglitz,No.  63,2  squadrons 
of  the  4th  I>ancei*s,  and  probably  4  batteries.  Alxuit  2.0(io 
yards  in  fr(mt  of  the  jjosition  there  was  a  lunette,  (»<•(  iijticd 
by  2  companies  and  2  guns. 

At   Zgalevitza   on   the  riffht   tliere   were  entrenched    2 


70         Tacticdl  Studies  on  Ihv  Baltics  A  yoiiiid  Plevna. 

Shuja  battalions,  2  squadrons  of  the  4th  Hussars,  2  foot 
batteries,  8th  Horse  Battery  of  the  IV.  Corps,  the  Galitz 
Regiment,  No.  20,  with  a  battery  of  the  IX,  Corps;  also  a  sap- 
per company. 

The  regiments  Jaroslof,  No.  117,  Koloma,  No.  119,  Ser- 
puchoff.  No.  120,  and  2  batteries  were  in  reserve. 

The  following  troops  of  the  IV.  Corps  were  absent: 

The  4th  Dragoons  observed  the  valley  of  the  Osma  at 
Karahassan; 

The  A'ladimir  Regiment,  No.  61,  was  on  the  way  from 
Zimnitza  to  join  its  corps  and  had  reached  Karagatch  (8 
miles  west  of  Bulgareni  on  the  great  road) ; 

The  Kazan  Regiment,  No.  64,  '1  Shuja  battalion,  No. 
118,  and  a  battery  were  with  the  corps  of  Prince  Imeretinski 
operating  against  Lovtcha; 

The  position  of  the  4th  Cossack  Regiment  and  3  bat- 
teries at  this  time  cannot  be  ascertained. 

2.     Turkish  Attack,  6:30  a.  m.   until  1  p.  m. 

At  6:30  a.  m.  the  Russian  outposts  reported  that  strong 
Turkish  bodies  were  marching  out  of  the  entrenchments 
south  of  the  highroad  and  advancing  onPelishataud  Zgalev- 
itza  with  a  thick  line  of  cavalry  in  front. 

General  Zotoff  was  at  first  inclined  to  consider  the  re- 
ported movement  a  feint  to  screen  a  serious  attack  against 
either  the  IX.  Corps  or  the  Roumanians.  No  changes  in  the 
position  of  the  troops  were  made  for  the  present. 

The  2  squadrons  of  Lancers  at  Pelishat,  the  2  Hussar 
squadrons,  and  the  horse  battery  at  Zgalevitza  advanced  to 


Battle  of  Zfjalevitza  and  Pdlsluit.  77 

the  support  of  the  haid-pressed  outposts.  In  view  of  the 
strength  of  the  Turkish  cavalry,  which  numbered  2,500 
horses,  the  Lancers  gradually  fell  back  on  Pelishat,  and  the 
Hussar  Regiment  on  Zgalevitza, 

At  8  a.  m.  the  Turkish  cavalry  withdrew  to  the  flank, 
disclosing  a  strong  line  of  infantry,  w'hich  moved  to  the 
attack  on  Pelishat,  The  lunette  was  taken  after  a  brief  but 
fierce  struggle;  its  garrison  fell  back  on  Pelishat,  where  it 
was  relieved  by  5  companies  of  the  Susdal  Regiment.  Af- 
ter 3  batteries  had  cannonaded  the  Turks  for  some  time,  de- 
tachments of  the  Susdal  Regiment  advanced  to  the  attack 
and  recaptured  the  lunette. 

Tow^ard  9  a.  m.  the  Turks  brought  up  considerable  re- 
inforcements; their  right  extended  more  and  more  and 
turned  the  left  of  the  Russian  position;  swarms  of  Bashi- 
bozouks*  penetrated  into  Pelishat  and  set  fire  to  the  village. 
A  new  attack  on  the  lunette  was  repulsed;  opposite  the 
position  of  Zgalevitza  batteries  came  into  action  and  a  can- 
nonade began  on  both  sides. 

At  10  a,  m.,  no  reports  of  any  hostile  movements  having 
been  received  from  the  outposts  of  the  IX.  Corps  and  the 
Roumanian  Division,  General  Zotoff  became  convinced  that 
the  main  attack  was  against  his  left  wing  I'lV.  Corpsi.  and 
issued  the  following  orders: 

(o)  One  brigade  of  the  IX.  Corps  to  advance  at  once  on 
the  highroad  and  attack  the  enemy's  left  flank. 

(&)  The  reserves  of  the  IX.  Corps — 3  regiments  of  the 
30th  Infantry  Division — to  take  position  north  of  I'oradim 

.*Guerinas   or  irreg-iilar  troops.— A.  L.  W. 


78         Tact'icaJ  studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

and  hold  tlieiuselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  commauder-iu- 
chief. 

(c)  The  Vladimir  Reji^imeiit,  Xo.  01,  which  had  reached 
Karagatch,  to  leave  train  and  knapsacks  and  to  march  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  Poradim  to  join  the  general  reserve. 

(d)  The  4th  Roumanian  Division  to  assemble  at  once  at 
( 'alysovat. 

Opposite  the  entire  Russian  position  from  Pelishat  to 
Zgalevitza  the  Turks  deployed  a  long  line  of  infantry  about 
noon;  in  front  of  the  infantry  some  40  or  50  guns  fired  on 
the  Russian  position  aud  were  replied  to  by  the  Russian 
batteries. 

3.     Repulse  of  the  Turkish  Attack,  1  to  5  p.  m. 

Toward  1  p.  m.  the  Turkish  infantry  advanced  to  a  gen- 
eral attack,  which  was  made  in  three  principal  directions: 
against  the  position  of  the  lunette,  against  the  left  flank,  and 
against  the  center  of  the  Zgalevitza  position, 

(a)  The  attack  against  Pelishat  and  the  lunette  in  front 
was  repulsed  in  front  by  the  fire  of  4  batteries;  the  com- 
mander of  the  IV.  Corps,  General  Krylotf,  advanced  against 
the  extreme  right  of  the  assailing  Turks  with  4  squadrons 
of  Lancers,  2  squadrons  of  Hussars,  and  a  horse  battery.  The 
Turks  retired  slowly  and  threw  their  right  well  back  when  it 
was  threatened  by  the  Russian  cavalry. 

(6)  The  attack  on  the  left  of  the  Zgalevitza  position 
struck  1  Galitz  battalion,  No.  20,  and  4  guns.  This  portion  of 
the  position  was  reinforced  from  the  reserve  at  Poradim  by 


Battle  of  Zf/alcvifza  and  PrJishttt.  79 

2  battalions  (Serpiu-lioff.Xo.  120)  aud  a  battery.     The  attack 
of  the  Turks  was  repulsed. 

(c)  The  attack  directed  a  gainst  the  center  of  theZgalev- 
itza  position  was  carried  out  witli  <ireat  energy  and  reached 
the  Russian  rifle-trenches,  but  was  repulsed  by  the  counter- 
attack of  the  Russian  infantry  posted  there — 2  Galitz  bat- 
talions. No.  20,  and  2  Shuja.  battalions.  No.  118;  24  guns  cov- 
ered the  Turks  with  a  murderous  fire  during  their  advance  as 
well  as  during  their  retreat. 

During  the  great  infantry  attack  the  cavalry  of  the 
Tui'kish  left  attempted  to  tuni  the  right  of  the  Zgalevitza 
position;  the  movement  was  discovered  by  the  2  Hussar 
squadrons  posted  ther(%  and  frustrated  without  difficulty  by 
artillery  fire. 

Notwithstanding  their  previous  failure  and  great  loss, 
the  Turks  undertook  a  second  attack  at  ;i  ]).  m.,  well  pre- 
pared by  artillery  and  infantry  fire.  The  attack  was  not 
made  with  the  same  energy-  as  the  first,  and  failed  also. 

On  this  occasion  the  regiments  Susdal  and  TTglitz  of  the 
left,  and  2  battalions  each  of  the  regiments  Galitz  and  Shuja 
of  the  right  wing,  made  an  attempt  to  take  the  offensive, 
but  were  checked  by  a  Turkish  counter-attack  undertaken 
l»artly  by  fresh  troops  and  su])ported  by  severe  fire  of  heavy 
artillery.  whereu]»on  the  Russian  battalions  fell  back  to  their 
original  positions.  At  4:30  p.  m.  the  Turks  began  their  re- 
treat to  IMevna.  under  the  cover  of  a  heavy  artillery  fire. 

Jj.     Ineffectual  l'iti:siiit. 
freneral  KrvlDft'  ordered  the  ten  battalions  in  first  line 


80         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

and  the  available  8  squadrons  of  Lancers  and  Hussars  to 
pursue,  which,  however,  yielded  no  result. 

The  2  cavalry  regiments  had  been  on  outpost  without 
interruption  for  two  months;  and  they  had  not  been  able 
either  to  feed  or  unsaddle  throughout  this  day.  The  Dra- 
goon regiment  posted  on  the  Osma  did  not  reach  the  corps 
until  after  the  termination  of  the  action. 

The  infantry  pursued  for  three  miles  and  returned  with- 
out having  effected  an;\i:hing  particular.  The  result  might 
have  been  better  if  the  brigade  which  was  ordered  forward 
to  Grivitza  by  the  highroad  had  been  able  to  take  the  Turks 
in  flank.  Although  directed  to  advance  with  the  utmost 
speed  in  the  direction  indicated,  the  brigade  did  not  leave  its 
knapsacks  behind,  but  started  with  them;  this  circumstance, 
in  connection  with  the  great  heat,  so  delayed  the  movement 
that  the  brigade  was  too  late  to  act  against  the  enemy's 
flank. 

5.    Losses. 
The  losses  of  the  Russians  were: 

Killed 3  officers,  171  men; 

Wounded 27  officers,  708  men; 

Missing 66  men; 

Total 30  officers,  915  men. 

Comments. 
1.     The  outer  line  of  the  Russian  line  of  investment,  or, 
better,  their  line  of  observation  east  of  Plevna,  began  on  the 
left  at  the  road  to  Lovtoha  and  described  from  there  an  arc 


Battle  of  Zf/alcvitza  and  Pelishat.  81 

of  a  circle,  with  Plevna  as  a  center,  to  the  Vid  above  Riben. 
The  line  had  an  extent  of  about  20  miles  with  a  radius  of 
'about  G  miles.  The  position  of  the  Russian  reserves  at  Pora- 
dini  was  12  miles  to  the  east  of  Plevna  and  G  miles  in  rear  of 
the  center  of  the  Russian  front. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  cast  a  glance  at  the 
strength  of  the  armies  opi)asing  each  other  at  IMevna. 

At  the  beginning-  of  August  the  ''West  Arm^^"  in  front 
of  Plevna  consisted  of  the  4  infantry  divisions  of  the  IV. 
and  IX.  Corps,  Avhich,  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Dan- 
ube, may  have  numbered  about  40,000  effectives.  Deduct- 
ing 10,000  men  for  the  losses  suffered  by  these  divisions  in 
the'  actions  of  July,  there  remain  30,000  infantry,  without 
counting  loss  from  disease.  To  these  may  be  added  about 
10,000  cavalry,  artillery,  and  special  troops,  and  as  many 
Roumanians  (4th  Division),  giving  a  total  of  some  50,000 
men.  Deducting  losses  from  disease  during  the  months  of 
July  and  August,  and  taking  also  into  account  the  absence 
of  several  bodies  included  in  the  above  calculation  which 
were  attached  to  the  cori)S  operating  against  Lovtcha,  the 
maximum  available  strength  did  not  probably  exceed  45,000 
men  present  before  Plevna  toward  the  end  of  August. 

In  calculating  the  strengtli  of  tlic  Tuikisli  Aiiiiy  it  is 
perhaps  best  to  figure  backward  from  the  number  of  men 
com])ris<'d  in  the  suncndci-.  At  1liat  lime  IIkm-c  were  in 
PleTua  some  57,000  men,  inclusive  of  20,000  sick  and 
wounded;  it  oan  be  proved  that  reinforcements  to  the 
amount  of  gome  12,000  men  entered  Plevna  during  the  month 


82         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

of  September,  which  leaves  45,000  men.  Estimating  the  htss 
from  battle  or  disease  from  September  to  December  at 
5,000  men  (probably  much  too  low),  we  find  that  toward  the 
end  of  August  the  Turkish  army  at  Plevna  numbered  at  least 
50,000  effectives,  and  was  at  least  equal,  and  probably  supe- 
rior, to  the  investing  army,  which,  moreover,  was  scattered 
over  a  line  20  miles  long. 

2.  The  failure  of  the  pursuit  after  the  repulse  of  the 
Turkish  attack  renders  it  proper  to  ask  whether  such  an  at- 
tempt was  right  under  the  circumstances. 

It  would  probably  be  so  only  in  case  it  were  the  in- 
tention to  enter  the  entrenchments  of  the  retreating  ene- 
my, or  in  case  it  seemed  practicable  to  drive  a  portion  of  the 
enemy  from  the  line  of  retreat  before  reaching  the  shelter 
of  the  entrenchments.  If  neither  is  the  case,  pursuit  under 
similar  circumstances  had  better  be  omitted,  as  it  will  in- 
variably result  in  the  retreat  of  the  pursuing  troops  from  the 
works,  thus  raising  the  moral  of  the  previously  defeated 
enemy. 


Capture  of  Lovtcha.  83 


PART    VII. 

CAPTURE  OF  LOVTCHA  OX  THE  3D  OF  SEPTEMBER. 

■  1.     Advance  on  Lovtcha. 

Early  in  August  General  Skobeleff  was  posted  at  Kak- 
rina,  on  the  road  from  Selvi  to  Lovtcha,  with  the  Caucasian 
Cossack  Brigade  and  a  mixed  detachment  from  the  IV. 
Corps  (Kazan  Regiment,  No.  64,  1  Shuja  battalion,  and  1  bat- 
tery). A  portion  of  the  new  reinforcements  had  by  this  time 
reached  Selvi,  consisting  of  the  2d  Infantry  Division,  the  2d 
]5rigade  of  the  3d  Infantry  Division  with  its  artillery,  the  3d 
Rifle  Brigade,  and  a  heavy  battery  made  up  of  4  guns  cap- 
tured at  Nikopolis. 

On  the  31st  of  August  Prince  Imeretinski,  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  forces  at  Selvi,  received  orders  to  .attack 
Lovtcha. 

On  the  1st  of  September  Skobeleff  was  accordingly 
I)ushed  forward  from  Kakrina  to  Fontana  (about  3,000  j'ards 
east  of  Lovtcha),  with  orders  to  occup}-  the  heights  dominat- 
ing the  approaches  to  the  position  of  Lovtcha,  to  recon- 
noiter  the  terrain  with  a  view  to  artillery  positions,  and  to 
construct  rifle-trenches  and  gun-emplacements. 

The  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade  was  to  cross  the  Osma 
at  Iglaw  (7  miles  below  Lovtcha)  and  to  reconnoiter  the  road 
to  Plevna  (by  which  reinforcements  might  reach  Lovtcha 


84        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

or  by  which  its  garrison  might  withdraw) ;  2  sotnias  of  the 
30th  Don  Cossacks  were  to  observe  the  roads  from  Trojan 
to  Selvi.  A  single  poor  road  was  available  for  the  march 
of  the  main  body  from  Selvi  to  Lovtcha  (33  miles),  so  that  it 
was  started  in  echelons^-the  2d  Brigade  of  the  2d  Division 
on  the  afternoon  of  September  1st,  the  2d  Brigade  of  the 
3d  Division  at  11  p.  m.,  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  2d  Division  at 
2  o'clock  next  morning,  and  at  4  a.  m.  (September  2d)  the  3d 
Kifle  Brigade. 

Z.     Preparatory  Arrangements  on  the  1st  and  2d  of 
Scptcinher. 

General  Skobeleff  reached  Fontana  at  2  p.  m.  September 
1st,  recounoitered  the  country,  and  ordered  the  1st  Kazan 
Battalion  to  occupy  the  height  (a)  on  the  left  of  the  road  and 
the  remaining  troops  of  his  detachment  to  take  post  in  rear 
of  that  height. 

Throughout  the  night  the  men  were  at  work  construct- 
ing rifle-trenches  and  emplacements  for  21  guns,  and  1  bat- 
tery was  dragged  by  the  infantry  to  the  steep,  rocky  height 
(6)  north  of  the  road,  where  it  opened  fire  at  5  a.  m.  September 
2d,  sweeping  more  particularly  the  ground  iu  front  of  the 
height  (a). 

During  the  uight  of  the  2d-3d  the  infantry  dragged  5 
batteries  to  the  height  (h),  so  that  on  both  sides  of  the  road 
48  guns  were  iu  position. 

Major-Greneral  Dobrovolski,  w^ho  was  to  form  the  right 
wing  of  the  position  with  the  3d  Rifle  Brigade,  arrived  at 
Prissiaka  (3  miles  northeast  of  Lovtcha)  on  the  evening  of 


Capture  of  Lovtcha.  85 

September  2d,  and  entrenched  himself  on  the  height  in  front 
during-  the  night  and  the  following  morning;  a  field  battery 
and  the  heavy  battery  heretofore  mentioned  were  placed 
in  position  at  this  point  early  on  the  morning  of  Septem- 
ber 3d. 

For  the  execution  of  the  general  attack  contemplated 
for  the  3d,  Prince  Imeretinski  directed  tliat,  after  proper 
preparation  by  artillery  fire,  the  left  wing  under  Skobeleff 
attack  the  **Red  Hill,"  situated  close  to  Lovtcha  and  forming 
the  key  to  the  enemy's  position;  that  Dobrovolski,  with  the 
right  wing,  attack  the  heights  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Os- 
ma.  The  2d  Infantry  Division  and  the  parts  of  the  3d  Di- 
vision present  were  to  follow  in  reserve. 

3.    Action  on  the  Right  Bank  of  the  Osma. 

At  5:30  a,  m.  September  3d  the  artillery  opened  along 
the  whole  Russian  linc^^ — with  IG  four-pounders,  40  nine- 
pounders,  and  the  4  heavy  guns.  On  the  left  the  fire  was 
continued  without  inteuruption  until  2  p.  m.  According  to 
Russian  accounts,  the  Turkish  artillery,  thenumber  of  whose 
guns  cannot  be  ascertained,  but  which  certainly  was  much 
inferior  to  the  Russian,  offered  a  most  obstinate  and  suc- 
cessful resistance. 

At  6:15  a.  m.  the  Turks  opened  a  brisk  infantry  fire  from 
the  trenches  on  the  heights  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Osma 
against  Dobrovolski's  rifle  battalions  in  front  of  Prissiaka, 
The  latter  must  have  been  in  a  faulty  jtosition — no  other  ex- 
planation-can be  given  of  the  loss  of  8  officers  and  150  men 


8 6        Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

iu  the  11th  Rifle  Battalion  before  the  Russian  infantry  in 
this  wing  had  fired  a  shot. 

According  to  the  plan,  Dobrovolski  ^Yas  not  to  advance 
until  Skobeleff's  attack  on  the  "Red  Hill"  had  succeeded. 
In  view  of  the  great  losses  which  his  troops  had  suffered,  and 
which  seemed  likely  to  increase  with  further  delay,  General 
Dobrovolski  at  8  a.  m.  moved  against  the  opposite  heights  on 
the  right  bank,  which  were  defended  by  two  lines  of  rifle- 
trenches — one  half  way  up,  the  other  at  the  crest.  The  rifle 
brigade  (reinforced  by  a  combined  company  of  the  head- 
quarters guard  of  the  commander-in-chief)  captured  the 
heights  after  an  action  lasting  from  8  to  11  a.  m. ;  the  Turkish 
left  wing  fell  back  behind  the  Osma.  The  Reval  Regiment 
was  brought  forward  from  the  reserve  to  support  General 
Dobrovolski;  it  turned  to  the  left,  where  meanwhile  the  at- 
tack on  the  "Red  Hill,"  the  chief  point  of  the  hostile  posi- 
tion, had  been  preparing. 

After  the  great  Russian  battery  on  both  sides  of  the 
road  had  continued  its  fire  against  the  Turkish  position  un- 
til 2  p.  m.,  the  Kazan  Regiment  advanced,  with  band  playing, 
to  the  attack  on  the  "Red  Hill,"  and  captured  it.  Two  bat- 
teries from  the  reserve  were  at  once  dragged  to  the  top  of  the 
hill,  whence  they  opened  fire  against  the  line  of  redoubts  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Osma,  whose  central  stronghold  was  a 
formidable  redoubt.  On  the  right  of  the  Kazan  Regiment, 
north  of  the  road,  the  regiments  of  Kaluga  and  Libau  crossed 
the  marshy  bottom  intervening  between  the  Russian  aiid 
Turkish  positions,  and  captured  the  heights  north  of  the 


Capture  of  Lovtcha.  87 

"Red  Hill,"  leaving  the  whole  right  bank  iu  j^he  hands  of  the 
Russians. 

4.     Action  on  the  Left  Bank  of  tlie  Osma. 

Upon  the  capture  of  the  "Red  Hill"  the  1st  Kazan  Bat- 
talion took  post  there,  while  the  remaining  2  battalions  of 
the  regiment  crossed  the  river,  penetrated  into  the  town,  and 
captured  its  farther  ed^e  after  a  brief  action. 

In  addition  to  the  2  batteries  posted  on  the  "Red  Hill" 
itself,  2  more  were  posted  on  the  highroad  farther  to  the 
north,  so  that  32  guns  brought  their  fire  to  bear  on  the  en- 
trenchments of  the  left  bank.  The  regiments  Pokof,  No  11, 
Estland,  No.  8,  Reval,  No.  7,  and  the  1st  Shuja  Battalion 
crossed  the  river,  so  that,  inclusive  of  the  2  Kazan  battalions 
already  there,  12  battalions  stood  in  readiness  for  attack. 

Eight  battalions  of  these  troops  advanced  at  5:30  p.  m. 
against  the  right  of  the  enemy's  position,  while  the  Kaluga 
Regiment,  No.  5,  together  with  detachments  of  the  Libau 
Regiment,  No.  (5,  and  the  Rifles,  crossed  the  river  lower 
down  and  attacked  the  left  of  the  Turkish  position.  The 
latter  was  taken  after  a  furious  hand-to-hand  conflict;  the 
retreating  Turks  were  pursued  by  the  Caucasian  Cossack 
Brigade,  which  advanced  from  the  right  wing  across  the 
Osma.  Two  Turkish  battalions  were  cut  off  and  destroyed 
by  the  Cossacks  after  brave  resistance;  the  fire  of  the  Cos- 
sack horse  battery  which  had  accompanied  ihc  Cossacks 
made  great  havoc  among  tlie  fleeing  Turks. 


88         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

5.    Losses. 

The  losses  of  the  Kussians  were:* 

Killed G  officers,  313  men. 

Missing 52  men. 

Wounded 33  officers,  1,112  men. 

Total 39  officers,  1,477  men. 

On  the  part  of  the  Turks  neither  the  number  of  troops 
engaged  nor  the  losses  can  be  ascertained.  According  to 
Russian  accounts,  2,200  Turks  were  buried  within  the  cap- 
tured entrenchments,  not  counting  those  killed  by  the  Cos- 
sacks during  the  pursuit.  It  seems  verv  probable,  under  the 
circumstances  described,  that  the  latter  number  was  very 
great.  The  statement  of  Prince  Imeretinski  at  the  conclusion 
of  his  report,  that  3,000  Turks  (the  number  occurs  more  than 
once,  and  is  therefore  not  a  misprint)  were  cut  down  in  their 
flight,  bears  too  much  the  stamp  of  inordinate  exaggeration 
to  be  of  any  value  whatever,  the  more  when  it  is  considered 
that  the  pursuing  Cossacks  could  barely  have  numbered 
more  than  1,000  horses. 

6.     Events  on  the  J/th  and  5th  of  September. 

Late  on  the  evening  of  September  3d  reports  were  re- 
ceived from  the  headquarters  of  the  IV.  Corps  that  strong 
bodies  of  the  enemy  had  marched  froni  Plevna  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Lovtcha;  soon  afterward  patrols  reported  the  appear- 
ance of  strong  hostile  detachments. 

On  the  morning  of  September  1th  this  column  moved  on 
the  position  of  Lovtcha,  and  tried  to  gain  the  Russian  left 


Capture  of  Lovtcha.  89 

flank  by  continued  maneuvering  to  the  right.  The  conflict, 
however,  was  limited  to  a  wholly  ineffective  artillery  com- 
bat, and  toward  noon  the  Turks  withdrew  in  the  direction 
of  Mikren  (12  miles  southwest  of  Lovtcha). 

On  the  5th  of  September  Prince  Imeretinski  left  the  2d 
Brigade  of  the  3d  Division  at  Lovtcha  and  marched  to  rejoin 
the  main  body  of  the  West  Army,  whose  left  wing  he  reached 
in  the  evening  at  Bogot  (about  12  miles). 

Comments. 

1.  A  surprising  feature  of  the  order  of  march  of  the 
corps  from  Selvi  to  Lovtcha  is,  that  the  Rifle  Brigade,  al- 
though intended  to  form  the  right  of  the  attack,  marched 
at  tJie  rear  of  the  column,  and  that  the  troops  intended  for 
reserves  marched  in  front.  It  is  also  surprising  that  the 
unity  of  the  2d  Division  was  broken  up  on  the  march  by 
sandwiching  a  brigade  of  the  3d  Division  between  the  two 
brigades  of  the  2d. 

2.  As  the  corps  had  70  guns,  there  must  have  been 
present  a  number  of  field  officers  of  artillery  and  certainly 
one  (probably  two)  brigade  commanders;  yet  it  was  not  an 
artillery  offlcer,  but  Captain  Kiiiopatkin*  of  the  general  staff', 
who  was  charged  with  ])osting  the  artillery  on  the  heights 
on  both  sides  of  the  highroad. 

The  same  Captain  Kuropatkin  traced  the  lines  for  the 
rifle-trenches  to  be  constructed  on  the  left,  and  the  execu- 


"In  view  of  the  fact  that  Kuropatkin.  though  only  a  captain,  was  Skobeleff'.s 
chief  of  staff",  the  author's  conun<=nts  seem  somewhat  severe.  Kuropatkin  after- 
wards became  a  lieutenant-Kt*neral  and  Governor  of  the  Trans-Caspian  Provinces. 
He  is  a  soldier  of  distinsruished  ability,  and  is  regarded  by  many  as  SkobeleflTs  nat- 
ural successor. — A.  L.  W. 


90         Tacticnl  FitudleH  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

tion  of  these  pioneer  works,  including  the  construction  of 
,  emplacements  for  4S  ^uns,  was  directed  by  an  infantry  lieu- 
tenant of  tlfe  Kazan  regiment.  On  the  right  of  General 
Dobrovolski's  position  the  construction  of  rifle-trenches  and 
gun-emplacements  was  superintended  by  an  ensign  of  the 
sapper  battalion  of  the  Guard,  who,  with  his  small  detach- 
ment of  sappers,  belonged  to  the  combined  Guard  company 
w^hich  formed  the  commander-in-chief's  headquarter  guard. 
This  corps,  therefore,  although  consisting  of  26  battalions, 
seems  to  have  been  practically  without  special  troops. 

3.  The  attack  on  the  Turkish  position  of  Lovtcha  was 
purely  frontal,  and  its  preparation  and  inception  was  left  to 
the  artillery,  which,  to  be  sure,  was  very  much  superior  to 
that  of  the  enemy.  Not  a  musket  seems  to  have  been  dis- 
charged on  the  Kussian  left,  before  the  infantry  advanced  to 
the  decisive  attack  on  the  ''Red  Hill,"  in  doing  which  it  had 
to  traverse  a  distance  of  not  less  than  1,000  yards  from  its 
sheltered  position  to  that  of  the  enemy. 

4.  It  would  appear  from  our  description  that  the  un- 
suitable position  of  the  rifle  brigade  on  the  right  made  it 
almost  helpless  against  the  enemy's  infantry  entrenched  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  Osma.  Instead  of  opposing  the  trou- 
blesome and  destructive  infantry  fire  of  the  Turks  with 
musketry,  the  Russian  right  wing  was  unable  to  help  itself 
except  by  an  attack,  which  was  contrary  to  the  programme 
and  insufiSoiently  prepared,  but  which  succeeded  through 
the  bravery  of  the  troops  and  their  superior  numbers. 

5.  The    vigorous    advanctv    of    the    Cossack    Brisrade 


Capture  of  Loutcha.  'Jl 

against  the  defeated  enemy's  line  of  retreat  resulted  in  con- 
siderable loss  for  the  latter.  The  question  seems  not  inap- 
propriate here,  whether,  in  view  of  the  great  and  undoubted 
numerical  superiority  o'f  the  Russians  in  this  action,  a  turn- 
ing movement  below  the  position  by  a  strong  infantry  de- 
tachment, say  a  brigade,  might  not  have  been  decisive  and 
entailed  less  loss?  It  appears  from  the  description  tliat  the 
Osma  could  be  crossed  with  little  trouble  and  witliont  using 
the  bridge. 

6.  The  headquarters  of  the  IV.  Corjjs,  which  formed 
the  left  of  the  Russian  army  before  Plevna,  discovered  in  the 
course  of  the  afternoon  that  a  strong  Turkish  column  was 
marching  from  Plevna  against  Lovtcha,  where  it  was  known 
that  Prince  Imeretinski  was  engaged  in  battle.  A  report 
was  accordingly  sent  to  him.  It  does  not  appear,  however, 
that  the  IV.  Corps  made  any  movement  of  troops  in  indirect 
support  of  the  corps  engaged  at  Lovtcha.  An  advance  of 
the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  posted  on  the  Russian  left 
against  the  flank  of  the  hostile  column  would  ceitainly  have 
seriously  delayed  or  stoj^ped  that  movement. 

7.  The  constant  maneuvering  to  the  right  by  the  Turk- 
ish column  which  appeared  before  Lovtcha  on  the  morning 
of  September  itii  is  explained  by  the  Russians  as  an  attempt, 
threatened  but  not  c<arried  out,  of  turning  their  loft.  The 
movement  is,  however,  susceptible  of  a  difl'erent  oxpliniation. 
The  Turkish  coIuhui  from  Plevna  iwliosc  approximate 
strength  is  not  known)  reached  the  vicinity  of  Lovtcha  at  a 
time  when  the  garrison  of  that  place  was  in  full  flight,  proba- 


92         Tactical  Sfxdic.^  on  the  Jiattles  Around  Plevna. 

bly  toward  Mikren,  in  the  oj  posite  direciion,  on  account  of 
the  turning  movement  of  The  Cossacks  in  the  north.  Under 
the  circumstances,  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  Turkish  col- 
umn had  good  reason  to  consider  the  direct  road  to  Plevna, 
leading  as  it  would  i»ast  the  left  of  the  Russian  main  posi- 
tion, too  dangerous  for  its  retreat,  and  therefore  executed  a 
sort  of  liank  march  past  the  Kussian  position  under  the  cover 
of  a  rather  harmless  cannonade,  with  a  view  of  gaining  the 
road  to  the  upper  Vid  by  way  of  Mikren.  Nor  should  it  be 
overlooked  that  the  movement  was  best  calculated  to  cover 
the  road  to  the  Tetewen  and  Jablonitza  passes,  which  were 
now  endangered  by  the  capture  of  Lovtcha  by  the  Russians 


Artillery  Attack  on  Plevna.  93 


PART  VIII. 

ARTILLERY  ATTACK  ON   PLEVNA  FROM   SEPTEM- 
BER 7TH  TO  IITH. 

1.     Dispositions  for  the  Night  of  September  6th-lth. 
At  0  p.  in.  (ju  the  <»tli  the  troops  left  their  eucanipineuts 
and  took  up  the  followin*^-  position  aj;ainst  the  south  front  of 
the  Turkish  entrenchments: 

(a)  General  Kriidener  with  the  IX.  Corps  between  the 
Bulgareni  and  the  I'elishat  roads,  where  emplacements  were 
constructed  for  the  artillerj-  and  trenches  for  the  infantry. 
Three  infantry  regiments  and  the  6  batteries  were  placed  in 
first  line;  8  infantry  regiments  with  4  batteries  formed  the 
corps  reserve;  1  regiment  and  1  battery  formed  part  of  the 
main  reserve;  1  regiment  with  1  battery  was  at  Nikopolis. 

In  addition  20  siege  guns  in  2  batteries  were  established 
in  the  front  line  of  the  corps. 

(b)  General  Kryloff  with  the  I\'.  Corps  was  on  the  left 
of  the  IX.  on  the  so-called  "heights  of  Radischevo,"  and  here 
also  emplacements  and  trenches  were  constructed.  The 
corps  had  3  regiments  of  the  16th  Division  and  5  batteries  in 
first  line;  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  3()th  Division  with  1  bat- 
teries formed  the  corps  reserve;  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  oOth 
Division  with  2  batteries  w'ere  assigned  to  the  main  reserve; 
1  regiment  (Kazan)  and  1  battery  were  as  yet  with  Prince 
Imeretinski. 


V»4         Tnctlval  titudies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

{(■)  GeiuMiil  IMiiicp  TiiicicJiiiski  with  his  detachment  of 
the  2d  Infaiili'v  Division  and  its  aitilleiy,  the  :>d  Rifle  Bri- 
gade, a  batteries  of  the  8d  Artillery  Brigade,  and  4  siege 
guns  was  posted  at  Tutchenitza,  in  rear  of  the  left  of  the  IV. 
Corps.  The  detachments  from  the  IV.  Corps  rejoined  their 
own  corps. 

(fZ)  The  4th  Koumanian  Division  was  posted  north  of 
the  highroad,  abreast  of  the  IX.  Corps.  Three  regiments  of 
irregular  Roumanian  cavalry  guarded  the  space  between  the 
right  of  the  division  and  the  Vid. 

(c)  General  Loshkareff  with  the  8th  and  9th  Dragoons, 
the  9th  Lancers,  and  the  9tk  Cossacks  with  2  horse  batteries 
was  posted  on  the  highroad  in  rear  of  the  Roumanians  and 
the  IX.  Corps. 

(f)  General  Leontieff  with  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  4th 
Cavalr}'  Division  and  a  horse  battery  covered  the  left  of  the 
IV.  Corps  and  maintained  communication  with  the  2  Cossack 
brigades  of  the  Don  and  Caucasus  which  were  observing  the 
Lovtcha  road. 

{g)  The  general  reserve  consisted  of  the  2d  Brigade  of 
the  30th  Division,  the  Galitz  Regiment,  No.  20,  of  the  5th  Di- 
vision, 8  batteries,  the  Hussar  regiments  Mariopul,  Xo.  4, 
and  Kieff,  Xo.  9,  and  a  horse  battery.  It  w'as  posted  west  of 
Pelishat  at  the  junction  of  the  Grivitza — Tutchenitza  and 
Pelishat — Plevna  roads. 

(/«)  Three  sotnias  of  the  84th  Don  Cossacks  formed  the 
headquarters  guard  of  the  commander  of  the  West  Army, 
who  took  jiost  with  the  main  reserve. 


Artillenj  Attack  mi  Plevna.  95 

{%)  Packs  were  left  bebiud  in  the  camps;  each  man  car- 
ried two  pounds  of  coolced  meat  and  four  pounds  of  hard 
bread.  Each  regiment  formed  a  detachment  of  convales- 
cents to  guard  the  packs  and  train. 

(/.)  The  light  baggage  followed  the  troops.  The  flying 
park  of  the  IX.  Corps  at  Zgalevitza,  of  the  IV.  Corps  between 
Tutchenitza  and  Bogot.  Reserve  park  of  the  IX.  Corps  at 
Bulgareni,  of  the  IV.  Coi^is  at  Leshan.  Baggage  of  the  IX. 
Corps  in  rear  of  Karagatch,  of  the  IV.  Corps  in  rear  of 
Poradim. 

(Z)     The  dressing  station  of  the  IX.  Cor])s  at  the  "Three 
Wells,"  2  miles  in  rear  of  the  IV.  Corps  on  the  Tutchen 
itza  brook.     As  many  country  carts  as  possible  were  col- 
lected at  the  dressing  stations. 
2.     Erection  of  Batteries  duriiKi  the  Night  of  Septemher  6th-7th. 

Notwithstanding  the  darkness  of  the  night,  the  whole 
movement  was  carried  out  with  rapidity,  order,  and  silence, 
the  leaders  having  previously  familiarized  themselves  with 
the  positions  to  be  taken  and  roads  to  be  followed.  The 
troops  carried  gabions,  fascines,  and  entrenching  tools,  and 
constructed  emplacements  for  field  and  siege  guns  2,000  to 
2,500  yards  from  the  enemy's  works. 

One  company  of  the  .''>d  Sapper  Battalion  was  assigned 
to  each  corps,  a,nd  a  detachment  of  40  sapi»ers  to  the  Rou- 
manian Division;  2  sapper  comi)anies  were  charged  with  the 
establishment  of  the  siege  artillery — one  for  12,  the  other  for 
S  twenty-four-p(»und(M-s.  Four  infantry  l)atlali<»ns  furnished 
the  working  parties  and  4  other  infantry  battalions  brought 
up  gabions,  fascines,  and  other  material. 


96         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  A  round  Plevna. 

The  entrenching  tools  had  been  issued  to  the  troops 
from  the  field  engineer  park. 

The  earthworks  were  completed  b}'  G  a.  m.  and  armed  with 
the  nine-pounder  field  batteries  and  the  20  siege  guns.  In 
each  of  the  2  great  batteries  an  observatory  95  feet  high 
was  constructed  of  ladders. 

3.     The  7th  of  September. 

At  G  a.  m.  the  battery  of  12  siege  guns  fired  a  salvo  as 
a  signal,  whereupon  all  the  batteries — numbering  altogether 
20  twenty-four-pounders  and  88  nine-pounders — opened  fire, 
which  W'as  briskly  answered  by  the  Turks. 

The  Russian  infantry  lines,  posted  under  cover,  were  in 
complete  readiness  for  battle.  Wherever  water  was  near, 
the  infantry  cooked  a  meal  at  noon. 

The  cannonade  was  continued  throughout  the  day. 

4.     Dispositions  for  September  8th. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  the  artillery  was  moved  closer 
to  the  enemy's  works  and  brought  into  action  some  four- 
poimder  batteries,  which  heretofore  had  not  taken  part  on 
account  of  the  long  range. 

The  3d  Roumanian  Division  crossed  the  Vid  at  Riben  at 
daybreak,  closed  up  on  the  right  of  the  4th  Division,  and 
brought  its  artillery  into  action. 

The  Roumanian  Reserve  Division  moved  to  Yerbitza 
and  formed  the  special  reserve  of  the  Roumanians. 

General  Loshkareff  with  his  4  Russian  cavalry  regi- 
ments,   reinforced    by    4    Roumanian    cavalry    regiments. 


Artillcri/  AtfacJ:  on  Ph  iitu.  97 

crossed  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  at  Ribeii  aud  moved  to 
Lower  Dubnik  on  the  Sophia  road;  his  task  was  to  cut  the 
enemy's  communications  and  to  fall  upon  him  in  case  of  his 
retreat  from  Plevna. 

General  Prince  Imeretinski  moved  during  the  night 
from  Tutchenitza  to  the  Lovtcha  road  to  gain  the  wooded 
ridge  south  of  Plevna. 
5.     The  Artillenj  Combat  on  the  8th,  9th,  and  10th  of  Septemher. 

The  dispositions  for  the  8th  of  September  were  carried 
out  with  precision;  the  batteries  were  advanced  during  the 
night  to  within  1,G00  yards  of  the  enemy's  works;  in  addi- 
tion to  those  previously  engaged,  5  Russian  and  5  Rou- 
manian batteries  took  part;  the  fire  was  chiefly  directed 
against  the  Grivitza  redoubt  and  the  Radischevo  redoubt. 
At  first  the  Turks  answered  briskly,  but  toward  2  p.  m.  their 
fire  diminished,  and  ceased  toward  evening  altogether. 

In  order  to  disturb  the  Turks  in  repairing  their  works, 
the  Russian  artillery  maintained  a  slow  fire  throughout  the 
night. 

Eight  of  the  siege  guns  which  on  the  8th  had  confined 
their  fire  to  the  Grivitza  redoubt,  were  shifted,  during  the 
night  to  the  position  of  the  IV.  Corps  to  bring  their  fire  to 
bear  on  the  middle  group  of  redoubts. 

The  cannonade  was  maintained  along  the  whole  front 
on  the  9th.  The  artillery  conflict  of  the  past  few  days  had 
cost  the  Russians  about  HOO  men. 

On  the  10th  of  September  the  bombardment  of  the  Turk- 
ish position  was  at  first  continued  as  heretofore,  but  it  soon 


1)8         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

became  evident  that  it  could  not  continue  niucli  longer  for 
lack  of  ammunition.  Prompt  replenishment  could  not  be 
hoped  for,  as  the  fine  weather  suddenly  changed  on  the  even- 
ing of  the  10th,  and  the  ensuing  rain  quickly  rendered  all 
roads  impracticable. 

The  uninterrujited  fire  of  several  days  had  also  damaged 
several  carriages  of  the  siege  guns  and  quite  a  number  of 
those  of  the  field  guns. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  seemed  unwise  to  continue 
the  artillery  combat,  and  the  assault,  which  was  to  be  pre- 
pared by  the  cannonade,  had  to  be  abandoned  or  made  at 
once.     The  latter  alternative  was  decided  upon. 

6.  Preparatori/  Actions  of  the  Left  Wing  on  the  8th,  9th,  and 
10th  of  September. 

During  the  artillery  combat  on  the  8th  of  September, 
Prince  Imeretinski  moved  his  corps  from  Tutchenitza  to  the 
Lovtcha  road  and  took  position  on  both  sides  of  the  road. 
General  Skobeleff  commanded  the  advance  guard — consist- 
ing of  the  regiments  Kaluga,  No.  5,  and  Estland,  No.  8,  2 
rifle  battalions,  8  sotnia,s  of  Cossacks,  4  batteries,  and  the  4 
heavy  guns.  He  occupied  Brestovetz  with  the  3d  Estland 
Battalion,  placed  2  nine-pounder  batteries  and  the  4  heavy 
guns  in  action  on  the  height  in  rear  of  the  town,  and  opened 
fire  on  the  Krishin  redoubt. 

After  the  artillery  fire  had  been  continued  until  8  p.  m., 
the  Kaluga  Regiment  was  ordered  to  take  the  so-called  "sec- 
ond laioll"  of  the  ''Green  Hills."     The  regiment  advanced  to 


ArtiUery  Attack  on  Plevna.  99 

the  attack  with  2  battalions  in  first  line,  the  3d  Battalion 
following  as  reserve  with  a  distance  of  500  yards;  9  com- 
panies of  the  Estland  Regiment  were  told  off  as  the  general 
reserve  of  this  attack,  and  6  companies  occupied  Brestovetz. 
The  Kaluga  Regiment  captured  the  "second  knoll" ;  carried 
on  by  its  ardor,  it  continued  the  attack,  took  the  ''third 
knoll,"  and  penetrated  to  the  rifle-trenches  between  that 
knoll  and  the  Krishin  redoubt;  here  the  regiment  was  as- 
sailed by  Turkish  reserves  and  driven  back  to  the  "second 
knoll,''  where  it  was  supported  by  the  previously  mentioned 
9  Estland  companies.  The  pursuing  enemy  was  then  him- 
self driven  back.  The  3  sotnias  attached  to  the  advanced 
guard  had  taken  an  active  and  skillful  part  in  the  infantry 
action,  and  proved  very  useful  in  seeking  out  and  removing 
the  wounded. 

The  Russian  losses  in  the  action  amounted  to  900  men, 
700  of  which  fell  on  the  Kaluga  Regiment. 

For  the  present  the  "second  knoll"  was  held  by  the 
Russians;  but  when  informed  during  the  night  that  the  gen- 
eral assault  which  he  expected  for  the  following  day  would 
not  take  place  until  some  later  day,  General  Skobeleff  consid- 
ered hisadvanced  position  astoo  risky  and  withdrew  his  right 
from  the  captured  "second  knoll"  to  the  "first  knoll,"  which 
was  streng-thened  feyadouble  lineof  rifle-trenches.  Anattack 
on  the  "first  knoll,"  attempted  by  several  Turkish  battalions 
at  5  a,  m.,  was  repulsed  chiefly  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery.  At 
8  a.  m,  the  attack  was  renewed  with  increased  numbers;  this 
time  the  Turks  penetrated  to  within  60  paces  of  the  rifle- 
trenches,  but  were  again  repulsed. 


lUO      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Anticipating  a  renewal  of  the  attack, — which,  however, 
did  not  talve  place, — Skobeleff  remained  in  his  position  with 
the  Estland  and  Libau  Regiments  (the  latter  from  the  re- 
serve having  relieved  the  Kaluga  Regiment)  and  ?>  rifle  bat- 
talions. His  right  was  on  the  "first  knoll,"  his  center  was 
formed  by  the  village  of  Brestovetz  and  the  height  in  rear 
with  28  guns,  his  left  by  a  series  of  rifle-trenches  to  the  w^est 
of  the  village  of  Brestovetz.  In  rear  of  the  position  stood 
Prince  Imeretinski  with  the  Kaluga  and  Reval  Regiments, 
a  rifle  battalion,  and  3  four-pounder  and  1  nine-pounder  bat- 
teries as  general  reserve. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  of  the  9th-10th,  Prince  Imere- 
tinski received  orders  from  General  Zotofl:",  chief  of  statf  of 
the  West  Army,  to  gain  possession  of  the  ''third  knoll"  of  the 
"Green  Hills"  next  morning.  He  was  reinforced  for  that 
purpose  by  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  16th  Division  (of  the  IV. 
Corps),  which  crossed  the  Tutchenitza  ravine  at  daybreak 
and  took  post  on  the  right  of  the  corps. 

Prince  Imeretinski  entrusted  General  SkobelefE  with  the 
direction  of  the  attack  and  placed  at  his  disposal  the  2d  Bri- 
gade of  the  2d  Division,  the  9th  and  10th  Rifle  Battalions, 
and  4  nine-pounder  batteries.  As  additional  support  the 
1st  Brigade  of  the  16th  Division  was  placed  in  readiness; 
the  remaining  troops  of  the  coi'ps — 1st  Brigade  of  the  2d  Di- 
vision, 11th  and  12th  Rifle  Battalions,  3  four-pounder  bat- 
teries— were  posted  in  rear  of  Brestovetz  as  general  reserve 
under  General  Dobrovolski.  At  daybreak  (September  10th) 
the  Estland  Regiment  captured  the  ''second  knoll"  almost 


ArtiUcrt/  Attack  on  Flevna.  1«>1 

without  resistance,  and  Sl^obeleff  had  it  fortified  at  once; 
in  the  construction  of  the  rifle-trenches  the  lack  of  entrench- 
ing tools  was  sensibly  felt  and  part  of  the  men  used  the  lids 
of  their  cooking-pots  and  their  bare  hands.  To  ensure  the 
best  possible  field  of  fire  to  the  front,  the  vines  in  the  vine- 
yards were  pulled  up. 

Skobeleff  had  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  16th  Division 
brought  up  at  once,  and  took  post  with  the  troops  under  his 
command  on  the  "second  knoll"  between  the  road  and  the 
Tutchenitza.  ravine;  16  nine-pounders  were  placed  in  battery 
in  the  center ;  the  Susdal  Regiment  was  posted  in  rear  on  the 
"first  knoll"  as  reserve. 

Not  deeming  it  advisable  to  attempt  the  capture  of  the 
"third  knoll,"  Skobeleff  postponed  it  till  the  general  attack 
ordered  for  the  morrow. 

To  support  the  contemplated  attack  2  companies  of  the 
Susdal  Regiment  escorted  12  nine-pounders  and  the  4  siege 
guns  to  the  east  side  of  the  Tutchenitza  ravine,  where  they 
were  so  posted  as  to  sweep  the  slopes  of  the  "third  knoll"  as 
well  as  the  "third  knoll"  itself  with  their  fire. 

Comments. 

1.  The  fact  that  the  carriages  of  all  the  Russian  guns 
were  damaged  by  the  fire  of  several  days"  duraticm  was  also 
met  with  in  the  siege  of  Kars.  There  it  was  attributed  to  the 
excessive  elevation  given  to  the  guns  on  account  of  the  great 
range. 

2.  The  number  of  technical   troops   employed    before 


102       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Plevna  was  altogether  insufficient;  there  was  but  1  sapper 
battalion  with  5  infantry  divisions,  not  counting  the  Rou- 
manians. But  35  sappers  were  at  the  disposal  of  Prince 
Imeretinski's  corps,  consisting  of  2  infantry  divisions;  more- 
over, no  entrenching  tools  were  issued  to  that  corps,  while 
the  lY.  and  IX.  Corps,  as  well  as  the  Roumanians,  received 
at  least  a  few  hundred  tools  each  from  the  field  engineer 
park. 


The  Assault  on  Fkniu.  103 


PART   IX. 

THE  ASSAULT  ON  PLEVXA  ON  THE  IITH  AND  12TH 
OF  SEPTEMBER. 

1.     Dispositions  for  the  Assault. 

The  hour  for  the  assault  was  selected  at  3  p.  m.  of  Sep- 
tember 11th,  instead  of  at  daybreak,  for  two  reasons:  first, 
to  spare  the  troops  a  half-day  of  battle;  second,  to  allow  the 
artillery  to  use  the  forenoon  in  i)reparino;  the  assault  by  its 
fire.  In  order  to  keep  the  Turks  as  much  as  possible  in  the 
dark  as  to  the  time  of  the  assault,  to  exhaust  their  attention, 
and  to  keep  up  their  suspense,  it  was  ordered  that  the  artil- 
lery should  open  the  heaviest  possible  fire  at  daybreak,  pause 
all  along  the  line  at  9  a.  m.,  to  resume  its  fire  at  11,  and  again 
suspend  suddenly  and  simultaneously  at  1  o'clock.  The 
fire  was  to  be  resumed  at  2:30  p.  m.  and  continued  until 
further  orders;  those  batteries  alone  whose  fire  should  be 
masked  by  Russian  troops,  suspending  their  fire  for  the  time. 

The  attack  was  to  be  directed  on  three  points:  the 
Grivitza  works,  the  Radischevo  works,  and  against  the  Kris- 
hin  works. 

The  Grivitza  redoubt  was  to  be  attacked  from  the  north- 
east by  the  Roumanians,  and  on  the  s<uith  by  the  1st  Brigade 
of  the  5th  Division  with  2  four-pounder  batteries. 

Against  the  Central   redoubt    tlie   1st   Brigade  of  the 


104       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

30th  Division  and  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  lOtli  Division  were 
tola  off. 

The  Krishin  redoubt  was  to  be  attacked  by  the  1st  Bri- 
gade of  the  IGtli  Division,  the  3d  Rifle  Brigade,  the  entire  2d 
Division,  and  9  batteries. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  31st  Division  was  charged  with 
the  protection  of  the  entire  line  of  the  artillery  from  Grivitza 
to  Radischevo;  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  same  division  and  2 
batteries  formed  the  special  reserve  for  the  1st  Brigade,  and 
was  posted  on  the  right  edge  of  the  Radischevo  ravine. 

The  main  reserve  was  posted  in  rear  of  the  center,  and 
consisted  of  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  30th  Division  and  1  regi- 
ment of  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  5th  Division,  3  batteries,  and 
the  4th  Hussars  with  a  horse  battery. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division,  with  the 
2  Cossack  brigades  and  2  horse  batteries,  all  under  com- 
mand of  General  Leontieff,  had  orders  to  cross  the  Vid  if 
possible  and  gain  the  Sophia  road,  as  well  as  to  establish 
communication  with  Loshkareff's  cavalry. 

The  9th  Hussars  were  posted  on  tlie  Bulgareni  road  be- 
tween the  IX.  Corps  and  the  Roumanians. 

A  brigade  of  Roumanian  cavalry  covered  the  right  of  the 
Roumanians  as  far  as  the  Vid. 

General  Loshkarefif,  who  already  had  4  Russian  and  4 
Roumanian  cavalry  regiments  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid 
in  the  vicinity  of  Lower  Dubnik,  sought  to  establish  com- 
munication with  Leontieff's  cavalry. 

The  rain,  which  began  to  fall  on  the  evening  of  the  10th, 
continued  without  interruption  until  Sei^tember  12th. 


The  Assault  on  Plciiia.  105 

On  the  early  moruiDg  of  tlie  11th  of  September  a  dense 
fog  covered  the  entire  field;  the  ground  was  thoroughly 
soaked,  and  everywhere  men  and  horses  moved  with  diflS- 
cult}'.  Still  any  further  postponement  of  the  assault  was 
not  advisable, 

2,     Attack  of  the  R'ujht  ^Vin(|  on  the  Grivitza  Works. 

The  double  attack  on  the  Grivitza  redoubt — from  the 
north  by  the  Roumanians,  from  the  south  by  the  Russians — 
was  carried  out  without  any  tactical  combination  what- 
ever; the  final  meeting  of  the  Russians  and  Roumanians  in 
the  captured  redoubt  appears  in  the  descriptions  of  both 
parties  more  like  an  accidental  meeting  than  the  result  of  a 
bloody  struggle  carried  out  according  to  a  common  plan. 

According  to  Roumanian  accounts,  parts  of  the  3d  and 
4th  Divisions  advanced  to  the  attack  from  the  north  at  3  p. 
m.  as  ordered,  and  were  three  times  repulsed.  At  0  p.  m. 
there  was  a  lull  in  the  fight,  and  at  7:30  p.  m.  the  2d  Rifle 
Battalion  and  the  16th  Dorobanzes  (militia)  Regiment  re- 
newed the  attack  and  captured  the  redoubt,  assisted  by  the 
Russian  Archangel  Regiment.  The  losses  of  the  Rouma- 
nians— 56  officers  and  2,.500  men  dead  and  wounded — give 
clear  proof  of  the  bravery  and  contempt  of  death  with  which 
that  young  army  had  here  undergone  its  baptism  of  fire; 
the  tactical  decision  of  the  attack,  ho\v«ner,  was  probably 
brought  about  by  the  advance  of  the  Russian  brigade  from 
the  south. 


1 OG       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  5tli  Division  under  Major-Gen- 
eral  Kodionof,  the  Archangel  Regiment,  the  Wologda  Regi- 
ment, and  2  batteries  crossed  the  Grivitza  brook,  passed 
through  the  village,  and  formed  for  attack  to  the  west  of  the 
latter.  Both  batteries  were  in  the  center,  on  the  right  the 
Archangel  Regiment,  on  the  left  the  ^Yologda  Regiment. 
Each  regiment  deployed  a  rifle  company  as  skirmishers  in 
front  and  formed  the  three  battalions  in  rear  in  three  lines, 
the  first  two  in  company  columns,  the  rear  one  in  battalion 
column. 

Immediately  upon  crossing  the  brook  the  brigade  re- 
ceived severe  artillery  fire  from  the  w^orks  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Grivitza  brook,  slightly  to  the  left  of  the  direction  of 
attack;  a  caisson  of  the  6th  Battery  was  blown  up. 

The  brigade  now  advanced  to  the  attack:  the  Archangel 
Regiment  straight  on  the  redoubt;  the  Wologda  Regiment, 
advancing  slightly  its  left  shoulder,  past  the  redoubt  and 
against  an  entrenched  camp  500  yards  farther  in  rear  and 
connected  with  the  redoubt  by  trenches. 

Twice  during  the  advance  General  Rodionof  halted  the 
troops  in  sheltered  depressions  to  restore  order  in  the  bat- 
talions. On  approaching  the  redoubt  the  interval  between 
the  regiments,  through  which  the  two  batteries  had  kept 
firing,  was  closed.  The  Archangel  Regiment  threw  itself 
on  the  redoubt  from  the  front,  passed  the  deep,  steep  ditch, 
and  climbed  the  breastwork,  which  was  10  feet  high  and 
slippery  from  the  rain.  At  the  same  time  a  portion  of  the 
Wologda  Regiment,  which  had  overlapped  the  redoubt  on  the 


The  Assault  on  Plevna.  107 

left,  entered  the  work  from  the  gorge;  the  rest  of  the  regi- 
ment advanced  past  the  redoubt  against  the  camp,  engaged 
the  troops  posted  there,  and  prevented  them  from  coming  to 
the  support  of  the  garrison  of  tlie  redoubt,  which  was  cut 
down  after  a  furious  resistance.  From  the  north,  Roumanian 
troops — particularly  the  2d  Rifle  Battalion  — also  penetrated 
into  the  redoubt.  Five  guns  were  captured.  The  Colonel 
of  the  Archangel  Regiment  and  the  commander  of  the  Rou*- 
manian  brigade  were  killed  near  the  works. 

At  7:30  the  Russian  brigade  was  assembled  at  the  re- 
doubt. Colonel  Rykatschef  relinquished  his  attack  on  the 
west  camp,  assumed  command  in  place  of  General  Rodionof, 
who  had  been  wounded,  re-formed  the  disordered  battalions, 
and  posted  them  partly  in  the  redoubt,  partly  in  the  adjoin- 
ing trenches.  During  the  night  the  Turks  make  three  at- 
tacks to  recover  the  redoubt,  but  were  repulsed  by  fire  and 
bayonet. 

The  loss  of  the  brigade  was  22  officers  and  1,300  men 
killed  and  wounded. 

A  sapper  company,  an  improvised  sapper  company 
formed  of  men  of  both  regiments,  and  on  the  extreme  right, 
as  outer  flank  guard,  the  Gth  Sotnia  of  the  34th  Don  Cossacks 
had  a  part  in  the  action. 

3.     The  Attack  of  the  Center  on  the  Radischevo  Works. 

The  troops  in  the  center,  between  the  Bulgareni  and 
Lovtcha  roads,  may  be  divided  into  four  groups  according 
to  their  tasks: 


108       Tactical  l^iiidics  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

((/)  To  attack  the  Kadischevo  works:  the  regiments 
Uglitz,  No.  63,  Kazan,  No,  64,  Jaroslaf,  No.  117,  Shuja,  No. 
118,  all  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Schnitnikolt', 
commander  of  the  30tli  Division; 

(&)  To  protect  the  batteries :  the  regiments  Penza,  No. 
121,  and  Tamboflf,  No.  122; 

(c)  Special  reserve  of  the  center:  the  regiments  Kos- 
loff.  No.  12.3,  and  Woronesh,  No.  124; 

(d)  Main  reserve:  the  regiments  Galitz,  No.  20,  Koloma, 
No.  119,  Serpuchoff,  No.  120.  An  unfortunate  accident  dis- 
arranged the  combination  from  the  beginning.  The  dense 
fog,  brisk  infantry  fire  on  the  extreme  left  (Skobeleff),  and 
an  insignificant  movement  in  the  Turkish  trenches  caused 
one  battalion  of  the  Uglitz  Kegiment  to  attack  prematurely 
at  11  a.  m.,  drawing  after  it  the  rest  of  the  regiment  and  also 
the  Jaroslaf  Regiment.  After  a  severe  action,  the  two  regi- 
ments captured  the  rifie-trenches  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  the 
redoubt,  but  were  compelled  to  retire  on  the  arrival  of  Turk- 
ish reinforcements,  after  losing  half  of  their  men  and  nearly 
all  their  officers. 

Though  deprived  by  this  accident  of  half  of  his  troops, 
General  Schnitnikoff  deemed  it  advisable  to  adhere  to  the 
original  disposition  and  advanced  at  the  appointed  time 
with  the  Kazan  and  Shuja  Regiments.  On  the  march  he 
met  the  retreating  Uglitz  and  Jaroslaf  Battalions,  which 
carried  disorder  into  his  ranks.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Kos- 
loff  and  Woronesh  Regiments  and  the  Galitz  Regiment  of  the 
main  reserve  were  brought  forward  in  support  of  the  attack. 


The  Assault  on  Pleimi.  109 

The  attack  was  finally  repulsed  with  enormous  loss:  the  7 
regiments  engaged  lost  altogether  110  officers  and  5,200 
men  killed  and  wounded;  the  greater  part  of  the  losses  fall- 
ing- on  the  Uglitz  and  Jaroslaf  Regiments. 

Jj.     Attack  hi/  the  Left  Winf/  on  the  Krisltin  Tro/-A-.S', 

The  task  set  General  Hkobeletf  was  to  capture  the  so- 
called  "third  knoll"  of  the  ''Green  Hills"  and  the  line  of  re- 
doubts in  rear  of  Krishin,  which  formed  the  direct  protec- 
tion of  the  camp  of  the  Turkish  reserves. 

To  enable  him  to  accomplish  his  task,  the  following 
troops  were  placed  at  his  disposal:  the  regiments  Vladimir. 
Xo.  61,  Susdal,  No.  02,  Reval,  No.  7,  the  3d  Rifle  Brigade,  3 
nine-pounder  batteries,  1  four-j)ounder  battery,  and  1  siege 
guns, 

Skobeleff  resolved  on  the  immediate  capture  of  the 
"third  knoll"  and  to  attack  the  redoubts  in  rear  simultane- 
ously with  the  general  attack  at  3  p.  m. 

After  the  10  guns,  jjosted  previously  at  the  east  of  the 
Tutchenitza  ravine,  had  taken  the  northern  slopes  of  the 
"Green  Hills"  for  some  time  under  fire,  Skobeleff.  at  10  a.  m., 
advanced  and  occupied  the  "third  knoll"  with  the  following 
troops:  in  the  center  2  Vladimir  battalions  in  two  lines  of 
company  columns,  on  their  right  the  10th  Rifle  Battalion,  on 
the  left  3  Estland  companies,  in  rear  as  special  reserve  the 
3d  Vladimir  Battalion  and  3  batteries.  The  "thiid  knoll" 
svns  deserted  by  the  enemy,  but  he  was  annoyed  by  fiie  from 
Turkish  infantry  in  the  trenches  between  this  knoll  and  the 
redoubts. 


110      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plerna. 

The  3d  Vladimir  Battalion  having  been  bi'()u«;ht  to  the 
front  to  reinforce  the  fighting  line,  its  place  as  special  reserve 
was  taken  by  the  Susdal  Regiment,  formed  in  battalion  col- 
umns in  rear  of  the  fighting  line  under  the  best  cover  ob- 
tainable. About  2  p.  m.  strong  lines  of  Turkish  skirmishers 
advanced  up  the  slopes  of  the  "Green  Hills"  against  the 
troops  on  the  top;  the  fire  of  the  Turkish  infantry  increased 
more  and  more  in  strength  and  inflicted  sensible  losses  not 
only  on  the  troops  in  the  firing  line,  but  also  on  the  first 
echelon  of  the  reserves  posted  1,000  yards  in  rear. 

In  view  of  these  circumstances  and  of  the  fact  that  the 
general  attack  was  soon  to  begin.  General  Skobelefl:  ordered 
the  Susdal  Regiment  to  drive  back  the  Turkish  skirmish 
lines.  This  was  done;  the  Turks  did  not  withstand  the 
attack  and  fell  back  on  their  redoubts;  from  there  and  from 
the  adjoining  rifle-trenches  they  maintained  a  brisk  and 
galling  fire  against  the  Russian  troops. 

About  2:30  p.  m.  Skobelefl"s  troops  had  approximately 
the  following  position:  on  the  "third  knoll"  in  the  firing  line 
next  the  enemy  the  Vladimir  and  Susdal  Regiments  and  the 
9th  and  10th  Rifle  Battalions;  in  the  depression  between 
the  "third"  and  "second  knoll"  the  Reval  Regiment;  in  the 
entrenched  position  on  the  "second  knoll"  2  Kaluga  and  2 
Estland  battalions  with  3  batteries;  in  the  depression  be- 
tween the  "first"  and  "second  knoll"  the  Libau  Regiment  and 
the  11th  and  12th  Rifle  Battalions;  1  Kaluga  battalion  held 
the  village  of  Brestovetz. 


The  Assault  on  PJeviia.  ill 

At  2:30  p.  m.  the  batteries  on  the  "second  kuoll"  upened 
over  the  heads  of  the  troops  on  the  "third  knoll." 

At  3  p.  m,  Skobeleff  gave  the  order  to  attack:  the  troops 
in  first  line  descended  from  the  "third  knoll."  crossed  the 
deep  depression  between  the  knoll  and  the  height  beyond, 
and  began  to  ascend  the  steep  height  on  whose  crest  lay  the 
three  strong  redoubts,  the  western  one  of  which  was  known 
as  the  '^redoubt  of  Krishin."  The  redoubts  were  connected 
by  trenches  and  on  the  slopes  in  front  were  a  series  of  rifle- 
trenches. 

The  attack,  which  was  directed  at  first  against  the  east- 
ern and  middle  redoubt,  was  received  by  a  murderous  mus- 
ketry fire  from  the  rifle-trenches  and  redoubts,  and  also  In- 
artillery  fire  from  the  redoubts.  The  attack  of  the  IV.  Corps 
on  the  entrenchments  north  of  Kadischevo  having  mean- 
while failed,  the  artillery  of  the  western  portion  of  these 
fortifications  then  directed  its  tire  across  The  Tutchenitza 
ravine  against  ihe  troops  of  C>kobelefl',  which  wore  attacking 
the  Turkish  right 

The  efficacy  of  this  severe  fire  and  the  ensuing  losses 
brought  the  attack  to  a  stop;  part  of  the  attacking  troops 
halted  in  the  depression,  and  those  which  had  begun  to  ascend 
the  further  slope  tried  to  find  cover,  and  ojiened  a  ratlier  in- 
effective fire  against  the  we-ll -covered  adversary. 

Skobeleff  now  ordered  the  Reval  Regiment  1  >  advance 
to  the  support  of  the  troops  engaged,  and  the  Libau  Regi- 
ment and  11th  and  12th  Rifle  Battalions,  posted  as  reserves 
between  the  ''first"  and  ''second  knoll,"  to  take  the  place  of 


1 1 2       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

the  Reval  Regiment  in  the  depression  between  the  "second" 
and  "third  knoll." 

The  Reval  Regiment  advanced  with  firm  order,  crossed 
the  brook,  ascended  the  bare  slope  beyond,  and  carried  for- 
w^ard  with  it  parts  of  the  troops  engaged  there,  but  the  at- 
tack of  this  regiment  was  also  stopped  half  way  up,  and  the 
remnants  of  the  Madimir  and  Susdal  Regiments  and  9th  and 
10th  Ritle  Battalions  began  to  fall  back — singly  at  first,  then 
in  crowds. 

Skobeleff  now  had  to  decide  whether  to  throw  in  his  last 
reserves  for  a  decisive  attack,  or,  in  view  of  the  failure  of 
the  attack  of  the  IV.  Corps,  to  order  the  retreat  of  the  troops 
engaged,  under  cover  of  part  of  his  reserves. 

He  decided  for  the  former:  the  Libau  Regiment  (leaving 
3  companies  in  rear)  and  the  11th  and  12th  Rifle  Battalions 
were  ordered  forward,  and  were  joined  by  those  remnants 
of  the  Vladimir,  vSusdal,  and  Reval  Regiments  and  the  9th 
and  10th  Rifle  Battalions  which  were  still  in  the  firing  line; 
the  whole  line  advanced  with  a  cheer  in  the  direction  of  the 
middle  redoubt  and  captured  the  rifle-trenches  in  front,  the 
Turks  withdrawing  within  the  line  of  redoubts. 

Encouraged  by  their  first  success,  the  Russian  battalions 
continued  the  attack  with  great  determination,  though  in 
disordered  crowds;  the  nearer  they  approached  the  enemy's 
position,  the  less  effective  became  the  enemy's  fire;  the  Turk- 
ish line  wavered  and  the  foremost  Russian  detachments 
penetrated  into  the  trenches  between  the  eastern  and  middle 
redoubts.     At  4 :25  p.  m.  the  middle  redoubt  was  in  the  hands 


The  Assault  on  Flerna.  113 

of  the  assailants,  who  seized  almost  the  entire  line  of  tiench 
up  to  the  eastern  redoubt.  One  gun  was  abandoned  in  the 
redoubt. 

Several  thousand  men  of  various  organizations  soonfilied 
the  interior  of  the  captured  redoubt  and  trenches;  those  ar- 
riving later  found  no  shelter  from  the  fire  from  the  other 
positions  of  the  Turks;  the  captured  middle  redoubt  was, 
moreover,  open  to  the  rear  and  its  interior  exposed  to  the 
fire  from  the  western  (Krishin)  redoubt,  which  was  making 
great  havoc  among  the  Russians  crowded  together  in  the 
interior.  At  the  same  time  strong  Turkish  reserves  ad- 
vanced to  the  counter-attack  from  the  entrenched  camp  in 
rear  of  the  line  of  redoubts,  partly  against  the  left,  partly 
against  the  front  of  the  Russians. 

Captain  Kuropatkin  of  the  general  staff  gathered  some 
300  men  from  those  inside  the  redoubt,  and,  moving  1*00 
paces  to  the  left,  led  them  against  the  enemy;  this  nucleus 
was  joined  by  other  crowds  of  assailants  arriving  at  tliis 
time,  and  about  5:15  p.  m.  the  counter-attack  against  the 
Russian  left  was  repulsed,  though  not  without  great  loss. 

At  5:o0  p.  m.,  when  the  Turkish  fire  slackened  somewhat, 
the  Russians  began  to  entrench  the  captured  position  on  the 
side  toward  the  enemy;  the  almost  total  absence  of  entrench- 
ing tools  was  painfull}^  felt. 

The  rapid  retreat  of  the  Turks  who  had  advanced  from 
the  Krishin  redoubt  against  the  Russian  left  had  been  influ- 
enced to  a  certain  extent  by  the  appearance  of  General 
Leontieff's  cavalry  in  the  vicinity;   a  horse  battery  opened 


1  ]  4      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

fire  on  the  redoubt  and  a  detachment  of  dismounted  Cossacks 
occupied  the  village  of  Krishin,  thereby  making  the  Turks 
uneasy  for  their  own  right  flank  and  preventing  an  energetic 
execution  of  the  counter-attack  against  the  Russian  left. 

Meanwhile  a  brisk  fire  was  maintained  from  the  east- 
ern against  the  captured  middle  redoubt,  and  part  of  the 
connecting  trench  was  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Turks.  An 
officer  collected  a  detachment  of  about  100  volunteersto  drive 
them  out,  seized  the  trench,  and,  carried  away  by  success, 
advanced  against  the  east  redoubt,  where  most  of  the  men 
fell  under  the  murderous  fire  of  the  Turks, 

Meanwhile  Colonel  Shestakoff  of  the  general  stafl",  act- 
ing under  orders  from  Prince  Imeretinski,  was  busy  in  rear 
of  the  front  collecting  the  scattered  men  and  forming  them 
into  detachments.  Thanks  to  his  efforts,  the  following  de- 
tachments formed  of  scattered  men  arrived  in  line  of  battle 
at  5  p.  m.,  in  addition  of  the  3  Libau  companies  which  had 
been  held  back  at  first:  2  Susdal  companies,  ^  Eeval  com- 
pany, 2^  Vladimir  companies,  and  1  company  of  the  12th 
Rifle  Battalion.  The  detachments  belonging  to  the  Vladi- 
mir and  Reval  Regiments  and  12th  Rifle  Battalion  rein- 
forced the  defenders  of  the  middle  redoubt,  over  which 
Major-General  Dobrovolski,  co^imander  of  the  rifle  brigade, 
and,  after  he  was  mortally  wounded,  Major-General  Teb- 
jauik,  commander  of  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  10th  Infantry 
Division,  assumed  command. 

The  5  liibau  and  Susdal  companies  were  led  forward 
against  the  east  redoubt,  supported  by  mixed  detachments 


The  Assault  on  Plevna.  115 

from  the  middle  redoubt;  at  5:30  p.  m.  tke  east  redoubt  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Russians;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mosze- 
woi,  of  the  Susdal  Regiment,  assumed  command  there. 

With  the  approach  of  darkness  the  Turkish  fire  slack- 
ened somewhat,  but  never  died  out  completely  throughout 
the  night. 

5.     The  Night  of  Septemher  llth-12th. 

As  darkness  settled  down,  the  troops  of  the  Russian  left 
wing  occupied  about  the  following  positions: 

Fractions  of  the  Vladimir,  Susdal,  Reval,  and  Libau 
Regiments  and  of  the  4  rifle  battalions  held  the  two  (^ap 
tured  redoubts  and  the  trenches  between  them;  opposite 
their  front  was  the  entrenched  camp  of  the  Turks  between 
the  town  and  river;  on  their  left  the  Krishin  redoubt  was 
still  in  the  hands  of  the  Turks;  on  their  right,  beyond  the 
Tutchenitza  ravine,  were  the  western  works  of  the  Rad- 
ischevo  entrenchments. 

In  the  rear  of  the  line  of  battle  the  ''third  knoll"  was  not 
occupied;  on  the  ''second  knoll"  2  Estland  battalions  and  2 
very  weak  Kaluga  battalions  covered  the  great  artillery 
position  of  24  guns;  1  Kaluga  battalion  held  the  village  of 
Brestovetz. 

To  guard  the  intermediate  space  of  almost  2,000  yards 
between  the  captured  redoubts  and  the  artillery  position  on 
the  "second  knoll,"  General  Skobeleff  personally  took  posi- 
tion at  dark  with  2  weak  battalions  in  the  middle  of  this 
space  at  the  northern  foot  of  the  '"third  knoll"  and  deployed 


J 1 6       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

2  companies  to  cover  his  right  and  left,  one  fronting  east, 
the  other  west;  the  remaining  3  companies  halted  with 
Skobeleff  and  faced  north. 

Scattered  men,  singly  and  in  groups,  moved  about  every- 
where— some  of  them  returning  from  the  redoubts,  where 
they  could  no  longer  find  cover,  and  some  coming  from  the 
rear  and  endeavoring  to  find  their  organizations  in  the  line 
of  battle.  Skobeleff  had  as  many  or  them  as  possible  col- 
lected by  members  of  his  staff  and  formed  into  a  battalion, 
without  regard  to  the  organizations  to  which  they  belonged. 
After  some  hours,  the  battalion  had  reached  a  strength  of 
more  than  1,000  men,  when  a  new  subdivision  was  made,  the 
men  of  the  several  regiments  and  of  the  rifle  brigade  being 
each  formed  into  a  separate  company. 

The  2  companies  mentioned  had  hardly  deployed  on  the 
flanks  when  Turkish  detachments  advanced  on  the  left  from 
the  direction  of  Krishiu,  but  were  repulsed  by  the  company 
deployed  on  that  flank. 

Soon  afterward  volleys  were  fired  against  the  Russian 
position  from  the  right  and  the  bullets  fell  near  the  reserves. 
The  darkness  prevented  the  firing  troops  from  being  recog- 
nized, but  patrols  reported  them  to  be  Russians.  Deeming 
it  possible  that  detachments  of  the  IV.  Corps  may  have 
crossed  the  Tutchenitza  ravine  to  make  a  night  attack,  Sko- 
beleff forbade  his  men  to  fire.  Patrols  were  again  sent  out 
and  made  a  positive  report  that  the  firing  troops  were  Turks 
some  hundred  paces  in  front  of  the  Russian  skirmish  line. 


Tlie  Assault  on  Flcuna.  1 1 7 

Fire  was  opened  on  both  sides,  but,  on  account  of  the  darli- 
ness,  nothing  but  the  Hash  of  the  guns  could  be  seen. 

To  get  his  main  body  out  of  the  line  of  the  Turkish  flank- 
ing fire,  Skobeleff  led  it  about  1,000  paces  to  the  rear  in  the 
utmost  silence,  and  prolonged  his  skirmish  lines,  which  had 
remained  in  jjlace,  by  adding  a  deployed  company  to  each. 
The  fatigue  of  his  men  had  become  such  that  they  would 
fall  asleep  as  soon  as  halted;  to  be  prepared  for  an  emer- 
gency, Skobelelf  had  them  waked  up  from  time  to  time  and 
formed. 

By  accident  a  sotnia  of  Caucasian  and  half  a  sotuia  of 
Don  Cossacks  arrived  at  t^kobeleff's  position  at  midnight, 
whereupon  he  immediately  sent  patrols  to  the  right  and 
left  beyond  the  skirmish  lines;  60  of  the  Cossacks  he  re 
tained,  resolved  to  oppose  them  to  any  sudden  attack  by  the 
enemy. 

Upon  report  that  the  firing  line  was  getting  short  of 
ammunition,  Skobeleff  had  ordered  up  ammunition-carts; 
two  of  them  reached  his  position  and  he  sent  the  ammuni- 
tion to  the  firing  line  by  special  detachments.  The  differ- 
ence in  the  armament  caused  some  difficulty:  the  infantry 
was  armed  with  the  Krenka,  the  Rifles  with  the  Berdan  rifle, 
and  the  latter  were  therefore  unable  to  use  the  infantry 
ammunition,  which  alone  was  contained  in  the  two  carts. 
A  Cossack  non-commisioned  officer,  who  with  20  Cossacks 
was  sent  after  Berdan  cartridges,  finally  brought  a  small 
supply  in  the  nosebags  of  his  detachment ;  thus  relieving  the 
want  to  some  extent. 


118       Tactical  ^Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plcrna. 

While  the  events  just  described  were  taking  place  in 
rear  of  the  line  of  battle  proper,  the  utmost  activity  was 
maintained  in  the  latter  throughout  the  night. 

The  open  gorges  of  the  two  captured  redoubts  had  to  be 
closed,  the  enemy's  rifle-trenches  had  to  be  arranged  for 
cover  from  the  opposite  side,  and  some  new  trenches  had  to 
be  made  to  cover  the  left  against  the  Krishin  redoubt,  the 
lines  having  been  marked  out  during  daylight  by  Captain 
Kuropatkin  of  the  general  staff.  The  execution  of  the  work 
was  extremely  difficult,  owing  to  the  almost  total  absence 
of  entrenching  tools;  the  Russian  soldiers  well  understood 
the  importance  of  the  task  in  view  of  the  murderous  charac- 
ter of  the  enemy's  fire,  and  worked  for  dear  life  with  bayo- 
nets, side  arms,  camp-kettle  lids,  and  bare  hands. 

With  the  beginning  of  darkness  the  Turkish  fire  had 
considerably  slackened;  but  toward  10  p.  m.  strong  Turkish 
bodies  rushed  on  the  Russian  position  with  much  yelling  and 
a  severe  fire,  but  in  this,  as  well  as  in  several  subsequent 
attempts,  they  were  repulsed  by  the  fire  of  the  Russians.  In 
one  of  these  attempts  the  retreating  assailants  were  mis- 
taken for  Russians  by  fresh  Turkish  reserves  which  were 
coming  up,  and  subjected  to  a  severe  musketry  fire. 

6.     TJie  12th  of  Septemher. 

Toward  6  a.  m.  the  Turks  opened  a  severe  artillery  fire 

from  the  Krishin  redoubt,  the  entrenched  camp,  and  the 

works  beyond  the  Tutchenitza  ravine,  and  caused  at  once 

considerable  losses  to  the  Russians.     To  engage  the  Krishin 


The  Assault  on  Plevna.  119 

redoubt  Skobeleff  ordered  4  nine-poimders  to  be  brought 
inside  the  middle  redoubt  and  to  open  fire,  which  served  to 
^encourage  the  troops  in  the  redoubt. 

Soon  afterward  large  bodies  of  Turks,  preceded  by  dense 
swarms  of  skirmishers,  advanced  against  the  Russian  left 
and  penetrated  to  within  300  yards  of  the  Russian  position 
despite  the  severe  fire  with  which  they  were  greeted.  There 
the  attack  was  checked  and  soon  converted  into  a  retreat; 
at  900  yards  from  the  Russian  position  the  Turks  halted  and 
opened  a  severe  fire. 

At  8  a.  m.  a  second  Turkish  attack  began,  which  was 
chiefly  directed  against  the  left  flank  of  the  Russian  first 
line;  Skobeleff,  who  was  on  the  ''third  knoll,"  dispatched 
from  there  a  skirmish  line,  which  opened  fire  at  900  yards 
against  the^ right  flank  of  the  attacking  Turks;  a  battery  was 
brought  up  to  the  "third  knoll"  to  fire  also  against  their 
right.  Notwithstanding  the  effective  cross-fire  of  the  12 
guns  (8  on  the  "third  knoll"  and  4  in  the  middle  redoubt),  the 
Turks  approached  the  Russian  rifle-trenches  to  within  500 
yards,  came  to  a  halt,  maintained  a  brisk  fire  for  some  time, 
and  then  fell  back  with  great  loss. 

Meanwhile  the  defenders  of  the  east  redoubt  had  been 
engaged  since  early  morning  with  the  enemy's  detachments 
posted  on  the  outskirts  of  Plevna  and  attempting  to  turn  the 
Russian  right. 

Convinced  of  the  importance  of  the  advantages  gained 
by  General  Skobelefl",  Osman  Pasha  utilized  the  inactivity  of 
the  Russians  opposite  his  loft  and  center  to  send  all  troops 


1 20      Tactical  /Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plana. 

that  could  possibly  be  spared  to  reinforce  his  threatened 
right. 

Leaving  a  thiclc  skirmish  line,  which  maintained  a  severe 
tire,  in  a  well-covered  position  opposite  the  two  redoubts  in 
the  hands  of  the  Russians,  the  Turks  assembled  their  main 
force  near  the  Krishin  redoubt,  to  advance  from  there 
against  the  Russian  left.  The  reinforcements,  withdrawn 
from  the  east,  moved  partly  through  Plevna  against  the 
right  of  the  line  of  captured  redoubts,  partly  in  the  Tutch- 
enitza  ravine  against  the  position  of  the  Russians  on  the 
"third  knoll." 

At  10:30  a.  m.  the  third  attack  began,  at  first  from  front 
and  left  against  the  middle  redoubt.  After  two  Turkish 
batteries  had  caused  great  havoc  among  the  defenders 
crowded  together  inside,  these  men,  after  an  uninterrupted 
exposure  to"severe  fire  for  thirty  hours,  began  to  waver  and 
to  leave  the  redoubt — singly  at  first,  afterward  In  crowds. 
The  defenders  of  the  east  redoubt  followed  the  infectious 
example,  but  when  Skobeleff  came  galloping  up  from  the 
''third  knoll"  and  spoke  words  of  admonition  and  cheer,  all 
turned  about  and  reoccupied  the  redoubts  before  the  Turks 
were  able  to  take  possession  of  them.  Isolated  Turkish  de- 
tachments which  succeeded  in  penetrating  into  the  redoubts 
were  cut  down. 

On  returning  to  his  position  on  the  "third  knoll"  Sko- 
belefif  sent  forward  some  companies,  formed  of  dispersed 
men,  to  support  the  troops  engaged  at  the  redoubts. 

Meanwhile  Turkish  troops  were  forming  partly  in  the 


The  Assault  oit  FIcciki.  121 

Tutchenitza  ravine  itself,  partly  on  its  eastern  edge  (north 
of  the  Radischevo  ravine),  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the 
"third  knoll,"  A  company  formed  of  dispersed  riflemen  was 
deploj'ed  for  the  defense  of  the  western  edge,  while  two  guns 
attempted  to  enfilade  the  ravine;  the  Turks  nevertheless 
su(.'ceeded  in  ascending  the  w'estern  edge  of  the  ravine  and 
driving  back  the  Russian  riflemen,  and  it  was  only  when 
assisted  by  two  Libau  companies  (which  had  been  detached 
yesterday  and  had  very  insignificant  losses)  and  a  Caucasian 
Cossack  sotnia  that  the  Turks  were  driven  back  into  the 
ravine.  The  Turkish  reserves  in  the  ravine  at  the  southern 
exit  of  Plevna  fell  back  into  the  town. 

Skobeleff  had  become  convinced  on  the  11th  Tliat  tlie 
capture  of  the  entrenched  height  between  town  and  river 
would  decide  the  victory,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  he  was 
too  weak  to  gain  that  result.  Having  asked  for  reinforce- 
ments on  the  11th,  General  Skobeleff  expressed  to  Colonel 
Orloff,  who  arrived  from  Grand  Headquarters  to  inform  him- 
self of  the  state  of  affairs,  his  opinion  that  without  reinforce- 
ments he  would  be  unable  to  maintain  his  position.. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  Skobeleff  received  a 
copy  of  the  following  order  addressed  to  General  Prince 
Imeretinski : 

"By  direction  of  the  Connnander-iu-Chief,  I  order  you 
and  General  Skobelett'  to  entren(.-h  and  maintain  yourselves 
In  the  positions  captured  to-day.  We  cannot  send  rein- 
forcements, because  we  have  none. 

(Signed)         "Zo/o/f,  LinifciKnif-GcncrdJ." 


122       Tactical  aS7//<//V.s-  oh  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

jS'otwitlistajiding  this  discouraging  order,  SkobelefE 
hoped  for  a  favorable  turn,  since  the  entire  IV,  Corps  stood 
east  of  the  Tutchenitza  ravine,  apparently  in  readiness  for 
battle,  but  inactive. 

At  10:30  a.  m.,  as  the  third  Turkish  attack  began.  Colo- 
nel OrlofE  delivered  to  General  Skobeleff  the  following 
order : 

"By  order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  if  you  cannot 
hold  the  captured  positions,  you  are  to  fall  back — if  possible, 
not  before  evening — in  the  direction  of  Tutchenitza,  covered 
by  the  cavalry  of  General  Leontieff.  Communicate  this  or- 
der, which  is  to  be  kept  secret  otherwise,  to  General  Prince 
Imeretihski.  The  Grivitza  redoubt  is  in  our  hands,  but  the 
attack  is  not  to  be  continued,  and  we  are  to  fall  back  slowly. 

8:30  a.m. 

(Signed)         '"Zotoff,  Lkiitcnant-Gciivral."' 

Even  after  the  receipt  of  this  order  Skobeleff  did  not 
give  up  hope  of  a  general  turn  for  the  better;  he  hoped  at 
any  moment  to  see  the  IV.  Corps  advance  to  the  attack  to  the 
east  of  the  Tutchenitza  ravine. 

The  situation  of  the  defenders  in  the  redoubts  was  be- 
coming more  and  more  critical,  receiving  fire  not  only  from 
the  Krishin  redoubt  in  front,  but  from  the  Radischevo  works 
in  rear,  ^  At  1  p,  m,  2  of  the  4  guns  in  the  middle  redoubt 
had  become  useless  and  the  other  2  were  almost  without  men 
and  teams,  Skobeleff  ordered  these  guns  to  be  relieved  by 
3  guns  of  the  5th  battery  of  the  3d  Brigade  posted  in  rear  of 
the  ''third  knoll."  The  movement  having  attracted  the  at- 
tention of  the  Turks,  thev  increased  their  fire,  causing  con- 


The  Assault  on  Pleimi.  123 

siderable  loss  to  the  newly  arrived  guus  iu  the  redoubt,  bu1 
the  latter  now  opened  on  the  Krishin  redoubt;  the  one 
ammunition-wagon  brought  along  was  i^osted  between  the 
breastwork  and  traverse,  the  only  comparatively  safe  place 
in  the  redoubt.  It  was  nevertheless  blown  uj)  by  a  hostile 
shell,  killing  and  wounding  many  men  in  the  narrow  space 
of  the  redoubt;  among  the  wounded  was  Major-General 
Tebjanik  (who  had  assumed  command  in  the  redoubt  after 
the  wounding  of  General  Dobrovolski)  and  Captain  Kuro- 
patkin  of  the  general  staff. 

At  2  p.  m,  the  last  available  troops,  sent  by  General 
Prince  Imeretinski,  arrived.  Two  exceedingly  small  Kaluga 
battalions  (heretofore  retained  as  protection  for  the  artillery 
position)  and  a  detachment  made  up  of  200  dispersed  rifle- 
men were  disposed  as  follows:  4  Kaluga  companies  pro- 
ceeded to  the  redoubts,  ?>  companies  covered  the  right  on  the 
''third  knoll"  against  the  Tutehenitza  ravine,  ;5  companies 
took  post  in  rear  of  the  left.  The  combined  rifle  detachment 
was  at  first  posted  in  rear  of  the  "second  knoll"  as  a  last 
general  reserve,  but  was  soon  ordered  forward  to  the  left, 
where  Skobeleff  also  ordered  4  guns  to  proceed  and  to  take 
up  a  covered  position. 

Soon  afterward  the  fourth  attack  began  from  the 
Krishin  redoubt.  This  time  Skobeleff  allowed  the  Turks 
to  approach  to  within  500  j'ards  and  then  greeted  them  with 
rapid  musketry  fire  from  his  infantry,  and  canister  from 
his  4  concealed  guns.  The  Turks  halted  and  replied  to  the 
fire,  but  their  fresh  rc'serves  were  not  able  to  carry  the  attack 


124       Tactical  IStiidics  on  the  Battles  Around  Plana. 

forward;  after  three-quarters  of  an  hour  of  very  costly  fire 
action,  the  Turks  fell  back. 

At  2:30  p.  m.,  when  Skobeleff  arrived  at  the  redoubts  to 
examine  personally  how  matters  stood  in  his  hrst  line,  the 
fortifications  presented  a  ghastly  spectacle.  The  interior 
of  both  redoubts  and  the  trench  connecting  them  were  filled 
with  corpses;  the  gorge  of  the  east  redoubt,  open  toward 
Plevna,  was  closed  by  a  breastwork  made  of  corpses;  the  3 
guns  of  the  3d  Brigade  in  the  middle  redoubt  were  dis- 
mounted, the  cannoneers  killed  or  wounded.  The  2  dis- 
mounted guns  of  the  2d  Brigade  were  removed,  and  the  aban- 
doned Turkish  gun  was  rendered  unserviceable  by  the  re- 
moval of  the  breech-block. 

The  movements  of  the  Turkish  troops  were  plainly  vis- 
ible as  they  assembled  from  all  directions  at  Plevna  against 
Skobeletf's  right.  Those  Turkish  troops  which  had  hereto- 
fore made  several  attacks  from  the  Krishin  redoubt  against 
the  Russian  left  departed  for  the  same  point. 

Upon  his  return  from  the  redoubts  to  the  "Green  Hills,'" 
Skobeleff  was  informed  that  the  Shuja  Regiment,  numbering 
1,300  men,  had  come  from  the  center  to  support  him.  He 
retained  the  regiment  in  reserve  and  sent  several  hundred 
dispersed  men  to  reinforce  the  defenders  of  the  redoubts. 

At  4:30  p.  m.  the  Turks  advanced  in  several  lines  to  make 
the  fifth  attack  simultaneously  on  both  redoubts.  The 
severe  fire  which  greeted  them  did  not  check  them;  though 
the  leading  columns  resolved  themselves  into  disordeied 
swarms,  &till  they  continued  to  advance  with  determination, 
and  were  followed  in  rear  by  fresh  troops. 


The  Assault  on  Flecua.  125 

Before  this  overwlielming  attack  the  defenders  of  the 
middle  redoubt  began  to  give  way  and  abandoned  the  re- 
doubt in  swarms;  the  small  body  of  brave  men  which  faced 
the  attack  fell  after  a  furious  hand-to-hand  struggle,  among 
them  Major  Gortaloff,  who  had  greatly  distinguished  him- 
self on  this  bloody  day. 

Despite  the  loss  of  the  middle  redoubt,  Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Moszewoi  held  out  in  the  east  redoubt  against  the  attack 
which  was  now  directed  against  him  from  the  front  and  both 
flanks.  To  prevent  the  useless  sacrifice  of  the  brave  garri- 
son of  this  redoubt,  Skobelefl:"  ordered  Moszewoi  to  fall  back, 
and  in  order  to  make  the  withdrawal  possible  he  advanced 
in  person  with  the  Shuja  Kegiment  and  a.  battery,  covering 
the  retreat  of  all  troops  engaged  in  front.  An  attempt  at 
pursuit  on  the  part  of  the  Turks  was  frustrated  by  a  splendid 
charge  of  2  sotnias  of  Cossacks. 

A  battery  of  2-1  guns  on  the  ''second  knoll,''  guarded  by 
some  detachments  formed  of  dispersed  men  of  the  Vladimir, 
Susdal,  and  Reval  Regiments,  covered  the  further  retreat, 
the  troops  carrying  their  wounded  along  as  best  they  could. 
On  the  13th  of  September  Skobeleft"  remained  almost  the 
entire  day  on  the  "first  knoll,"  ^ind  at  7  p.  ni.  fell  back  by  or- 
der to  15ogot. 

7.     Losses. 

The  total  loss  sustained  h\  the  Russians  in  the  attacks 
on  Plevna  from  the  7th  to  the  12th  of  September  is  stated  in 
round  numbers  at  300  officers  and  12.500  men.  including  60 
officers  and  3,000  men  killed. 


126      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

According  to  the  special  lists  of  losses,  the  2  regiments 
of  the  right  wing  which  captured  the  Grivitza  redoubt  lost 
22  officers  and  1,305  men;  the  7  regiments  which  vainly 
attacked  the  Radischevo  works  in  the  center  lost  110  officers 
and  5,249  men.  •  Adding  about  300  for  losses  sustained  dur- 
ingthe  artillery  attack  on  the  first  days  of  the  attack,  wehave 
for  the  troops  of  the  left  wing  under  Skobeleff — 6  regiments 
and  4  rifle  battalions — a  loss  of  160  officers  and  5,600  men. 

Individual  losses  cannot  be  accurately  ascertained  from 
the  available  data;  still  some  figures  may  be  given  as 
accurate. 

The  Uglitz  and  Jaroslaf  Regiments,  which  attacked  pre- 
maturely in  the  center,  lost  respectively  370  and  300  killed. 
Of  Skobeleff's  troops,  the  Vladimir  Regiment  lost  200,  the 
Susdal  Regiment  150  killed;  the  former  regiment  lost  36  offi- 
cers killed  and  wounded,  the  latter  15  officers. 

The  3d  Rifle  Brigade,  consisting  of  4  battalions,  which 
had  entered  upon  the  theater  of  war  barely  3,000  strong  and 
had  lost  at  Lovtcha  1  officer  and  132  men  killed  and  17  offi- 
cers and  400  men  wounded,  lost  here  its  commander,  Major- 
General  Dobrovolski,  3  officers  and  177  men  killed,  and  20 
officers  and  666  men  wounded. 

Of  the  superior  leaders,  Major-General  Dobrovolski,  of 
the  rifle  brigade,  was  among  the  killed,  as  already  stated: 
Major-General  Rodionof,  commanding  the  1st  Brigade  of  the 
5th  Division,  and  Major-General  Tebjauik,  commander  of  the 
1st  Brigade  of  the  16th  Division,  were  wounded.     The  loss 


The  As.suKJt  on  Plevna.  127 

of  the  Roumaniaus — 50  officers  and  2,500  men — has  been 
previously  stated. 

The  losses  of  the  Turks  are  not  accurately  known;   op- 
posite General  Skobeleff  they  must  have  been  very  heavy. 

Comments. 
1.  The  above  description  of  the  attack  on  the  (irivitza 
redoubt  is  based  on  the  official  Russian  report;  other  ac- 
counts state  that  two  attacks  were  repulsed  and  that  the 
third  succeeded.  The  difference  may  be  explained  by  the 
two  halts  made  by  the  assailing  troops,  which  practically 
did  interrupt  the  advance,  though  it  does  not  imply  that 
the  attack  was  repulsed. 

There  was  no  preparation  by  infantry  fire;  the  tactical 
form  of  the  attack  was  about  the  same  as  that  of  the  uu- 
successful  assault  on  the  same  works  on  July  30th.  but  in 
this  instance  the  real  result  was  gained  by  the  advance  of 
portions  of  the  Wologda  Regiment  past  the  flank  of  the  re- 
doubt, for  it  seems  that  the  entrance  of  portions  of  the  regi- 
ment through  the  gorge  of  the  redoubt,  and  the  engagement 
of  the  Turkish  reserves  in  rear  by  other  detachments,  brought 
the  attack  to  a  successful  issue. 

It  is  not  quite  clear  whether  in  forming  for  the  attack 
the  first  and  second  line  of  each  regiment  consisted  of  one 
battalion  each,  or  whether  two  battalions  were  formed 
abreast,  each  in  two  lines  of  company  columns;  in  view  of 
the  formation  used  on  other  occasions  where  they  are  clearly 
described,  the  latter  seems  more  probable. 


128       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Since  the  two  tii'st  lines  are  expressly  stated  to  have 
been  formed  in  company  columns,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
in  the  third  line  the  battalions  were  formed  in  mass.  It 
would  seem,  however,  that  all  three  lines  started  at  the  same 
time  with  comparatively  short  distances;  the  two  halts 
seem  to  have  diminished  the  distances  between  the  lines,  the 
whole  in  the  further  course  of  the  attack  formed  a  single 
mass  of  unequal  depth;  special  tactical  employment  of  the 
lines  and  reserve  was  out  of  the  question.  All  reached  the 
enemy  about  the  same  time. 

Although  the  faulty  cooperation  of  the  two  columns  who 
were  attacking  the  same  work  may  be  attributed  to  several 
causes,  it  nevertheless  remains  reprehensible  from  the  pro- 
fessional point  of  view;  proper  combination  and  coopera- 
tion of  the  double  attack  would  no  doubt  have  accomplished 
its  object  more  quickly  and  with  less  loss, 

2,  The  details  of  the  failure  of  the  attack  of  the  center 
are  still  enshrouded  in  obscurity;  no  tactical  details  are 
known  and  the  whole  thing  seems  to  have  been  a  wild  chaos 
from  the  beginning. 

The  fact  that  an  unfortunate  accident  caused  the  prema- 
ture advance  of  the  Uglitz  and  Jaroslaf  Regiments  does  not 
provoke  criticism;  but  it  may  well  be  asked  whether  the 
procedure  after  that  event  might  not  have  been  better  con- 
trived. Obeying  the  letter  of  his  orders,  General  Schnit- 
nikof  held  back  the  two  regiments  still  in  hand  until  3  p,  m,; 
for  three  hours  he  allowed  the  regiments  v.ho  had  advanced 
prematurely  to  fight  single  hauded.       It  might  have  been 


The  Assault  on  Plevna.  129 

assumed  as  certain  that  these  two  regiments  alone  would  not 
be  able  to  take  the  enemy's  works;  on  the  other  hand, it  could 
not  be  presumed  that  these;  regiments  would  be  really  eifect- 
ive  after  lighting  single-handed  for  three  hours  against  great 
odds.  Hence,  after  the  advance  of  the  Uglitz  and  Jaroslaf 
Regiments,  General  Schuitnikof  sliould  either  have  pushed 
the  Kazan  and  Shuja  Regiments  also  forward  at  once,  or  the 
Koslof  and  Woronesh  Regiments  should  have  been  brought 
up  in  order  to  undertake  the  attack  with  sufficient  strength 
from  the  very  beginning;  for,  as  above  stated,  the  Uglitz 
and  Jaroslaf  Regiments  could,  under  the  circumstances,  not 
be  counted  upon  at  3  o'clock. 

Under  the  circumstances,  there  was  no  good  reason  for 
postponing  the  attack  until  3  o'clock  pursuant  to  the  disposi- 
tion, for  not  only  had  the  advance  of  those  two  regiments 
compelled  a  large  part  of  the  Russian  artillery  to  cease  fir- 
ing, but  the  Turks  had  long  been  alarmed  and  prepared  for 
the  assault;  hence  the  contemplated  surprise  could  under 
no  circumstances  be  realized. 

Did  the  commander-in-chief,  posted  in  rear  of  the  cen- 
ter, receive  any  information  whatever  of  the  premature  at- 
tack? If  yes,  when?  Did  he  express  no  opinion  whatever 
to  General  Schnitnikof  as  to  what  he  should  do?  In  what 
formation  was  the  attack  made?  When  and  in  what  direc- 
tion did  the  regiments  from  the  reserve  advance?  These  are 
questions  which  can  not  as  yet  be  answered,  but  which  are 
indispensable  for  any  real  criticism  of  the  bloody  events  in 
the  center. 


130      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

3.  In  turning  now  to  the  events  on  the  Russian  left, 
the  peculiar  mode  of  command  obtaining  here  attracts  our 
attention.  Prince  Imeretinski  was  the  senior  general,  but 
he  played  an  entirely  subordinate  role  by  the  side  of  the 
younger  Skobeleff,  and  was  pushed  altogether  into  the  back- 
ground by  the  latter. 

During  the  initiatory  actions  on  the  8th,  9th,  and  10th 
of  September  Imeretinski  officially  had  the  command  of  all 
troops  of  the  left  wing.  Skobeleff  was  subordinated  to  him, 
but  acted  independently  as  commander  of  an  advance  guard, 
which  was  increased  to  a  strength  equal  to  two-thirds  of  the 
whole  corps.  Since  a  very  small  part  of  the  troops  under 
Imeretinski's  command  was  not  engaged  on  the  10th,  his  to- 
tal subsidence  is  less  striking.  But  on  the  11th  of  Septem- 
ber matters  were  different:  on  this  day  Skobeleff  was 
charged  direct  from  the  headquarters  of  the  West  Army  witli 
the  conduct  of  the  attack  on  the  south  front  of  the  enemy's 
position,  and  was  reinforced  by  part  of  Imeretinski's  troops; 
the  latter  was  left  in  command  of  the  remaining  troops,  and 
ordered  to  support  Skobeleff'  if  necessary.  In  the  course  of 
the  action  Prince  Imeretinski  gradually  sent  all  his  troops 
to  General  Skobeleff's  assistance,  so  that  in  the  end  he  had 
not  a  company  under  his  command  and  was  a  mere  spectator 
on  the  battle-field,  and  was  even  favorably  mentioned  in  the 
junior's  direct  report  to  the  commander-in-chief  for  making 
himself  useful  in  collecting  the  dispersed  men  and  looking 
after  the  sanitary  service.  These  are  conditions  for  which 
our  conception  lacks  understanding  and  expression! 


The  Assault  on  Plevna.  131 

i.  Skobelefif's  method  of  couclucting  the  action  exhib- 
its the  traits  discussed  in  connection  with  the  events  of  July 
30th,  on  a  larger  scale;  careful  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's 
position;  general  prepai-ation  of  the  attack  by  concentrated 
artillery  fire,  careful  formation  of  the  infantry  in  the  fighting 
line,  special  reserves  in  rear  of  the  flanks,  and  a  general  re- 
serve in  two  lines ;  special  preparation  of  the  attack  by  brisk 
fire  of  strong,  well-covered  skirmish  lines,  increased  where- 
ever  possible  by  that  of  some  batteries  or  at  least  some  guns 
brought  into  the  front  line;  advance  of  the  infantry  by 
stages,  occupation  of  the  new  line  reached,  and  renewed  prep- 
aration by  infantry  and  artillery  fire  from  that  point;  great 
care  for  the  safety  of  the  flanks ;  wise  husbanding  of  the  re- 
serves; wherever  practicable,  new  reserves  were  foiuied 
from  troops  heretofore  engaged;  notwithstanding  the  un- 
favorable condition  of  the  ground  for  cavalry,  the  latter  was 
at  the  right  place  at  the  decisive  moment,  was  properly  em- 
pJoyed,  and  took  a  decisive  part  in  the  action;  lastly,  the  in- 
defatigable efforts  in  collecting  scattered  men,  which  alone 
made  it  possible  again  and  again  to  lead  formed  and  half- 
fresh  detachments  into  the  action.  To  be  sure,  mistakes 
may  have  been  made  in  the  details  of  tactical  employment  of 
the  individual  bodies  of  troops,  but  the  conduct  of  the  battle 
as  a  whole  presents  a  brilliant  picture,  interesting  and  fas- 
cinating in  its  smallest  details. 

5.  It  was  only  by  their  utmost  efforts  that  the  Turks 
succeeded  on  the  12th  of  September  in  recapturing  the  re- 
doubts lost  on  tlie  preceding  day,  when  the  complete  inac- 


132      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

tivity  of  the  Russians  opposite  the  Turldsh  left  and  center 
left  the  latter  free  to  use  most  of  their  available  troops  for 
support  of  their  right.  Had  the  Turks  failed  to  drive  Skobe- 
lefif  from  the  position  he  had  captured — and  there  can  be  lit- 
tle doubt  that  this  would  have  been  the  case,  had  the  Rus- 
sian right  and  center  shown  auv  activity  whatever — had  the 
Russians  permanently  ensconced  themselves  on  the  heights 
south  of  Plevna  and  posted  their  numerous  artillery  there, 
the  remaining  portions  of  the  Turkish  position  would,  it  is 
presumed,  have  become  untenable. 

That  the  supreme  command  failed  to  appreciate  the  im- 
portance of  the  advantages  gained  by  Skobeleff,  or  to  do 
anything  for  their  completion,  preservation  or  retention,  is 
probably  due  to  the  fact  that  the  supreme  command,  posted 
in  rear  of  the  center  near  Radischevo,  was  so  struck  and  in- 
fluenced by  the  defeat  inflicted  under  its  own  eyes  as  to  be 
unable  to  divert  its  mind  to  any  other  thought. 

The  complete  inaction  of  the  Russian  center  on  the  12th 
at  a  time  when  but  a  short  distance  away  the  furious  action 
on  the  "Green  Hills"  w^as  fought  out,  does  not  admit  of  ex- 
planation by  the  theory  of  exhaustion  and  losses  on  the  pre- 
vious day;  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  defeat  witnessed 
on  the  preceding  day  had  deprived  the  supreme  command 
of  confidence  in  a  happy  result,  and  that  the  only  thought 
was  to  find  some  honorable  way  out  of  the  battle. 

At  the  time  when  Skobeleff's  request  for  reinforcements 
was  denied,  4  entirely  fresh  regiments  were  available  in  the 
center,  not  to  mention  the  Ingermanland  Regiment  (of  the 


The  Assault  on  Flecna.  133 

3d  Division),  which  was  not  mentioned  in  the  disposition  and 
seems  to  have  been  the  special  escort  of  headquarters. 

The  Shuja  Regiment,  which  came  to  Skobeleff's  assist- 
ance at  noon  on  the  12th  and  covered  the  retreat  of  the  other 
troops  by  an  offensive  movement,  was  one  of  the  7  regiments 
which  on  the  preceding  day  had  suffered  defeat  in  the  center; 
it  may  therefore  be  presumed  that  the  other  regiments  (ex- 
cepting perhaps  the  Uglitz  and  Jaroslaf  Regiments)  were 
again  fit  for  action;  at  any  rate,  they  would  have  been  capa- 
ble to  undertake  the  protection  of  the  artillery  positions, 
thus  setting  those  4  fresh  regiments  free. 

It  should  be  stated,  however,  that  the  Shnja  Regiment 
was  sent  to  Skobeleff's  assistance  not  by  the  supreme  com- 
mand, which  was  opposed  to  any  continuation  of  the  battle, 
but  by  the  commander  of  the  IV.  Corps,  from  courtesy,  as  it 
were. 


1 34       Tactical  Siudies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plerna. 


PART  X. 

WORK  OF  THE  CAVALRY  ON  THE  LEFT  BANK  OF 

THE  VID. 

1.     General  Loshkareff  from  the  1th  to  the  19th  of  Septemhcr. 

On  September  7th  General  Loshkarett",  commander  of 
the  9th  Cavalry  Division,  was  posted  on  the  highroad  east  of 
Grivitza,  between  the  IX.  Corps  and  the  Roumanians,  with 
the  Astrachan  Dragoons.  No.  8,  Kazan  Dragoons,  No.  9,  Bug 
Lancer  Regiment,  No.  9,  Don  Cossacks,  No.  9.  and  the  16th 
Horse  and  2d  Don  Cossack  Battery.  He  was  ordered  to 
move  to  Riben,  pass  the  night  there,  to  draw  to  himself  both 
regular  Roumanian  cavalry  regiments,  the  5th  and  6th  irreg- 
ular cavalry  regiments,  and  1  Roumanian  horse  battery,  to 
cross  the  Vid  on  the  next  day  with  the  united  cavalry  corps,  to 
make  an  energetic  advance  toward  Dubnik,  and  to  threaten 
the  communications  of  Osman  Pasha's  army  by  taking  suit- 
able position  on  the  left  bank. 

Pursuant  to  this  order,  the  8  regiments  of  cavalry  and  3 
batteries  were  assembled  by  9  p.  m.,  September  7th,  at 
Riben,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  brook  which  there  emptied 
into  the  Vid. 

At  6  a.  m.  September  8th  the  Vid  was  crossed,  and  at 
n  :30  a.  m.  Smaret-Trestenik  was  reached,  8  miles  west  of 


Work  of  the  Cavalry.  135 

Riben  and  about  the  same  distance  to  the  northwest  of  the 
bridge  over  the  Vid  at  Plevna. 

Wheeling  to  the  left,  the  cavalry  corps  took  front  to- 
ward the  southeast  against  Plevna.  Thence  the  Roschiori 
(Regular)  Brigade  with  the  battery  moved  to  Dolni  (Lower) 
Netropolie  with  instructions  to  observe  Plevna  and  the  road 
leading  thence  to  Rahova.  The  main  body  of  the  corps 
marched  through  Grorni  (Upper)  Netropolie  to  Dolni  Dub- 
nik,  where  it  went  into  bivouac  at  1:45  p.  m.  On  the  march 
the  Cossacks  of  the  advance  guard  captured  a  small  herd  of 
cattle,  whose  armed  escort  fled  to  Plevna;  nothing  further 
was  seen  of  the  enemy. 

The  line  of  outposts  of  the  Roumanians  at  Lower  Netrop- 
olie  extended  from  the  Vid  opposite  Bivolar  to  the  Sophia 
road,  facing  the  west  front  of  the  Plevna  position.  At  the 
Sophia  road  began  the  Russian  outpost  line,  formed  of  2 
Lancer  squadrons  and  a  sotnia  of  Cossacks,  which  extended 
at  first  southward  along  the  heights  between  the  Vid  and 
highroad,  turned  oft"  to  the  west  half  way  between  Lower 
and  Upper  Dubnik,  crossed  the  road,  and  fronted  toward 
Upper  Dubnik;  the  length  of  the  entire  line  was  about 
lo  miles.  A  separate  detachment  was  posted  in  rear  of  the 
whole  position  in  observation  of  the  road  from  Lower  Dub- 
nik to  Rahova.  The  distance  between  Lower  Dubnik  and 
Lower  Xetropolie  is  about  6  miles;  the  former  place  is  4  miles 
from  the  bridge  over  the  Vid  at  Plevna,  the  latter  about  2i 
miles. 

At  4  p.  m.  reports  were  received  from  the  outposts  that 


136      Tactical  ^^tudies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

from  1,000  to  1,500  cavalry,  followed  by  3  battalions  of  in- 
fantry, were  approaching  Lower  Dubnik  from  Plevna;  at 
the  same  time  the  Eoumanians  reported  that  about  4  bat- 
talions of  infantry  with  some  cavalry  were  approaching 
Lower  Netropolie,  and  that  the  works  of  the  west  front  of 
the  Plevna  position  had  opened  an  artillery  fire. 

The  Roumanians  were  ordered  to  maintain  themselves 
at  Lower  Xetropolie  as  best  they  could ;  the  balance  of  the 
9th  Lancers  (1st  and  2d  squadrons),  a  sotnia  of  Cossacks,  and 
4  Cossack  guns  were  dispatched  to  support  the  Russian  out- 
posts; the  main  body  was  posted  in  readiness  at  Lower 
Dubnik. 

The  Turkish  infantry  halted  within  the  range  of  protec- 
tion afforded  by  the  works;  the  1.000  to  1,500  cavalry  ad- 
vanced against  the  Russian  line  of  outposts,  which  fell  slowly 
back  on  its  supports.  Of  the  latter,  one-half  of  the  1st  squad- 
ron, supported  by  the  formed  detachments  of  the  outpost 
squadrons  (3d  and  4th),  advanced  against  the  Turks  from  the 
front;  the  other  half  X)f  the  1st  squadron  took  them  on  the 
left  flank,  a  platoon  of  the  2d  squadron  on  the  right  flank; 
after  a  brief  hand-to-hand  conflict,  the  Turks  fell  back  on 
their  infantry,  and  the  pursuing  Lancers  were  received 
with  infantry  fire  and  retired.  The  Turkish  cavalry  left  70 
dead  on  the  ground.  The  Turkish  detachments,  which  had 
been  advancing  against  the  Roumanians,  retired  to  the  works 
after  a  brief  artillery  fire,  without  having  made  a  real  at- 
tack. After  the  outposts  had  taken  their  former  positions  and 
the  4  Cossack  guns  had  been  posted  under  cover  to  one  side 


IVor/i-  of  the  Cavalry.  137 

of  the  highroad,  the  Turks  again  advanced  to  the  attack  at 
6  p.  m.  with  infantiy.  At  1,500  yards  the  Turks  were  greeted 
with  shrapnel  fire  from  the  heretofore  concealed  guns,  and 
retired  at  once. 

The  total  Russian  losses  on  this  day  were  3  men  and  9 
horses  killed,  9  men  and  22  horses  wounded.  The  Rou- 
manians suffered  no  loss. 

Early  on  the  9th  of  September  patrols  weie  sent  out 
westward  toward  the  Isker,  southeastward  along  the  high- 
road, and  southward  up  the  Vid.  TTpon  report  of  the  ajj- 
pearance  of  Tcherkesses  west  of  Upper  Dubnik,  2  sotnias 
of  the  9th  Cossacks  were  dispatched  in  that  direction  at  2 
J),  m. 

At  3:30  p.  m.  the  outposts  reported  the  approach  of 
strong  hostile  bodies  against  the  position  of  the  Roschiori 
at  Lower  Netropolie,  and  that  bodies  of  hostile  troops  were 
assembling  at  the  bridge  over  the  Vid,  opposite  the  Russian 
position.  Upon  receipt  of  this  report  the  whole  corps  was 
placed  in  readiness. 

At  4:30  p.  m,  bodies  of  hostile  troops  api)eared  on  the 
heights  on  tlie  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  and  farther  to  the  south 
dense  skirmish  lines,  cavalry  on  the  flanks,  closed  infantry 
and  artillery  in  rear,  amounting  to  about  (>  batlalions,  1 
cavalry  regiment,  and  4  guns.  The  attack  was  supported 
by  artillery  fire  from  the  works  of  Opanetz,  and  was  made 
with  great  determination.  The  Regular  Brigade  retired 
from  Lower  Netropolie.  With  a  view  of  utilizing  the  favor- 
able situation  for  a  successful  attack.  General  Loshkareff 


1 3 8       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

ordered  tbe  Koumaniaus  to  fall  back  to  the  heights  of  Upper 
Netropolie,  in  order  to  entice  the  Turks  as  far  as  possible 
from  their  works;  as  soon  as  the  main  body  took  the  enemy 
in  flank,  the  Roumanians  were  to  attack  in  front. 

The  8th  Dragoon  Regiment,  on  outpost  south  of  Lower 
Netropolie,  was  to  push  2  dismounted  squadrons  under  cover 
of  the  high  corn  and  a  depression  of  the  ground  against  the 
left  flank  of  the  Turks  advancing  on  the  Roumanians;  the 
attack  was  to  be  supported  on  the  left  by  2  mounted  squad- 
rons of  the  9th  Dragoons  with  2  guns  of  the  16th  Horse  Bat- 
tery; 2  Lancer  squadrons  and  the  remaining  4  guns  of  the 
horse  battery  were  posted  on  the  right  as  protection  against 
any  Turks  who  might  advance  from  the  bridge  over  the 
Vid,  Two  sotnias  of  Cossacks  having  been  dispatched  to 
Upper  Dubnik,  and  2  squadrons  of  the  8th  Dragoons  (and 
probably  also  a  sotnia  of  Cossacks)  having  been  deployed 
on  the  extensive  outpost  line,  there  remained  in  general  re- 
serve 4  squadrons  of  Dragoons  and  Lancers,  3  sotnias  of  Cos- 
sacks, the  Cossack  battery,  and  probably  the  2  Kalarashi 
(Irregular)  Regiments,  of  whose  special  employment  nothing 
is  known.  The  attack  directed  simultaneously  against  their 
front  and  flank  caused  the  Turks  to  fall  back  to  their  works 
about  6  p.  m.,  whereupon  the  troops  at  the  bridge  also  with- 
drew. 

While  this  engagement  was  in  progress,  the  detachment 
of  Cossacks  dispatched  to  Upper  Dubnik  reported  that  it 
had  encountered  Tcherkesses,  and  that  an  infantry  camp  of 
some  10,000  men  had  been  observed  in  rear  of  the  wood  west 
of  Upper  Dubnik. 


Work  of  thv  Vara!  11/.  139 

Loshkareff  now  ordered  his  outposts  into  their  original 
positions  and  moved  with  his  main  body  to  Lower  Netropolie; 
the  9th  Cossacks  remained  at  Lower  Dubnik  with  instruc- 
tions to  light  a  large  number  of  camp-fires,  with  a  view  of 
deceiving  the  enemy  at  Upper  Dubnik  as  to  the  strength  of 
the  troops  at  Lower  Dubnik,  and  at  the  same  time  to  lead 
the  Turks  in  Plevna  to  believe  that  reinforcements  from 
Riben  had  arrived  at  Lower  Netropolie  in  the  evening. 

The  aggregate  loss  of  the  Russians  and  Roumanians  on 
the  9th  of  September  was:  1  man  and  11  horses  killed,  1  man 
missing,  and  25  men  and  31  horses  wounded. 

Early  on  September  10th  the  corps  took  up  the  following 
position:  the  Regular  Brigade  between  Upper  and  Lower 
Netropolie,  facing  Plevna;  all  1  Russian  regiments  with 
both  batteries  and  the  5th  Militia  Regiment  at  Lower  Dub- 
nik, their  right  resting  on  the  highroad,  their  front  fac- 
ing the  south,  covered  by  the  Dubnik  brook,  a  branch  of  the 
Vid;  the  Gth  Militia  Regiment,  south  of  Upper  Netropolie, 
connecting  the  two  bodies. 

The  Turks  could  be  plainly  observed  increasing  and 
strengthening  the  works  of  their  west  front;  a  number  of 
guns  were  placed  in  battery.  The  Turks  were  evidently  ex- 
pecting the  beginning  of  a  serious  attack  from  this  direction. 

Besides  several  small  patrols  which  reconnoitered  the 
ground  on  both  sides  of  the  highroad  between  the  Vid  and 
Isker,  as  well  as  the  ground  beyond  the  Isker,  two  strong 
patrols  were  dispatched  with  instructions  to  seek  communi- 
cation with  the  cavalry  of  the  left  wing  of  the  West  Army 


140      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

and  to  cross  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Vid  above  Plevna  if 
necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  their  object.  The  4th 
squadron  of  the  9th  Lancers  crossed  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
Vid  at  Medivan  (O  miles  above  the  bridge)  and  scouted  in 
an  easterly  direction  as  far  as  Kebel  (2  miles  southeast  of 
Medivan),  without  meeting  either  Turks  or  Eussians.  A 
sotnia  of  Cossacks  which  attempted  to  cross  at  Dessewitza 
(3  miles  above  the  bridge)  found  the  village  held  by  Turkish 
infantry  and  cavalry,  and  fell  back.  The  reports  of  all  the 
patrols  agreed  that  small  bodies  of  Tcherkesses  were  roam- 
ing between  the  Vid  and  Isker,  and  that  beyond  the  Iskcr 
they  were  in  orreater  force. 

On  September  11th  a  squadron  of  regular  Roumanian 
cavalry  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Isker  at  Magaleta  (west  of 
Lower  Dubnik)  and  to  send  patrols  as  fai*  as  possible  in  the 
direction  of  Rahova — Widdin.  For  the  purpose  of  establish- 
ing communication  with  the  left  flank  of  the  West  Army,  a 
second  squadron  of  the  9th  Lancers  was  sent  out  with  or- 
ders to  find  the  Russian  troops  under  all  circumstances,  and, 
if  possible,  to  communicate  directly  with  the  commander- 
in-chief.  The  squadron  accomplished  its  object  and  re- 
turned next  day  by  the  same  route,  capturing  a  Turkish 
officer  on  the  road.  Moreover,  a  squadron  of  the  4th  Dra- 
goons dispatched  by  General  Leontief,  commanding  the  cav- 
alry of  the  left  wing  of  the  West  Army,  arrived  during 
the  day. 

During  the  night  of  the  llth-12th  skirmishing  took 
place  along  the  entire  line  of  outposts  with  small  bodies  of 


Work  of  the  Valid nj.  Ul 

Tcherkesses  and  Bashi-bozouks,  who  endeavored  to  steal 
througli  to  the  west  and  south  and  lost  some  killed  and  pris- 
oners in  the  attempt.  At  the  same  time  many  Bulgarians 
with  empty  wagons  were  leaving  Plevna. 

On  the  12th  of  t^eptember  the  Turks  began  llu*  <t)nst  ruc- 
tion of  a  new  battery  along  the  highroad  to  sweep  the  ap- 
proaches of  the  bridge ;  at  Opanetz  also  a  4-gun  battery  was 
built  against  the  Roumanian  battery  at  Lower  Netropolie. 

On  September  13th  the  Roumanian  squadron  dis- 
patched to  Magaleta  reported  that  the  patrols  on  the  pre- 
vious day  found  the  ntugliboring  villages  full  of  Tcher- 
kesses and  Bashi-bozouks.  The  total  loss  of  the  Roumanians 
in  this  reconnaissance  consisted  of  1  man  wounded. 

A  detachment  of  2  squadrons  of  Lancers,  which  ad- 
vanced on  the  highroad  toward  Telis  and  dispatched  small 
patrols  to  the  right  toward  the  Isker  and  on  the  left  to 
Rakita  and  Radomirtza,.  found  in  all  the  villages  plundering 
Tcherkesses  and  Bashi-bozouks,  who  retired  on  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Lancers. 

Patrols  sent  ont  on  the  14th  and  15th  of  September 
rendered  similar  reports.  On  the  latter  day  7  sotnias  of  the 
Don  Cossack  Brigade  of  (Jt^noral  Shernosuboff,  with  the 
15th  Don  Cossack  Battery,  arrived  at  Lower  Dubnik,  and 
brought  an  order  for  the  0th  Cossacks  to  move  to  Bogot 
(south  of  Plevna  on  the  road  to  Lovtcha). 

The  patrols  sent  out  on  the  lOth  everywhere  had  skir- 
mishes with  Tcherkesses  and  armed  inhabitants;  the  Rou- 
manians at  Magaleta  lost  1  man  and  1  horse  killed. 


142       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

During  the  night  an  attaclc  was  made  from  Plevna 
against  the  5th  Irregular  Regiment,  which  was  on  outpost 
along  the  Vid.  The  attack  was  repulsed  without  loss  to  the 
Roumanians. 

The  patrols  sent  out  southward  on  the  17th  and  18th  of 
September  no  longer  met  with  hostile  detachments;  in  the 
evening  an  attack  on  the  outposts  north  of  the  highroad  was 
repulsed  with  a  loss  of  1  man  wounded;  the  Turks  had  2 
men  killed. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  having  ar- 
rived on  the  evening  of  the  18th  of  September,  General  Losh- 
kareff  started  for  Bogot  at  10  o'clock  next  morning  with  the 
rest  of  his  division,  the  9th  Lancers,  the  Dragoons,  and  the 
9th  Cossacks  preceding  him  there;  the  9th  Hussars  had 
throughout  this  period  been  at  the  east  of  Plevna. 

General  Loshkareflf  then  with  his  (9th)  Cavalry  Division 
guarded  the  left  of  the  West  Army. 

2.  General  Kri/loff  from  September  19th  to  October  1th. 
General  Kryloff,  the  newly  appointed  commander  of  the 
"Combined  Cavalry  Corps"  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  ar- 
rived at  Lower  Dubnik  on  the  19th  of  September.  Rein- 
forcements, consisting  of  a  Don  Cossack  brigade,  a  Caucas- 
ian Cossack  brigade,  and  part  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division, 
which  had  heretofore  been  posted  on  the  left  of  the  West 
Army  near  Bogot  and  toward  Lovtcha.  arrived  at  Lower 
Dubnik  partly  before,  partly  at  the  same  time  with  Kryloflf. 
The  task  of  the  corps  was  to  cut  off  all  supplies  from 


Work-  of  the  Caialnj.  143 

the  Turkish  army  at  Plevna,  to  save  the  troops  as  much  as 
possible,  to  prevent  entireh-  any  cooperation  of  the  troops  in 
Plevna  with  operations  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  or  to 
entice  the  troops  from  Plevna  to  such  a  distance  as  to  tem- 
porarily weaken  the  garrison. 

About  the  time  of  the  arrival  of  Kryloff  and  the  main 
body  of  his  corps  at  Lower  Dubnik  reports  came  in  of  the  ap- 
proach of  hostile  columns  from  Magaleta;  these  reports 
proved  erroneous,  but  still  Kryloff  bestowed  special  atten- 
tion to  the  country  of  Magaleta  and  west  of  the  Isker. 

On  September  20th  Colonel  Stakelberg,  with  2  squad- 
rons of  Hussars,  2squadronsof  Irregulars, and  2guns, scouted 
toward  Telis  in  order  to  reconnoiter  the  country  between 
the  Isker  and  the  highroad  as  far  as  Rakita.  Near  Telis  he 
encountered  strong  hostile  detachments,  and  fell  back  after 
a  brief  engagement. 

In  order  to  more  accurately  ascertain  the  strength  and 
position  of  the  enemy,  Colonel  Tutolmin,  with  the  Caucasian 
Cossack  Brigade,  2  squadrons  of  regular  cavalry,  and  the  8th 
Don  Battery,  was  again  dispatched  toward  Telis.  His  vig- 
orous attack  developed  about  10  Turkish  battalions  en- 
sconced in  rifle-trenches,  and  about  2  regiments  of  cavalry; 
3  guns  were  covered  by  entrenchments  and  several  others 
were  in  the  open.  While  the  action  was  taking  place,  a  gen- 
eral staff  officer  made  a  sketch  of  the  enemy's  position.  The 
enemy's  strength  was  estimated  at  10,000  or  12,000  men. 

On  the  22d  of  September  the  outposts  reported  that  con- 
siderable hostile  forces  were  approaching  Lower   Dubnik 


1 44:       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

from  Upper  Dubuik,  and  tliat  the  strong  Russian  patrols 
were  falling  back  fighting  to  Lower  Dubnik. 

General  Kryloff  at  first  decided  to  make  a  stand  at  Lower 
Dubnik;  but,  on  receipt  of  information  from  Loshkareff  on 
the  right  bank  that  he  was  marching  on  Telis,  Kryloff  de 
cided  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front,  while  Loshkareff,  as  he 
supposed,  was  attacking  in  rear. 

After  Kryloff  had  opened  the  action  by  a  brisk  artillery 
fire,  the  sound  of  the  guns  of  Loshkareff's  detachment  was 
heard  at  3  o'clock — not,  however,  in  the  enemy's  rear,  but  in 
prolongation  of  the  Russian  left;  at  the  same  time  reports 
came  in  from  the  outposts  at  Lower  Dubnik  that  strong 
bodies  of  hostile  infantry  were,  advancing  from  the  bridge- 
head against  the  Russian  position.  In  view  of  these  circum- 
stances, Krylott'  led  his  corps  to  Smaret-Trestenik,  leaving 
a  strong  advance  guard  (the  Don  Cossack  Brigade  and  the 
Irregular  Brigade)  at  Netropolie.  The  infantry  advanc- 
ing from  the  bridge-head  retired  within  the  works  toward 
evening. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2.3d  of  September  the  advance 
guard  at  Netropolie  reported  that  the  hostile  forces  at  Up- 
per Dubnik  had  marched  into  Plevna  during  the  night  under 
the  fire  of  the  15th  battery  attached  to  the  Don  Cossack 
Brigade. 

On  the  24th  Kryloff  was  ordered  to  cover  the  right  of 
the  army  by  taking  position  abreast  of  Brestovetz  (midway 
between  the  lower  Yid  and  lower  Isker),  and  to  fall  back  in 
case  of  necessity  to  Riben.     At  the  same  time  reports  arrived 


Work  of  the  Cavalnj.  1^:5 

from  the  west  of  the  presence  of  bodies  of  Tcherkesses  col-   . 
lecting  provisions  for  the  Turkish  Army. 

On  the  25th  of  September  Krjloff  marched  to  Rahova 
with  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade,  the  Roumanian  Regular 
Brigade,  the  1st  Brigade  of  the  4th  Cavalry  Division,  the  8th 
Dragoons,  and  3  batteries.  A  flank  detachment  marched  to 
Bieloslatina.  Bodies  of  Tcherkesses  were  driven  from  sev- 
eral of  the  villages  of  that  vicinity;  the  telegraph  line  be- 
tween Widdin  and  Plevna  was  cut. 

On  the  26th  of  September  the  3  redoubts  covering  Ra- 
hova were  bombarded  and  1  Turkish  gun  dismounted. 
Kryloff  made  no  attempt  to  capture  Rahova,  since  he  would 
not  have  been  able  to  hold  it ;  nor  did  he  desire  to  set  it  on  fire 
by  shells,  as  the  village  was  chiefly  inhabited  by  Bulgarians. 

On  the  28th  Kryloff  retired  to  Riben  to  replenish  his 
provisions  and  ammunition,  and  on  the  30th  the  corps  again 
stood  at  Smaret-Trestenik. 

During  the  absence  of  the  main  body  the  detachment  at 
Ketropolie  captured  2  wagon-trains,  of  20  and  100  wagons 
loaded  with  flour  and  barley  respectively,  and  on  another 
occasion  relieved  a  Turkish  foraging  party  of  i)art  of  the  hay 
collected. 

On  the  30th  of  September  Colonel  Levis  advanced  with 
4  sotnias  of  the  Vladi  Caucasian  Regiment,  2  squadrons  of 
Charkof  Lancers,  2  squadrons  of  Mariopul  Hussars,  and  the 
8th  Horse  Battery  on  Telis  and  Radomirtza.  He  reported 
on  October  1st,  that  he  had  encountered  Bashi-bozouks  and 
pursued  them  to  Lukovitza,  that  his  detachment  had  cap- 


146      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

tured  1,000  head  of  beef  cattle,  80  horses,  and  a  wagon-train 
loaded  with  salt  and  quinine,  and  that  the  bridge  at  Rado- 
mirtza  and  the  telegraph  line  had  again  been  destroyed  as 
far  as  Lukovitza. 

On  the  1st  of  October  General  Tchermat,  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  Roumanian  Army,  appeared  and  informed 
General  Kryloff  that  he  had  arranged  for  a  reconnaissance 
in  force  on  the  next  day  by  a  body  of  Roumanian  troops 
against  the  position  of  Opanetz,  and  requested  support. 

In  compliance  with  the  request.  General  Krsioff  ordered 
the  detachment  at  Netropolie  to  advance  on  October  2d 
against  Opanetz.  Learning  of  the  advance  of  a  strong  Turk- 
ish corps  of  all  arms  from  the  bridge-head  against  Lower 
Netropolie,  he  sent  forward  all  the  troops  at  Smaret- 
Trestenik. 

On  reaching  the  detachment.  General  Kryloff  found  the 
15th  Don  Battery  engaged  with  Turkish  infantry  and  artil- 
lery, which  had  advanced  to  Lower  Netropolie;  the  Rouma- 
nian and  Sth  Don  Batteries  came  at  once  into  action  on  the 
right  of  the  engaged  battery,  and  took  part  in  the  conflict. 
One  of  the  enemy's  guns  was  dismounted,  an  ammunition- 
cart  blown  up,  and  Netropolie  was  set  on  fire  by  shells.  The 
15th  Don  Battery  being  seriously  molested  by  the  fire  of 
Turkish  skirmishers  ensconced  in  the  outskirts  of  the  vil- 
lage, 2  squadrons  of  the  4th  Dragoons  dismounted  and  drove 
them  away.  The  retreat  of  the  Turkish  infantry  was  covered 
by  an  attack  of  a  body  of  Tcherkesses,  and  to  cover  the  dis- 
mounted Dragoons  2  sotnias  of  the  Kuban  Regiment  ad- 
vanced and  threw  the  Tcherkesses  back  on  their  infantrv. 


Work  of  the  Cavalry.  l^T 

At  1 :30  p.  m.  the  Roumanian  Colonel  Tcherkass  reported 
that  the  reconnaissance  against  Opanetz  could  not  take 
place,  and  as  it  would  have  been  to  no  purpose  under  these 
circumstances  to  continue  the  action,  General  Kryloft"  with- 
drew to  his  right  about  3  p.  m.  An  attempt  of  the  Turks  to 
take  the  Russian  detachment  in  left  flank  was  frustrated 
by  a  counter-attack  of  the  Kuban  Regiment 

Meanwhile  the  detachment  of  Colonel  Levis  had  ad- 
vanced southward,  and  its  patrols  had  established  commu- 
nication with  General  Loshkareff's  cavalry  scouting  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Vid. 

Having  burned  the  bridge  at  Shervenibreg  on  October 
2d  while  en  route  from  Radomirtza  to  Sumakova,  Colonel 
Levis  moved  from  Sumakova  on  October  3d,  and  assembled 
at  Lukovitza  in  the  evening,  having  skirmished  with  Tcher- 
kesses  on  the  way.  The  bridge  at  Lukovitza  was  demol- 
ished; some  mail  was  captured  and  sent  to  Kryloff,  and  by 
him  to  the  commander  of  the  West  Army. 

On  the  4th  and  5th  of  October  Levis  remained  at  Rado- 
mirtza with  the  main  body,  and  sent  patrols  in  all  directions; 
on  the  6th  of  October  he  was  attacked  by  some  4.000  or  5,000 
infantry  and  Tcherkesses  from  Lukovitza.  Up  to  2  p.  m.  he 
repulsed  the  attacks  on  his  front,  but  at  this  hour  an  equally 
strong  body,  which  left  Plevna  in  the  morning,  appeared  in 
his  rear.  Covered  by  the  fire  of  his  artillery  and  Dragoons. 
Levis  withdrew,  crossed  the  Isker,  and  moved  to  Sumakova. 

On  the  7th  of  October  Levis  moved  to  Magaleta,  from 
which  point  a  detachment  sent  against  Telis  reported  tapper 
and  Lower  Dubnik  occupied  by  the  Turks. 


148      Tactical  Stitdies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plecna. 

By  entrenching  Lukovitza,  Telis,  and  Upper  and  Lower 
Diibnik  the  Turks  protected  their  line  of  communication  from 
Orkhanie  to  Plevna  so  etfectively  that  the  Kussian  cavalry 
was  compelled  to  abandon  for  the  present  all  attempts  to 
cut  the  line.  The  investment  at  the  West  of  Plevna,  which 
for  a  time  seemed  successfully  established,  was  completely 
broken. 

Comments. 

The  task  of  the  Russo-Koumanian  cavalry  was  to  pre- 
vent reinforcements  and  supplies  from  reaching  Plevna. 
The  task  might  be  accomplished  by  defensive  or  offensive 
means — i.  e.f  the  cavalry  might  bar  the  road  to  an  approach- 
ing relief  corps  in  some  favorable  position,  or  it  might  go 
to  meet  the  relieving  troops  and  try  to  overthrow  them  by  a 
vigorous  and  unexpected  attack.  The  latter  method  is  more 
in  keeping  with  the  tactical  ideas  of  cavalry  than  a  pure 
defensive  in  which  the  inherent  strength  of  the  arm,  modern 
armament  and  training  notwithstanding,  cannot  be  fully 
developed. 

In  the  period  described  above  the  Eussian  cavalry  made 
no  attempt  whatever  to  solve  the  problem  by  offensive 
action,  and  the  very  weak  defensive  aittempt  failed 
completely. 

The  work  of  the  Russo-Roumanian  cavalry  may  be  di- 
vided into  two  portions:    the  period  of  the  attempted  in- 
vestment up  to  the  successful  movement  of  the  Turkish 
relief  corps  September  23d,  and  the  period  of  simple  observa 
tion  subsequent  to  that  day;   within  the  latter  period  fall 


Work  of  the  Cavalry.  149 

the  movement  on  Rahova  from  September  25tli  to  28th,  and 
the  expedition  of  Colonel  Levis  to  Lukovitza  from  September 
30th  to  October  7th. 

On  the  8th  of  September,  the  day  when  Loshkareff  was 
dispatched  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  the  artillery  prelude 
to  the  great  attack  on  Plevna  was  beginning;  at  this  mo- 
ment it  was  not  so  much  Loshkareff's  task  to  cut  Plevna  from 
relief  without  as  to  facilitate  the  attack  on  the  east  by  de- 
monstrations on  the  west,  and,  in  case  of  the  capture  of 
Plevna,  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  fleeing  Turks  on  the  left 
bank.  It  is  evident  that  the  appearance  of  the  strong  body 
of  cavalry  opposite  the  west  side  of  their  position  attracted 
the  attention  of  the  Turks  in  no  small  degree,  but  we  fail  to 
note  any  sensible  effect  on  the  events  of  the  east  front. 

On  the  receipt  by  Loshkareff  on  September  9th  of  infor- 
mation that  a  hostile  corps  of  some  10,000  men  was  in  the 
vicinity  of  Upper  Dubnik,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  a  strong 
advance  would  be  made  at  once  in  that  direction  to  verify 
the  correctness  of  this  important  information.  Loshkareff, 
however,  contented  himself  with  taking  up  a  defensive 
position  so  close  to  Plevna  as  to  expose  himself  to  the  dan- 
ger of  being  attacked  simultaneously  by  the  relief  corps  and 
by  the  garrison  of  Plevna  itself. 

Upon  the  abandonment  of  the  idea  of  a  capture  of 
Plevna  by  assault  after  the  failure  of  the  attack  on  Sep- 
tember 11th,  the  investment,  particularly  on  the  west,  be- 
came the  important  feature.  Loshkareff  with  part  of  the 
cavalry  was  withdrawn  from  the  left  to  the  right  bank,  where 


150      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

he  covered  the  left  of  the  army.  In  his  phice  Kryloff  made 
his  appearance  with  considerable  reinforcements,  so  that  the 
total  strength  of  the  cavalry  corps  operating  on  the  left 
bank  must  be  put  down  at  not  less  than  G,000  or  7,000 
effectives. 

Kr^'loli"  had  very  pertinent  instructions  from  the  com- 
mander-in-chief to  meet  any  relief  corps  at  as  great  a  distance 
as  possible  from  Plevna,  yet  when  the  approach  of  a  strong 
hostile  corps  from  Telis  became  known,  Kryloff  remained 
close  to  Plevna,  and,  upon  the  appearance  of  the  enemy,  fell 
back  without  offering  any  serious  resistance,  so  that  the 
Turks  had  no  difficulty  in  getting  their  large  train  of  pro- 
visions and  ammunition  into  the  town. 

The  task  demanded  of  General  Kryloff'  and  his  cavalry 
was  a  cavalry  task  of  the  most  common  sort.  He  failed 
completely,  and  made  no  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  by 
force  of  arms.  The  passage  in  Kryloft's  orders  "to  save  his 
troops  as  much  as  possible  in  the  solution  of  his  task"  may 
perhaps  be  admitted  as  an  explanation — though  by  no  means 
as  an  extenuation — of  his  feeble  action.  That  phrase  was 
not  well  chosen  and  served  no  clear  purpose.  That  a  gen- 
eral should  save  his  troops  "as  much  as  possible"  is  so  ele- 
mentary a  rule  that  it  would  be  trivial  and  unnecessary 
to  call  attention  to  it;  if  it  is  used,  it  is  apt  to  lead  a  careful 
and  prudent  man  into  such  exaggerated  caution  as  to  render 
any  success  impossible,  because  real  success  against  an 
active  enemy  will  rarely  be  gained  without  bloody  sacrifices. 

If  Kryloff  had  been  compelled  to  leave  the  road  open  to 


Work  of  the  Cavalry.  151 

the  Turks  after  losing  a  few  hundred  of  his  horsemen  in  a 
fruitless  defensive  action  or  in  a  vigorous  though  hopeless 
charge,  the  Eussians  might  have  consoled  themselves  with 
the  idea  that  the  fortune  of  war  is  variable;  but  it  is  hardly 
to  be  assumed  that  the  Russian  commander-in-chief  was 
satisfied  when  the  Turks  were  able  to  accomplish  their  ob- 
ject almost  without  any  shedding  of  blood,  in  the  face  of 
G,(JUU  to  7,000  eager  horsemen. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  Kryloflf  in  his  report  seeks 
to  vindicate,  not  to  say  excuse,  his  action.  In  the  first  place, 
he  claimed  credit  for  delaying  the  arrival  of  the  relief  corps 
in  Plevn:a  by  forty-eight  hours;  since  no  decisive  events 
were  taking  place  in  Plevna  at  the  time,  it  was  a  matter  of 
indifference  whether  the  Turkish  corps  arrived  forty-eight 
hours  sooner  or  later. 

He  justified  his  retreat  from  Lower  Dubnik  to  Smaret- 
Trestenik  on  September  22d  by  stating,  "that  that  point  was 
but  little  farther  from  the  highroad  than  Lower  Dubnik,  and 
much  closer  to  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  corps  (Riben);  and 
that  the  posting  of  the  detachment  at  Netropolie  furnished 
the  means  for  observing  everything  that  passed  in  and  out 
of  Plevna."  To  watch  the  Turks  from  a  distance  carrying 
provisions  into  Plevna  did  not,  we  should  say,  require  the 
presence  of  a  body  of  7,000  cavalry. 

If  the  entire  affair  could  be  repeated  with  the  difference 
of -having  Skobeleff  or  Gourko  at  the  head  of  the  cavalry 
corps,  a  comparison  between  their  action  and  that  of  Kryloff 
would  be  as  interesting  as  it  would  be  instructive. 


152       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna, 

The  very  iuterestiug  events  during  the  first  weelv  of 
October  could,  unfortunately,  not  be  described  in  full,  owing 
to  the  lack  of  reliable  information. 

The  expedition  of  (.'olonel  Levis  was  the  first  attempt, 
though  undertaken  with  insufficient  force,  to  accomx)lish  the 
investment  of  Plevna  by  offensive  movements,  and  the  idea 
of  opposing  an  attempt  at  relief  at  Lukovitza  rather  than  at 
Dubnik  was  certainly  correct;  but  there  is  a  certain  ob- 
scurity in  the  accounts  before  us  as  to  what  the  main  bod}' 
of  some  40  squadrons  was  doing  while  Levis  advanced  south- 
ward with  12  squadrons  and  8  guns,  and  how  a  compara- 
tively small  Turkish  force  should  find  it  possible  under  his 
very  e3es  to  advance  against  Levis's  rear. 

The  numerous  tactical  details  which  it  was  possible  to 
interweave  in  the  description  are  of  interest  in  judging  the 
tactics  of  the  Kussian  cavalry.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted 
that  information  as  to  tactical  details  and  losses  in  the  two 
most  important  actions — at  Netropolie  on  the  2d  and  at 
Lukovitza  on  the  6th  of  October — are  scant  in  the  case  of  the 
former  and  lacking  altogether  in  the  case  of  the  latter. 


Invcstmciit  of  Plevna.  153 


PART    XI. 

INVESTMENT  OF  i'LEVNA  FKOM  THE   WEST. 

1.     The  Comnuinieations  of  Plevna  to  the  Reav. 

As  early  as  the  beginning  of  hostilities  an  army  of 
newly  formed  reserves  was  assembled  at  Sophia.  About 
the  time  of  the  Russian  passage  of  the  Danube  par-t  of  it  was 
I'Ut  in  motion  and  effected  its  junction  at  Plevna,  with  Osman 
Pasha's  array  frora  Widdin. 

When,  after  their  repeated  failure  to  capture  Plevna  by 
force,  the  Russians  threatened  to  cut  the  communications  of 
the  army  posted  there,  it  became  the  duty  of  the  force  at 
Sophia  to  keep  the  communications  with  Plevna  open,  and 
to  look  to  the  safety  of  the  trains  of  provisions  and  ammu- 
nition destined  for  that  place. 

Crossing  the  Balkans  with  part  of  the  army  assembled 
at  Sophia,  Chefket  Pasha  moved  to  Orkhanie,  and  thence 
with  about  10,000  men  to  Telis,  and,  after  some  slight  en- 
gagements with  reconnoitering  Russian  cavalry,  succeeded, 
on  September  22d,  in  driving  back  General  Kryloft"  and 
getting  his  large  convoy  of  provisions  and  ammunition  into 
Plevna,  where  the  greater  part  of  his  troops  renuiined;  he 
himself,  however,  returning  to  Orkhanie. 

At  the  beginning  of  October  Chefket  again  started  out 
with  a  large  convoy  and  5.000  men,  a  corps  of  equal  strength 


154       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  A  round  Plevna. 

marching  from  Plevna  to  meet  him.  Colonel  Levis,  wlio 
blocked  the  road  at  Radomirtza,  was  driven  back  on  the  6th 
of  October,  and  the  convoy  of  2,000  wagons  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  opposite  Plevna  on  Octo- 
ber 8th,  the  lighter  vehicles  crossing  at  once  by  a  ford  above 
the  bridge,  while  the  heavy  wagons  waited  for  the  damaged 
bridge  to  be  repaired. 

In  order  to  protect  tlie  march  of  further  convoys  against 
Russian  scouting  parties,  the  Turks  fortified  three  stations 
on  the  northernmost  part  of  the  road  between  Plevna  and 
Orkhanie,  Dolni  Dubnik,  Gorni  Uubnik,  and  Telis.  These 
stations  were  garrisoned  by  a  division  consisting  of  20  bat- 
talions and  15  guns  (according  to  other  accounts,  18  bat- 
talions and  24  guns)  and  a  number  of  Tcherkesses  under 
Chifsi  Pasha,  whoi  established  his  headquarters  at  Gorni 
Dubnik,  Other  bodies  of  troops  stood  echeloned  on  the  sec- 
tion from  Lukovitza  to  Orkhanie. 

Very  considerable  supplies  were  collected  at  Sophia 
and  Orkhanie  for  Osman  Pasha,  between  whom  and  Chefket 
Pasha  there  was  an  agreement  that  every  two  weeks  a  con- 
voy with  provisions  for  a  month  should  be  dispatched. 

2.     General  Gourko's  Task  and  Disposition  for  the  2.'ith  of 

October. 
The  arrival  of  the  Guard  having  considerably  increased 
the  number  of  available  troops,  it  was  decided  to  adopt  the 
plans  of  General  Todleben,  now  appointed  "assistant''  to  the 
commander-in-chief,  and  to  undertake  the  investment  of 
Plevna  from  the  west  in  a  manner  that  would  ensure  success. 


Inca^tinriit  of  Flrviia.  155 

General  (iourko,  heretofore  commauding  the  2d  Cav- 
alry Division  of  the  Guard,  was  entrusted  with  the  task 
and  given  the  greater  part  of  the  Guard  in  addition  to  the 
masses  of  cavalry  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid. 

At  this  time — about  the  middle  of  October — the  follow- 
ing troops  under  General  Arnoldi  (Kryloff  having  been  re- 
lieved) were  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid,  northwest  of  Plevna, 
in  the  vicinity  of  Trestenik  and  Riben :  the  4th  Cavalry  Di- 
vision, numbering  18  squadrons  and  sotnias  with  12  guns; 
a  Don  Cossack  brigade  of  12  sotnias*  and  6  guns;  lastly,  4 
Roumanian  cavalry  regiments  (the  two  regular  and  the  5th 
and  6th  militia  regiments)  of  IG  squadrons  and  G  guns;  total, 
G2  squadrons  and  sotnias  with  30  guns. 

At  the  south  of  Plevna,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vid, 
was  Loshkareff  with  the  9th  Cavalry  Division  (18  squadrons 
and  12  guns),  scouting  southward  on  both  banks. 

In  addition  to  these  bodies  of  cavalry,  the  following 
troops  of  the  Guard  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  General 
Gourko  to  enable  him  to  accomplish  his  purpose:  the  1st 
and  2d  Infantry  Divisions  with  32  battalions,  the  Rifle  Bri- 
gade with  4  battalions,  the  battalion  of  sappers,  the  2d  Cav- 
alry Division  with  24  squadrons,  the  personal  escort  of  the 
Emperor  with  4  squadrons,  12  foot  batteries  willi  JM'»  guns, 
and  3  horse  batteries  with  18  guns;  all  these  trooi)s  were 
south  of  Plevna,  between  the  Vid  and  the  highroad  to 
Lovtcha.  In  addition,  General  Arnoldi's  cavalry  was  rein- 
forced by  7  battalions  of  Roumanian  infantry  and  a  Rou- 

•This  is  the  organic  strength;  on  their  arrival  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  the 
account  mentions  but  7  sotnias. 


156       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

mauian  foot  battery,  while  the  •Ith  Don  Cossacks,  thoutfh  be- 
longing to  the  4th  Cavalry  Division,  were  attached  to  the 
Guard  Corps  to  serve  as  guides,  on  account  of  their  knowl- 
■  edge  of  the  terrain  gained  from  their  protracted  presence  in 
the  locality. 

On  the  22d  of  October  each  of  the  6  cavalry  regiments 
of  the  Guard  sent  a  platoon  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  to 
reconnoiter;  at  the  same  time  General  Gourko  was  recon- 
noitering  in  the  direction  of  Telis,  accompanied  by  the  supe- 
rior officers  of  cavalry  of  the  Guard  and  escorted  by  2 
squadrons  of  the  Emperor's  escort  and  1  sotnia  of  the  -tth 
Cossacks.  From  that  point  he  rode  forward  on  the  high- 
road toward  Gorni  Dubnik,  accompanied  by  a  few  officers, 
and  reconnoitered  the  enemy's  position  under  a  brislv  fire. 

As  a  first  step  in  the  accomplishment  of  his  task,  Gourko 
decided  upon  the  seizure  of  the  fortified  position  of  Gorni 
Dubnik.  While  the  main  attack  was  to  be  directed  against 
that  point,  the  enemy's  forces  at  Telis  and  Dolni  Dubnik 
were  to  be  kept  busy,  and  a  sortie  from  Plevna  as  well  as 
the  approach  of  reinforcements  from  Orkhauie  had  also  to 
be  provided  against. 

The  disposition  drawn  up  to  this  effect  by  General 
Gourko  for  the  24:th  of  October  divided  his  forces  into  five 
groups: 

(a)  The  following  troops  were  to  make  the  direct  at- 
tack on  Gorni  Dubnik:  the  2d  Infantry  Division  of  the 
Guard  with  15  battalions,  the  rifle  brigade  of  the  Guard 
with  1  battalions,  the  sapper  battalion   of  the  Guard,  2 


1  nvestment  of  Plevna.  1 57 

squadrons  of  the  imperial  escort,  4  sotuias  of  the  ith  Don 
Cossaclvs,  and  (3  foot  batteries  of  the  Guard  with  48  guns. 
In  addition,  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade  (12  sotnias  with 
6  guns)  was  to  advance  from  Abaskoi  and  take  post  west  of 
Gorni  Dubnik  to  prevent  any  retreat  westward. 

One  battalion  of  the  2d  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard 
and  a  foot  batter}-  of  the  Guard  were  to  remain  at  the  ford 
of  Medivan  to  cover  the  passage  there. 

(6)  The  following  troops  were  detailed  to  make  a  dem- 
onstration against  Telis  and  repulse  any  troops  of  the  ene- 
my that  might  be  advancing  from  Orkhanie:  the  Chasseur 
Regiment  of  the  1st  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard  with  4 
battalions,  the  1st  and  2d  Brigade  of  the  2d  Cavalry  Divis- 
ion of  the  Guard  with  16  squadrons,  1  sotnia  of  the  4th  Cos- 
sacks, and  1  foot  and  2  horse  batteries  of  the  Guard  with  20 
guns.  In  addition,  Formak's  militia  brigade — 8  squadrons — 
was  to  move  from  Magaleta,  i)artly  on  the  riglit  bank  of  the 
Isker  to  Shervenibreg,  partly  on  the  left  bank  to  Sumakova, 
forming  as  it  were  the  western  flank  guard  of  the  detach- 
ment operating  against  Telis. 

(c)  The  following  troops  under  General  Arnoldi  were 
told  oft"  for  the  demonstration  against  Dolni  Dubnik:  the 
4t.h  Cavalry  Division  (without  the  4th  ('ossacks  and  another 
squadron  detached  with  2  guns)  with  11  squadrons  and 
10  guns  and  the  militia  brigade  with  8  squadrons,  (J  guns, 
and  2  battalions  of  Roumanian  infantry. 

In  addition,  a  detachment  was  to  be  dispatched  by  the 
9th  Cavalry  Division  from  Medivan  against  Dolni  Dubnik 
to  establish  communication  with  General  Ainoldi. 


L58      Taeilcul  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

(d)  To  meet  any  sortie  from  Plevna,  General  Shernosubof 
was  to  occupy  the  position  of  Netropolie  with  7  sotnias  of 
his  brigade,  5  battalions  of  Koumanian  infantry  and  6  Rus- 
sian horse  and  G  Roumanian  foot  guns. 

(e)  The  general  reserve  was  posted  between  Upper  and 
Lower  Dubnik,  and  consisted  of:  the  1st  Infantry  Division 
of  the  Guard  with  12  battalions,  the  3d  Brigade  of  the  2d 
(^avalry  Division  of  the  Guard  with  S  squadrons,  2  squad- 
rons of  the  imperial  escort,  1  sotnia  of  the  4th  Cossacks, 
and  4  foot  and  2  horse  batteries  of  the  Guai'd  with  44  guns. 

3.     Capture  of  Gorni  Duhnik  on  October  24th. 

Gorni  Dubnik  is  situated  on  the  Dubnik  brook,  about 
i.OOO  yards  west  of  the  highroad.  At  the  highest  point  west 
of  the  road  and  south  of  the  village  a  spacious  redoubt  was 
built  with  a  cavalier  in  the  interior;  a  smaller  redoubt  lay 
east  of  the  great  redoubt;  both  redoubts  were  surrounded 
by  rifle-trenches. 

On  the  north  the  level  and  open  ground  sloped  almost 
insensibly  toward  Dolni  Dubnik;  toward  the  east  the  slopes 
were  gentle  and  covered  with  a  young  and  very  dense  growth 
of  timber;  the  distance  of  the  smaller  redoubt  from  the 
edge  of  this  wood  was  about  400  yards.  To  the  south  and 
west  the  ground  sloped  steeply  into  a  depression  about  200 
yards  wide.  About  1,800  yards  south  of  the  small  redoubt 
there  was  a  clearing  in  the  wood  which  the  Turks  had  begun 
to  fortify. 

The  troops  detailed  for  the  direct  attack  on  Gorni  Dub- 


Investment  of  Plevna.  159 

nik  crossed  the  Vid  duiiug  the  uight  iieur  Shiiakuva  by  three 
fords  with  kuee-deep  water,  and  were  divided  into  three  col- 
umns as  follows: 

Right  column  under  Major-General  Ellis — 4  rifle  bat- 
talions, 2  batteries,  2  squadrons,  and  1  sotuia — on  the  road 
from  Shirakova  to  Krushevitza,  2,000  yards  from  the  former 
place. 

Middle  column  under  Major-General  Baron  Zeddeler — 
1st  Brigade  of  the  2d  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard  with  7 
battalions,  the  sapper  battalion  of  the  Guard,  2  batteries, 
and  1  sotnia. — on  the  road  from  Shirakova  to  Sumakovitza, 
500  yards  from  the  former  place. 

Left  column  under  Major-General  Rosenbach — 2d  Bri- 
gade of  the  2d  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard  with  8  bat- 
talions and  2  batteries — was  the  last  to  cross  the  Md,  and 
took  position  3,500  yards  west  of  the  river  in  the  ravine  of 
Swinar. 

Two  sotnias  of  Cossacks  can  not  be  accounted  for. 

The  two  flank  columns,  which  were  to  advance  from  the 
north  and  south  against  the  enemy's  position  w'ere  to  start 
aL  G:15  a.  m.;  the  middle  column,  which  was  to  attack  from 
the  east  and  had  the  shortest  route,  was  to  start  at  ():45  a.  m. 
The  latter  column  entered  the  action  at  8:30,  the  two  flank 
columns  at  !)  a.  m.,  their  movements  having  been  somewhat 
delayed. 

The  artillery  of  the  middle  column  was  posted  about 
the  center  of  the  position  of  that  column;  on  the  left  of  the 
artillerv  was  the  Bodv  Guard  Grenadier  regiment  with  its 


1 60      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

4th  battalion  in  first  line,  the  2d  and  3d  battalions  in  second 
line;  to  the  right  of  the  batteries  was  the  Body  Guard  Moscow 
Kegiment  in  the  same  formation;  the  1st  battalion  of  the 
Grenadiers  and  the  sapper  battalion  formed  the  reserve. 

At  8:30  a.  m.  both  batteries  came  into  action  in  the  clear- 
ing above  referred  to  and  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  1,600 
yards.  The  Grenadier  regiment,  advancing  through  dense 
undergrowth,  lost  direction,  went  too  far  to  the  left,  and 
touched  the  left  column,  whereupon  General  Zeddeler  moved 
the  regiment  some  distance  to  the  rear  and  then  to  the  right- 
oblique  to  approach  the  batteries.  The  gap  caused  by  the 
oblique  movement  had  meanwhile  been  filled  from  the  re- 
serve by  the  1st  battalion  of  the  regiment. 

On  renewing  the  advance  the  Grenadier  regiment 
reached  the  western  edge  of  the  wood  and  was  about  abreast 
of  the  Moscow  Regiment  on  the  right  of  the  artillery. 

At  this  time  (9  o'clock)  the  two  tiank  columns  appeared 
before  the  enemy's  position  and  opened  fire  from  their  artil- 
lery. At  9:30  o'clock  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Brigade  ap- 
peared west  of  Gorni  Dubnik  and  also  opened  fire  from  its 
battery,  so  that  the  Turkish  position,  where  there  were  but  1 
guns,  was  receiving  a  concentric  fire  from  51  guns. 

Shortly  after  10  o'clock  the  Grenadier  regiment  at- 
tacked the  east  redoubt,  which  was  captured  in  spite  of  the 
murderous  fire  from  this  as  well  as  from  the  main  redoubt. 
The  garrison  of  the  east  redoubt  fell  back  on  the  main  re- 
doubt; an  attempt  of  the  Grenadiers  to  enter  the  main  re- 
doubt at  the  same  time  with  the  retreating  enemv  was  frus- 


Inccstineitt  of  Plevna.  1 61 

trated  by  a  severe  tire,  whereupon  the  Grenadiers  ensconced 
themselves  in  the  captured  redoubt. 

^V'hile  the  attack  of  the  Grenadiers  was  in  progress, 
Major-Genera  1  Zeddeler  ordered  the  batteries  and  the  Mos- 
cow Regiment  to  go  forward.  The  1st  Battery  approached 
under  a  severe  infantry  fire  to  within  800  yards  of  the  main 
redoubt,  but,  being  unable  to  maintain  itself,  fell  back  to  its 
original  position  after  firing  a  few  rounds.  The  Moscow 
Regiment  advanced  until  abreast  of  the  Grenadiers  and  en- 
sconced itself  in  the  rifle-trenches  to  the  right  (north)  of  the 
captured  redoubt. 

Meanwhile  the  right  column  had  gained  the  highroad 
leading  from  Dolni  to  Gorni  Dubnik,  and  advanced  against 
the  Turkish  position  from  the  north;  the  two  Kuban  squad- 
rons of  the  imperial  escort  marching  at  the  head  drove  bands 
of  Tcherkesses  before  them  and  cut  the  telegraph  line  which 
ran  by  the  side  of  the  road. 

Leaving  1  battalion  opposite  Dolni  Dubnik,  General 
Ellis  formed  his  remaining  3  battalions  for  the  attack:  1 
battalion  on  each  side  of  the  road,  the  2  batteries  in  the 
center,  1  battalion  in  reserve. 

At  1,700  yards  from  the  main  redoubt  the  artillery 
opened  fire,  the  rifle  battalions  continuing  the  advance.  In 
consequence  of  the  loss  of  the  east  redoubt,  the  Turks  also 
abandoned  the  northern  line  of  advanced  trenches;  the 
Rifles  of  The  Guard  took  cover  in  them  and  opened  fire  at  a 
range  of  from  600  to  700  yards.  As  the  Rifles  were  directly 
in  front  of  their  artillerv  and  masking  their  fire,  both  bat- 


162      Tactical  Httnlics  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

teries,  notwithstanding  the  severe  fire  of  the  enemy,  came 
up  almost  to  the  position  of  the  Rifles  and  again  opened  fire 
at  SCO  yards.  The  1st  Division  of  the  Guard  having  mean- 
while arrived  between  Gorni  and  Dolni  Dubnik  and  having 
deployed  with  front  toward  the  latter  place,  the  rifle  bat- 
talion heretofore  opposite  Dolni  Dubnik  was  ordered  to  join 
its  brigade. 

Gourko  had  ridden  to  the  foremost  line  of  the  Rifles  of 
the  Guard  to  reconnoiter  the  great  redoubt,  and  there  about 
noon  received  report  of  the  failure  of  the  attack  of  the  left 
column. 

The  left  column  started  about  6:15  o'clock  from  the 
ravine  of  Swinar,  and  was  considerably  delayed  in  crossing 
a  narrow  but  deep  water-course.  It  advanced  on  the  road 
leading  from  Telis  to  Gorni  Dubnik,  and  did  not  arrive  be- 
fore the  enemy's  position  until  9  o'clock.  Two  batteries 
placed  in  the  center  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  1,800  yards, 
but  soon  closed  to  1,500  yards,  and  were  reinforced  by  the  5th 
Horse  Battery  of  the  Guard. 

The  Finland  Regiment  advanced  on  the  left  (west)  of  the 
road  against  Gorni  Dubnik  through  dense  underwood;  the 
Pawlof  Regiment  to  the  right  (east)  of  the  road,  on  open 
ground.  After  crossing  the  ravine  in  front,  both  regiments 
moved  to  the  attack  on  the  main  redoubt,  but  were  re- 
pulsed by  a  severe  fire  and  rallied  in  several  places  where  the 
terrain  afforded  cover  in  rear. 

The  rifle  battalions  meanwhile,  utilizing  the  depression 
opening  into  the  valley  of  the  Dubnik  brook,  were  obliquing 


Investment  of  Plevna.  1 63 

more  and  more  to  the  rig-lit  so  sis  almost  to  face  the  west 
front  of  the  Turkish  position.  Gourko  ordered  forward  2 
battalions  of  the  Ismailof  Regniment  to  fill  the  gap  between 
the  Rifles  and  the  artillery  on  the  road,  which  belonged  to 
the  right  column;  at  the  same  time  he  reinforced  the  middle 
and  left  column  each  by  1  battalion  of  the  same  regiment. 
Having  made  these  arrangements,  Gourko  repairf^d  in  per- 
son to  the  batteries  of  the  middle  column,  at  about  2  \).  m. 

Having  learned  that  the  Chasseur  regiment  of  the  Guard 
had  been  repulsed  at  Telis  and  was  retreating,  Gourko  feared 
the  arrival  of  Turkish  reinforcements' from  that  direction, 
and  decided  to  bring  the  aifair  before  Gorni  Dubnik  to  a  con- 
clusion by  a  simultaneous  assault  from  all  sides;  the  mid- 
dle column  received  verbal  instructions  to  that  effect;  a 
written  order  was  dispatched  to  the  right  flank  column. 

The  following  arrangement  was  made  to  ensure  a 
simultaneous  attack:  as  soon  as  the  left  column  had  com- 
pleted its  arrangements  and  stood  ready  to  attack,  its  artil- 
lery was  to  fire  three  salvoes;  the  same  was  to  be  done  by 
the  middle  column  when  everything  was  in  readiness  there, 
and  lastly  by  the  right  column.  As  soon  as  the  artillery  of 
the  right  column  fired  the  last  salvo,  the  assault  was  to  begin 
from  all  directions.  The  space  to  be  crossed  by  the  assault- 
ing ti'oops  differed  at  the  various  points  from  100  to  400 
paces. 

Having  himself  seen  to  the  arrangements  of  the  middle 
column,  Gourko  went  to  the  left  column  to  personally  see  to 
what  was  needful;  but  before  this  was  accompliv*ihed,  the 


1 64      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

salvoes  of  the  right  column  resounded  and  its  troops  ad- 
vanced to  the  assault,  which  misunderstanding  rendered  a 
simultaneous  attack  impossible. 

In  order  to  support  the  assaulting  troops  of  the  right 
column  as  much  as  possible,  Gourko  dispatched  orderlies  in 
all  directions  with  orders  for  every  detachment  to  advance 
to  the  attack  without  waiting  for  the  signal — with  the  nat- 
ural result  of  provoking  a  series  of  individual  attacks  which 
were  anything  but  simultaneous.  Received  by  a  murderous 
infantry  fire,  none  of  the  detachments  was  able  to  reach  the 
redoubt,  and  the  assailants  ensconced  themselves  at  various 
distances  from  the  redoubt  where  they  found  shelter;  the 
Finland  Regiment,  finding  no  shelter  at  all,  fell  back  to  its 
original  position  on  the  rear  slope  of  the  hill. 

The  attack  came  to  a  standstill  about  4  o'clock.  Gourko 
decided  to  leave  his  troops  in  their  positions  for  the  time 
being,  and  to  renew  the  attack  at  dusk. 

The  artillery  was  compelled  to  suspend  its  fire  every- 
where in  order  not  to  fire  on  its  own  troops. 

As  darkness  set  in,  2  battalions  of  the  Ismailof  Regi- 
ment advanced  creeping  to  within  about  50  paces  of  the  re- 
doubt and  threw  themselves  on  it  simultaneously  from  all 
sides.  After  a  brief  struggle,  the  redoubt  was  taken;  the 
Turkish  commander,  Ahmed  Chifsi  Pasha,  surrendered  with 
his  whole  garrison,  which  still  numbered  53  officers  and 
2,235  unwounded  men;  4  (Krupp)  guns  and  large  quantities 
of  cartridges  were  also  captured. 

The  main  body  of  the  general  reserve  did  not  become 
engaged. 


Investment  of  Plevn a.  165 

4,     Events  at  Telis  on  October  2'ith. 

To  tlie  troops  detailed  to  operate  against  Telis,  and 
which  crossed  the  Vid  at  Shirakova  toward  morning,  the 
tasks  were  assigned  as  follows:  the  1st  Cavalry  Brigade  of 
the  Guard  to  block  the  communication  between  Telis  and 
Gorni  Dubnik ;  the  2d  Brigade,  the  Chasseur  regiment  of  the 
Guard,  and  a  battery  to  move  to  the  direct  attack  of  Telis. 

The  latter  detachment  started  at  0:15  a.  m.  from  the 
ravine  near  Swinar,  where  it  had  remained  for  some  time 
after  crossing  the  Vid;  at  its  head  the  Dragoon  regiment 
with  2  horse  guns  moved  to  the  height  of  Rakita  to  cover  the 
left  and  rear  of  the  troops  on  their  march  to  Telis ;  the  Hus- 
sar regiment  with  4  horse  guns  moved  to  the  left  in  order  to 
advance  against  Telis  from  the  south,  and  the  Chasseurs 
with  the  foot  battery  advanced  from  the  east. 

The  works  of  Telis  consisted  of  a  large  redoubt  built 
across  the  highroad,  a  smaller  redoubt  more  to  the  west,  and 
a  series  of  rifle-trenches  in  front. 

The  detachment  arrived  before  Telis  at  9:30  a.  m.,  and 
the  8  foot  and  4  horse  guns  opened  fire  at  a  range  of  1,000 
yards;  the  Chasseur  regiment  having  been  drawn  up  in  two 
lines  of  2  battalions,  the  first  line  advanced  across  tlie  i»er- 
fectly  level  and  open  ground  to  attack  the  foremost  rifie- 
trenches.  The  latter  were  captured  with  the  bayonet  about 
10  a.  m„  but,  unfortunately,  they  offered  no  shelter  w  hat- 
ever  from  the  fire  from  the  enemy's  main  position  in  rear,  so 
that  the  Chasseurs  sutlcM-ed  great  losses  in  tlu*  captured 
position. 


166      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

h\  Older  uot  to  expose  themselves  idly  and  uselessly  to 
this  miii-derous  fire,  the  2  battalions  of  the  first  line  tried  to 
attack  the  main  redoubt,  and  were  followed,  without  or- 
ders, by  the  2  battalions  of  the  second  line  not  heretofore 
engaged,  but  the  attack  did  not  approach  the  redoubt  closer 
than  within  100  paces,  where  the  assailants  sought  such 
cover  as  they  could  find. 

A  sortie  of  the  Turks  was  repulsed  by  a  brisk  fire,  but  as 
the  capture  of  the  redoubt  proved  impracticable,  and  as  re- 
port was  received  from  the  Dragoons  at  Rakita  that  bodies 
of  hostile  infantry  and  artillery  were  approaching  Telis  from 
the  south,  the  order  to  retreat  was  given. 

During  the  unsuccessful  attack  of  the  Chasseurs,  the 
Hussars  advanced  on  Telis  from  the  south;  some  of  their 
detachments  galloped  into  the  foremost  rifle-trenches  and 
drove  out  the  Turks.  An  attack  made  by  a  strong  body  of 
infantry  from  the  Turkish  main  position  was  repulsed  by  the 
fire  of  the  horse  artillery  and  the  dismounted  fire  of  some  of 
the  Hussars.  The  retreat  of  the  Chasseurs  was  covered  by 
1  lie  Hussars. 

The  Dragoon  regiment  dispatched  to  Rakita  was  skir- 
mishing with  swarms  of  Tcherkesses;  bodies  of  infantry 
Avith  artillery  appeared  near  Radomirtza,  but  did  uot  ad- 
vance further. 

Subsequently  the  regiment  joined  the  retreat  of  the 
troops  that  had  been  engaged  at  Telis;  part  of  the  regiment, 
in  conjunction  with  a  squadron  of  Hussars,  assisted  in  the  re- 
moval of  the  wounded. 


1  urcstiiKnt  of  Plmia.  167 

At  dusk  the  2d  Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  (Inaid  halted  iu 
touch  with  the  enemy. 

The  1st  Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  Guard  started  from  the 
Vid  about  7  o'clock  and  readied  the  highroad  between  Telis 
and  Gorni  Dubnik  at  10  o'clock;  communication  was  estab- 
lished with  the  column  moving  on  Telis  and  with  the  Cau- 
casian Cossack  Brigade,  which  had  arrived  west  of  Gorni 
Dubnik.  The  2d  Horse  Battery  of  the  Guard,  which  be- 
hmged  to  the  brigade,  was  dispatched  in  support  of  the  left 
column  moving  on  Gorni  Dubnik,  and  took  part  in  the  fire 
against  the  Turkish  position. 

On  learning  about  noon  of  the  failure  of  the  attack  on 
Telis,  the  regiment  of  Mounted  Grenadiers  was  dispatched 
to  meet  and  sui)port  the  retreating  troops,  but  no  assistance 
was  required,  as  the  enemy  failed  to  pursue. 

During  the  night  the  brigade  remained  in  its  position 
between  Telis  and  Gorni  Dubnik. 

J.     E rents  at  Dohti  Duhnik  on  Octohcr  2-'ith. 

Leaving  Trestanik  early  on  October  24th  with  his  de- 
tachment, consisting  of  19  squadrons,  2  battalions,  and  1<» 
horse  guns.  General  Arnoldi  arrived  8,000  yards  nortli  of 
Dolni  Dubnik  about  7  a.  m.  Being  greeted  with  artillery 
fire  from  two  redoubts  in  front  of  the  place,  Arnoldi  moved 
to  the  southwest,  turning  Dolni  Dubnik,  and  continued  the 
march  under  cover  of  the  4th  Dragoons,  whom  he  left  oppo- 
site the  town. 

When  the  detachment  liad  almost  reached  the  high- 


168      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

road,  a  third  redoubt  was  encountered.  Covered  by  the  4th 
Hussars  and  the  2  militia  regiments,  tlie  Roumanian  and  1 
Kussian  battery  came  into  action  against  this  redoubt  and 
opened  fire.  Meanwhile  the  4th  Lancers  with  4-horse  guns 
advanced  at  a  trot  on  the  highroad  toward  Gorni  Dubuik, 
where  the  rifle  brigade  of  the  right  column  arrived  about 
the  same  time. 

A  hill  which  commanded  the  redoubt  was  captured  by 
some  dismounted  Dragoons  and  occupied  at  once  by  the  Rus- 
sian artillery.  A  daring  charge  of  the  Russian  cavalry 
against  Dolni  Dubnik  was  repulsed  by  infantry  fire. 

The  2  Roumanian  battalions  arrived  and  threw  up  en- 
trenchments on  the  left  of  the  artillery  position.  The  can- 
iiouade  was  kept  up  by  both  sides  until  late  in  the  evening, 
without  visible  result. 

The  Turks  in  Dolni  Dubnik  numbered  6  battalions  and  4 
guns. 

While  the  action  of  General  Arnoldi's  detachment 
against  Dolni  Dubnik  was  in  progress.  General  Loshkaref 
ordered  6  of  his  squadrons  and  a  horse  battery  from  Medivan 
to  cross  to  the  left  bank.  Dashing  against  Gomi  Dubnik 
without  result,  the  action  of  the  detachment  was  thereafter 
limited  to  maintaining  communication  between  the  troops  of 
General  Arnoldi,  the  general  reserve,  and  the  troops  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Vid. 

6.     Capture  of  Tells  on  October  28t1i. 

After  the  capture  of  Gorni  Dubnik,  the  1st  Division 
fronted  toward  Dolni  Dubnik,  covering  the  2d  Division  and 


Investment  of  Plevna.  169 

the  sapiJei-  battalion  wiiile  tlu^y  entrenched  the  captured 
position  of  Gorni  Dnbnik  on  the  side  toward  Plevna. 

Meanwhile  Arnoldi's  cavalry  was  watching  Dolni  Dub- 
nik  and  the  bridge-head  of  Plevna.  The  Cavalry  Division  of 
the  Guard  was  south  of  Gorni  Dubnik  toward  Telis. 

Dolni  Dubnik  and  Telis  were  each  occupied  by  G  or  7 
battalions  of  infantry',  a  few  hundred  Tcherkesses,  and  4 
guns.  The  guard-house  on  the  highroad  3  miles  south  of 
Telis  was  also  entrenched,  surrounded  by  rifle-trenches,  and 
occupied  by  infantry.  At  Radomirtza  there  were  strong 
bodies  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  under  Chefket  Pasha,  w'ho 
was  approaching  from  Orkhanie  with  20  battalions,  10  guns, 
and  several  thousand  horsemen  to  succor  the  ''etappen" 
posts,  and  who  had  halted  and  faced  about  on  learning  of  the 
capture  of  Gorni  Dubnik. 

From  the  25th  to  the  28th  of  October  the  2d  Cavalry  Bri- 
gade of  the  Guard  was  stationed  at  Rakita  Avith  outposts 
toward  Radomirtza,  the  guard-house,  and  the  south  side  of 
Telis;  the  outpost  service  w'as  very  exacting,  and  skirmishes 
with  the  enemy  were  incessant ;  the  horses  of  the  2d  Brigade 
remained  saddled  for  almost  three  times  twenty-four  hours. 
The  1st  Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  Guard  was  in  the  ravine  of 
Swinar  with  outposts  toward  the  east  side  of  Telis,  the  3d 
Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  Guard  at  Gorni  Dubnik  with  outposts 
toward  the  north  side  of  Telis;  the  Caucasian  Cossack  Bri- 
gade was  farther  to  the  west  on  the  Isker.  and  observed 
Telis  from  the  west. 

On   October  2Sth!  Gourko  advanced   to  the  attack   on 
"11— 


17(>      Tactical  ^tmlies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Telis.  While  the  1st  aud  2d  Cavalry  Brigade  were  observing 
toward  the  south,  Telis  was  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  16  bat- 
talions of  infantry  and  the  3d  Cavalry  Brigade,  and  subjected 
to  a  concentric  fire  from  0  foot  and  2  horse  batteries  between 
11  a.  m.  and  2  p.  m.  Gourko  then  sent  some  Turks,  captured 
at  Cxorni  Dubnik,  into  Telis,  with  a  demand  for  immediate 
surrender  and  the  threat  that  he  would  destroy  everything 
with  his  artillery  if  the  surrender  did  not  take  place  within 
half  an  hour.  Ismail  Haki  Pasha  now  surrendered  with  his 
garrison  of  7  battalions,  still  numbering  100  officers  and 
3,000  men.  Four  guns  and  very  large  quantities  of  cart- 
ridges fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians,  whose  entire  loss 
consisted  of  1  man  killed  and  a  few  wounded;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  many  dead  Turks  lay  about  in  the  badly  damaged 
works. 

We  now  turn  to  the  events  of  the  1st  and  2d  Cavalry 
Brigades  of  the  Guard,  which  during  this  time  were  posted 
at  Rakita  to  check  the  approach  of  reinforcements  from  that 
direction  and  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  garrison  of  Telis  to 
the  south. 

The  Dragoon  regiment  was  at  Rakita,  fronting  south; 
on  its  right  the  5th  Horse  Battery,  escorted  by  a  squadron  of 
mounted  Grenadiers,  came  into  action  against  the  guard- 
house; the  2d  Horse  Battery,  escorted  by  2  squadrons  of 
Lancers,  was  firing  against  the  south  front  of  Telis.  The 
rest  of  the  2  brigades — i.  e.,  3  squadrons  of  Grenadiers,  2  of 
Lancers,  and  4  of  Hussars — were  posted  in  reserve  in  rear  of 
the  Dragoons, 


In  vest  men  t  of  Plevna .  Ill 

The  5th  Horse  Battery  opened  fire  about  10  a.  m.,  and 
soon  compelled  the  Turks  to  leave  the  rifle-trenches  in  front 
of  the  guard-house.  At  the  same  time  the  Caucasian  Cos- 
sack Brigade  advanced  from  the  west  against  Radomirtza 
under  a  brisk  engagement  with  Turkish  infantry  and  cavalry, 
and  was  joined  by  2  squadrons  of  Lancers  sent  toward  them 
from  the  reserve;  the  brigade  was,  however,  ultimately 
forced  to  fall  back,  followed  by  the  Lancers,  who  thus  be- 
came separated  from  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  of  the 
Guard,  , 

Having  repulsed  the  attack  on  their  left,  the  Turks  ad- 
vanced against  the  enemy  opposite  their  right.  Turkish 
infantry  began  to  advance  from  the  guard-house  through 
the  brush  against  the  5th  Horse  Battery,  and  dense  swarms 
of  mounted  Tcherkesses  threatened  the  2d  Horse  Battery, 
which  was  firing  on  Telis.  The  2  squadrons  of  Lancers 
which  formed  the  escort  of  this  battery  and  were  posted  with 
front  toward  Telis  changed  front  against  the  Tcherkesses, 
and  the  7  squadrons  posted  in  reserve  at  Rakita  also  ad- 
vanced against  them  in  the  space  between  the  batteries. 

The  Lancers  charged  before  the  arrival  of  these  rein- 
forcements. The  3d  squadron  followed  in  second  line  at  a 
trot;  the  4th  squadron  charged  at  full  speed  against  the 
Tcherkesses,  who  received  the  charge  with  a  brisk  fire  from 
their  magazine  rifles,  and,  suddenly  wheeling  to  the  right 
and  left,  unmasked  a  line  of  infantry  which  had  been  posted 
under  cover  and  now  greeted  the  Lancers  with  a  severe  fire. 
The  Lancers  galloped  around  the  flanks  of  the  infantry, 
charged  from  the  flank,  and  cut  down  the  greater  part. 


172      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

On  proceeding  further  in  the  direction  of  the  guard- 
house, the  Lancers  received  fire  from  the  infantry  posted  in 
the  dense  brush,  and,  turning  about,  regained  their  original 
position  at  a  short  trot. 

Meanwhile  the  main  body  of  the  cavalry  reached  the 
highroad  between  Telis  and  the  guard-house,  when  the  news 
of  the  capture  of  Telis  arrived.  Small  detachments  of  the 
garrison,  attempting  to  escape  to  the  south,  were  overtaken 
and  cut  down  by  the  cavalry. 

The  2d  Horse  Batter}-  now  also  directed  its  fire  on  the 
guard-house,  which  was  soon  after  abandoned  by  the  Turks ; 
all  Turkish  troops  that  had  come  under  observation  so  far 
were  withdrawing  southward.  The  3d  Cavalry  Brigade  of 
the  Guard,  arriving  from  Telis,  relieved  the  outposts  toward 
Eadomirtza  and  Lukowitza ;  the  1st  and  2d  Brigades  were 
assembled  at  Rakita. 

The  Turkish  brigade  at  Dolni  Dubuik  evacuated  the 
place  on  October  31st  and  withdrew  without  further  action 
into  Plevna.  Dolni  Dubnik  was  occupied  on  November  1st 
by  the  Russians,  who  advanced  their  lines  2,000  yards  beyond 
the  village  toward  Plevna,  and  at  once  entrenched  their 
position. 

Plevna  was  now  completely  invested  on  the  west  side, 
and  deprived  of  all  communication  with  the  army  posted  at 
Orkhanie  and  Sophia. 


Investmcitt  of  Plccna.  173 

7.     Losses. 
The  accounts  of  the  losses  of  the  Guards  iu  the  actions 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid  toward  the  end  of  October  are  very 
complete, 

(a)     Capture  of  Gorni  Dubnik,  October  24th: 
Killed:  18  officers,  811  men. 
Wounded:  3  generals,  05  officers,  2,384  men. 
Total  loss:  116  officers  and  3,195  men. 
(?>)     Action  of  Telis  on  October  24th : 

Chasseur  Regiment  of  the  Guard:    2()  officers  and 

907  men  killed  and  wounded. 
2d  Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  Guard:   1  officer,  1  man, 
and  2  horses  killed;    1  officer,  15  men.  and  18 
horses  wounded. 
(c)     Action  of  Telis  on  October  28th: 

Infantry:  1  man  killed  and  15  men  wounded. 
Lancers  of  the  Guard:  5  men  and  14  liorses  killed; 
4  officers,  11  men,  and  31  horses  wounded. 
No  special  data  are  given  for  the  losses  of  the  4th  Cav- 
alry Division,  the  Cossacks,  and  Roumanians,  during  this 
period,  particularly  in  the  action  of  Dolni  Dubnik  on  Octo- 
ber 24th;  the  losses,  however,  were  very  slight. 

Nothing  accurate  is  known  of  the  losses  of  the  Turks  in 
killed  and  wounded  in  these  actions.  The  garrisons  of  Gorni 
Dubnik  and  Telis  contained  13  battalions  of  infantry  and 
about  2  regiments  of  cavalry,  or  8,000  men  at  the  most. 
Since  not  less  than  5,500  unwounded  prisoners  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Russians  and  a  finv  hundred  men  seem  to  have 


174      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

escaped  from  Telis,  the  losses  of  the  Turks  in.  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  two  actions  of  the  24th  and  28th  of  October 
were  probably  not  much  in  excess  of  2,000  men. 

The  losses  of  the  Turks  engaged  at  Kadomirtza  on  the 
28tb  can  not  have  been  heavy. 

Comments. 

The  actions  described  above  are  in  more  than  one  re- 
spect worthy  of  attention. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  they  were  the  result  of  a  correct 
strategic  idea  after  repeated  previous  mistakes;  then,  as 
regards  tactics,  they  were  planned  with  great  prudence  and 
skill  and  executed  with  much  awkwardness;  lastly,  the  Rus- 
sian Guards  appeared  for  the  first  time,  which  apparently 
very  indifferent  fact  is  of  importance  for  an  understanding 
of  many  features. 

The  strategic  importance  of  the  operations  described  we 
will  not  discuss  here,  as  considerations  of  this  character  will 
find  a  place  later.  We  turn  to  the  conception  of  the  opera- 
tions directed  by  Gourko  up  to  the  investment  of  Plevna  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vid. 

The  enemy's  troops  encountered  here  numbered  12,000 
men  at  the  most,  about  equally  distributed  among  the  three 
fortified  "etappen"  stations,  Dolni  Dubnik,  Gorni  Dubulk, 
and  Telis.  Under  certain  circumstances,  they  might  liope 
for  assistance  from  Plevna  or  Orkhanie.  The  insuflicient 
supply  of  artillery  with  these  troops  deserves  special  men- 
tion; there  seem  to  have  been  but  4  guns  in  each  of  the  for- 
tified places. 


liirr.sfiKCHt  of  Plevna.  175 

To  overcome  these  three  points  General  Gonrko  was 
given  considerable  forces:  36  battalions  of  the  Kussian 
Guard,  7  battalions  of  Roumanian  infantry,  about  80  squad- 
rons and  sotnias  of  Russian  and  Roumanian  cavalry,  and 
150  guns— a  total  of  not  less  than  32,000  infantry  and  8,000 
cavalry.  Leaving  out  a  few  small  detachments,  we  find 
about  one-half  of  the  cavalry,  the  7  Roumanian  battalions, 
and  30  guns  employed  to  observe  Dolni  Dubnik  and  Plevna; 
one-quarter  of  the  cavalry,  20  battalions,  and  00  guns  were 
detailed  to  attack  Gorni  Dubnik;  one-quarter  of  the  cavalry, 
4  battalions,  and  20  guns  observed  Telis;  lastly,  12  bat- 
talions and  32  guns  stood  as  general  reserve  between  Upper 
and  Lower  Dubnik. 

The  force  detailed  against  Gorni  Dubnik  was  so  large  in 
comparison  with  the  garrison  of  that  place  that  the  defeat 
of  the  latter,  as  long  as  it  had  to  depend  on  itself,  could  n<jt 
be  doubtful.  The  general  reserve  may  therefore  from  the 
beginning  be  considered  as  intended  for  use  against  Dolni 
Dubnik  and  Plevna;  any  attack  from  Plevna  in  the  direction 
of  Dolni  Dubnik  would  therefore  encounter  not  less  than 
4,000  cavalry,  19  battalions,  and  62  guns.  The  enterprise 
against  Gorni  Dubnik  may  therefore  be  considered  as  well 
covered  on  the  side  of  Plevna. 

To  be  sure,  considerably  smaller  forces  were  posted 
toward  Telis;  but,  in  the  first  place,  the  appearance  at  this 
point  of  superior  forces  of  the  enemy  was  much  less  proba- 
ble; in  the  second  place,  the  approach  of  such  a  force  would 
have  been  discovered  at  quite  .a  distance,  so  that  the  proper 


17G       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

counter-measiir€^s  might  have  been  taken;  the  enterprise 
against  Gorni  Dubnik  may  therefore  be  considered  as  suffi- 
ciently covered  toward  the  south  also. 

When  we  consider  that,  according  to  the  disposition, 
Dolui  Dubnik  and  Telis  were  to  be  merely  observed,  and  not 
attacked,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  plan  was  bound  to  suc- 
ceed, and  that  there  was  no  reason  to  fear  a  check.  The 
Large  number  of  troops  available  for  these  operations  might 
have  been  a  source  of  temptation  to  make  a  decisive  attack 
against  all  three  points  at  the  same  time,  and  the  relative 
strength  of  the  opponents  would  justify  the  Russians  in  ex- 
pecting certain  success  in  that  case  also.  Gourko  restricted 
himself  to  the  attack  on  one  point  in  order  to  make  it  with  an 
overwhelming  force,  and  this  extreme  prudence,  which  ap- 
proaches timidity,  may  be  explained  in  several  ways;  in  the 
first  place,  the  confidence  of  the  Russians  in  their  own 
strength  w^as  undoubtedly  weakened  after  the  many  failures 
suffered  before  Plevna;  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  was  his 
intention  to  prevent  any  failure  of  the  Russian  Guards  in 
their  first  action,  and  to  preserve  their  unshaken  self- 
confidence. 

2,  Gourko's  plan  bore  within  it  all  the  conditions  for 
certain,  quick,  and  easy  success ;  and  it  is  solely  due  to  the 
awkward  tactical  execution  that  the  success,  though  ulti- 
mately attained,  was  gained  only  after  a  protracted,  varia- 
ble, and  bloody-  action. 

A  field  entrenchment  held  by  4,000  men  and  4  guns  was 
surrounded  by  20,000  men,  subjected  for  half  a  day  to  a  con- 


In  vesfmen  t  of  PI  em  a.  177 

centric  fire  from  OU  guus,  and,  after  repeated  failures,  ulti 
mately  captured,  with  a  loss  to  the  assailant  almost  equal- 
ing the  total  strength  of  the  defenders.  This  cannot  be  ex- 
plained by  the  single  assumption  of  extreme  bravery  and  skill 
on  the  part  of  the  defender,  and  any  one  is  warranted  in  say- 
ing that  great  tactical  mistakes  were  undoubtedly  made  by 
the  assailant. 

In  turning  to  the  details  of  the  attack  on  Gorni  Dubnik, 
we  miss  uniformity  of  instructions  as  to  the  method  of  exe- 
cution of  the  attack  by  three  infantry  columns  advancing 
separately  against  the  Turkish  position.  Each  of  the  three 
detachments  moved  to  the  attack  without  regard  to  the 
other  two.  Moreover,  the  attack  was  fairly  executed  only 
on  the  part  of  the  right  column;  the  conformation  of  the 
ground  was  here  utilized  and  the  advance  made  by  rushes, 
and  an  attempt  was  made — though  without  much  success — 
to  prepare  the  attack  by  infantry  fire. 

The  attack  of  the  middle  and  left  column  makes  the  im- 
pression of  having  developed  itself  not  in  accordance  with 
some  well-defined  plan,  but  under  the  influence  of  a  precip- 
itate advance  from  the  beginning,  and  of  an  irrepressible  ar- 
dor on  the  part  of  the  troops. 

At  any  rate,  all  the  troops  were  almost  simultaneously 
engaged,  and  there  was  practically  no  preparation  of  the  at- 
tack by  infantry  fire.  The  attack  itself  was  made  without  a 
formation  of  several  lines  and  without  utilizing  the  terrain; 
the  dense  masses  threw  themselves,  with  a  bravery  which 
despised  death,  from  a  great  distance  (1,000  paces),  against 


178      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

the  murderous  frontal  fire,  and,  of  course,  suffered  terrible 
losses. 

It  is  surprising  that  the  middle  column  failed  to  utilize 
the  small  eastern  redoubt,  which  was  captured  at  the  begin- 
ning, as  an  intermediate  position  from  which  to  prepare  the 
further  attack  by  artillery  and  infantry  fire;'  It  is  stated 
(in  extenuation,  as  it  were)  that  the  captured  position  af- 
forded no  shelter  from  the  fire  from  the  main  position  in 
rear.  To  be  sure,  this  is  a  notable  proof  of  the  skill  of  the 
Turks  in  planning  and  locating  the  fortifications  (which  also 
becomes  manifest  at  Telis),  but  would  not  the  entire  sapper 
battalion,  which  accompanied  this  column  and  was  un- 
doubtedly equipped  with  entrenching  tools,  have  supplied 
the  means  for  converting  the  captured  position  into-  good 
cover?  The  employment  of  the  sajjper  battalion,  which 
seems  to  have  been  held  as  a  closed  reserve  to  the  last  like 
ordinary  infantry,  must  certainly  be  set  down  as  unusual. 

In  view  of  the  noise  and  excitement  of  battle,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  Gourko's  attempt  to  secure  combination  in 
the  renewed  attack,  by  a  seemingly  very  well  devised  though 
complicated  signal,  failed  in  execution;  it  might  have  been 
better  to  fix  a  certain  hour,  not  too  near  the  time  of  the  order. 

In  the  attack  of  the  Chasseurs  of  the  Guard  on  Telis  we 
miss  plan  and  direction  even  more  than  in  the  attack  on 
Gorni  Dubnik.  Not  only  was  the  attack  of  the  first  line 
made  without  due  reflection  and  contrary  to  the  general  dis- 
position, but  the  second  line — the  last  available  body  of  in- 
fantry— ran  away  from  the  superior  leader  and  threw  it- 


Investment  of  Flemia.  179 

self  into  the  action  without  orders.  The  detachment  was 
sufficiently  strong,  but  the  attack  was  contrary  to  pro- 
gramme and  premature,  and  its  severe  loss  diminished  the 
defensive  strength  of  the  detachment  to  such  an  extent  that 
a  vigorous  counter-attack  of  the  Turks  from  Telis  might  have 
exercised  a  bad  effect  on  the  entire  enterprise  against  Gorni 
Dubnik. 

Nearly  all  the  defects  in  the  Kussian  attack  may  be 
somewhat  extenuated  by  the  fact  that  the  troops  were  on 
that  day  under  fire  for  the  first  time,  and  that  they  felt  that, 
being  a  specially  privileged  corps,  they  were  expected  to  do 
something  quite  extraordinary.  The  Russian  Guards  may 
certainly  point  with  pride  to  the  fact  that  they  failed  in  no 
enterprise,  and  that  upon  their  appearance  the  war  took  a 
brilliant  turn;  nevertheless  a  little  more  steadiness  and 
coolness  on  the  day  of  their  baptism  of  fire  would  certainly 
not  have  diminished  the  success,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
would  have  greatly  reduced  the  losses. 

3.  The  behavior  of  the  Turkish  garrisons  in  Gorni  Dub- 
nik on  the  24th,  and  in  Telis  on  the  28th,  shows  a  striking 
contrast.  On  the  24th  Gorni  Dubnik  was  cannonaded  for 
half  a  day  by  (JO  guns,  yet  the  garrison  repulsed  several 
furious  assaults  of  a  greatly  superior  enemy  and  did  not 
succumb  until  after  a  protracted  struggle.  On  the  2Sth  the 
garrison  of  Telis  surrendered,  though  its  tactical  situation 
was  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  their  brethren  at  Gorni  Dub- 
nik, after  being  cannonaded  for  two  hours,  and  without 
waiting  for  an  assault. 


180      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

On  the  part  of  the  Kussians  the  reason  is  assi^^ed  that 
the  garrison  of  Telis  was  so  disheartened  bv  the  fall  of 
Gorni  Dubnik  as  to  lose  all  heart  for  resistance;  but  that 
fact  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  explain  the  striking  contrast. 

If  on  the  24th  Gourko  had  demanded  the  surrender  of 
the  garrison  of  Gorni  Dubnik  after  a  cannonade  of  five  or 
six  hours,  without  moving  his  infantry  to  the  attack,  I  be 
lieve  that  very  probably  the  garrison  would  have  surren 
dered.  On  the  other  hand,  if  on  the  28tli  Gourko  had  sent 
his  infantry  to  the  attack  instead  of  opening  negotiations,  J 
believe  it  very  probable  that  the  gai-rison  of  Telis  would  have 
offered  an  obstinate  resistance. 


The  Fall  of  Plevna.  181 


PART   XII. 

THE  FALL  OF  PLEVNA. 

1.     General  Measures  for  the  Investment. 

It  having  been  determined  by  the  Russians  to  avoid  any 
attack  entailing  useless  loss,  and  to  overcome  Osman  Pasha's 
army  by  a  close  investment,  all  requisite  steps  were  taken 
with  great  care  under  the  direction  of  General  Todleben. 

The  line  of  investment  was  strengthened  by  a  series  of 
rifle-trenches  and  artillery  emplacements;  the  most  import- 
ant points  were  secured  by  lunettes  or  redoubts;  between 
the  positions  of  the  investing  troops  commodious  communi- 
cations were  constructed  and  their  use  facilitated  by  sign- 
posts; lastly,  the  line  was  connected  throughout  by  a  line 
of  telegraph. 

The  line  of  investment,  which  measured  44  miles,  was 
divided  into  six  separate  and  to  a  certain  degree  indejjend- 
ent  sectors. 

The  first  sector  extended  from  Bi volar  on  the  Vid  to  the 
Grivitza  redoubt;  commander,  General  Tschermat;  troops, 
the  main  body  of  the  Roumanian  Army,  exclusive  of  the  4th 
Division. 

The  second  sector  extended  from  the  Grivitza  redoubt  to 
the  Galitz  redoubt  near  Radischevo;  commander,  General 
Kriidener;  troops,  31st  Infantry  Division  witli  31st  Artillery 


182       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Brigade  and  2d  Brigade  of  the  5tli  Infantry  Division  with  4 
batteries  of  the  5th  Artillery  Brigade;  total,  18  battalions 
and  10  batteries. 

The  third  sector  extended  from  the  Galitz  redoubt  to  the 
ravine  of  Tutehenitza;  commander,  General  ZotofE;  troops, 
2d  Infantry  Division,  12th  Rifle  Battalion,  and  30th  Artillery 
Brigade;  total,  13  battalions,  6  batteries. 

The  fourth  sector  extended  from  the  ravine  of  Tutehen- 
itza to  that  of  Kartuschaven ;  commander,  General  Skobe- 
leff ;  troops.  16th  and  30th  Infantry  Division,  9th,  10th,  and 
11th  Rifle  Battalions,  and  16th  and  2d  Artillery  Brigades; 
total,  27  battalions,  12  batteries,  and  a  Cossack  regiment. 

The  fifth  sector  extended  from  the  Kartuschaven  ravine 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Vid  at  Tyrnen;  commander,  Gen- 
eral Kataley;  troops,  3d  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard,  2 
squadrons  of  Cossacks  of  the  Guard,  3d  Foot  Artillery  Bri- 
gade of  the  Guard,  and  10th  Don  Horse  Battery;  total.  16 
battalions,  2  squadrons,  and  7  batteries. 

The  sixth  sector  extended  from  the  left  bank  opposite 
Tyrnen  to  opposite  Bivolar;  commander.  General  Ganetzki; 
troops,  2d  and  3d  Grenadier  Divisions  with  the  2d  and  3d 
Grenadier  Artillerly  Brigade,  1st  Brigade  of  the  5th  In- 
fantry Division  with  2  batteries  of  the  5th  Artillery  Bri- 
gade, Ith  Roumanian  Division  with  its  artillery,  9th  Dra- 
goons, 9th  Lancers,  9th  Hussars,  and  4th  Cossacks,  7th 
Horse  Battery,  2d  Don  Horse  Battery,  and  a  regiment  of 
Irregulars;  total,  30  battalions,  18  squadrons,  16  batteries, 
besides  the  Roumanians. 


The  Fall  of  Plevna.  183 

The  commanders  of  sectors  had  exact  instriictious  in  the 
various  possible  cases  of  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Turks 
to  break  through;  some  days  before  the  sortie  of  the  Turks 
took  place  the  marches  prescribed  were  carried  out  under 
Todleben's  direction  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  sectors,  in  order  to 
ascertain  the  amount  of  time  requisite  to  carry  out  these 
concentrations. 

The  remainder  of  the  troops  heretofore  belonging  to  the 
West  Army — 1st  and  2d  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard,  the 
Rifle  Brigade  of  the  Guard,  Cavalry  of  the  Guard,  part  of  the 
4th  Cavalry  Division,  several  Cossack  regiments,  and  some 
Eoumanian  detachments — were  united  under  Gourko's  or- 
ders, pushed  to  the  south  and  west,  and  engaged  in  seizing 
several  passes  over  the  Balkans  and  opening  communication 
toviard  Servia. 

2.  Signs  of  the  Impendkuj  Attempt  to  Break  Throu(jh  : 
Russian  Dispositions  for  December  10th. 
From  the  reports  received  on  December  9th  from  all 
parts  of  the  line  of  investment,  and  from  the  statements  of 
numerous  deserters,  it  appeared  that  Osman  Pasha  was  pre- 
paring for  a  decisive  attempt  to  break  through.  The  fire 
from  the  Turkish  works  had  been  quite  weak  on  the  8th,  and 
almost  completely  silent  on  the  9th.  Deserters  stated  that 
shoes  and  a  supply  of  hard  bread,  as  well  as  150  rounds  of 
ammunition  i)er  man,  had  been  issued,  and  that  the  rifles  had 
been  inspected,  ^fuch  movement  was  discernible  on  and 
along  the  highroad  between  town  and  livcr;  large  bodies 
bivouacked  there  and  large  trains  were  parked. 


184      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Since  all  these  statements  and  signs  pointed  to  an  at- 
tack against  the  sixth  sector,  General  Todleben,  in  concert 
with  the  Prince  of  Koumania,  made  the  following  disposi- 
tions on  the  evening  of  December  9th: 

1.  At  daybreak  on  the  10th  of  December  General 
Skobeleflf  to  cross  the  Vid  with  1  brigade  of  the  IGth  Divi- 
sion and  3  of  its  batteries,  and  1  brigade  of  the  3d  Division 
of  the  Guard;  the  Brigade  of  the  16th  Division  with  the  ar- 
tillery to  move  to  Dolni  Diibnik  and  remain  in  readiness  to 
support  Ganetzki's  troops;  until  the  situation  should  be 
cleared  up,  the  brigade  of  the  Guard  to  remain  close  to  the 
river  on  the  left  bank,  so  as  to  be  available  for  reinforcing 
either  in  the  fifth  or  sixth  sector. 

2.  The  fifth  sector  to  remain  occupied  by  a  brigade  of 
the  3d  Division  of  the  Guard,  the  fourth  by  a  brigade  of  the 
IGth  Division  and  the  whole  of  the  30th  Division.  General 
Schnitnikof  to  assume  command  in  Skobeleflf 's  place. 

3.  No  changes  in  the  troops  holding  the  third  sector. 
1.     The  three  rifle  battalions  belonging  to  the  garrison 

of  the  fourth  sector  to  move  to  the  village  of  Grivitza  to  rein- 
force the  second  sector. 

5,  The  main  body  of  the  Roumanian  Army  to  occupy 
the  first  sector;  early  in  the  morning  1  battalions  and  3  bat- 
teries to  cross  to  the  left  bank  and  move  to  Demirkioi  to  sup- 
port the  troops  of  the  sixth  sector;  1  battalions  and  2  bat- 
teries to  remain  in  readiness  to  follow. 


The  Fall  of  Pin- un.  185 

S.     The  Events  on  the  Left  Bank  of  the  \"kL 

Oil  the  morning  of  December  lOtli  the  following  was  the 
situation  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid: 

The  line  of  Russian  entrenchments  began  near  Tyrneu 
and  extended  east  of  Dolni  Dubnik  and  Gorni  Netropolie  to 
the  ground  opposite  Bivolar.  In  addition  to  a  number  of 
connected  rifle-trenches,  it  seems  there  were  two  redoubts 
east  of  Dolni  Dubnik,  three  east  of  Gorni  Neftrojtolie,  and  a 
sixth  redoubt  north  of  Gorni  Netropolie. 

The  entrenchments  of  the  right  wing  of  this  position,  in- 
cluding the  first  and  second  redoubts,  were  held  on  the  morn- 
ing of  December  10th,  bv  the  Grenadier  Regiment  Kieff  and 
theSnine-pounder  batteriesof  the2dGrenadier Artillery  Bri- 
gade; in  their  rear  was  the  Grenadier  Regiment  Tauris  as 
first  reserve;  the  second  reserve  posted  at  Dolni  Dubnik 
consisted  of  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  2d  Grenadier  Division — 
the  Samogitia  and  Moscow  Regiments — and  the  3  four- 
])ounder  batteries  of  the  2d  Grenadier  Artillery  Brigade. 

The  entrenchments  of  the  center,  including  the  redoubts, 
were  held  by  the  Grenadier  Regiment  Siberia  and  3  nine- 
pounder  batteries;  in  reai^  stood  the  Russia  Minor  Regiment 
as  reserve.  The  Fanagoria  and  Astrachan  Regiments  and 
the  3  four-pounder  batteries  were  posted  at  Gorni  Netroiio- 
lie  as  second  reserve. 

The  left  wing  of  the  entrenchments  north  of  (lorni 
Netropolie  was  held  by  the  Archangel  Regiment  and  two 
Roumanian  divisions;  in  their  rear  were  the  Wologda  Regi- 
ment and  two  Russian  batteries  as  first  reserve;  farther  to 

-12- 


186      Tactical  studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

the  rear,  near  Demirkioi,  the  4th  Koumanian  Division  was 
posted  as  second  reserve. 

One  brigade  of  the  16th  and  another  of  the  3d  Guard 
Division  were  expected  to  arrive  in  rear  of  the  right  of  the 
entire  position;  the  reserves  in  rear  of  the  left  were  to  be 
reinforced  by  four  Koumanian  battalions  from  the  right 
bank. 

During  the  night  cavalry  patrols  reported  the  concen- 
tration of  Turkish  forces  on  the  banks  of  the  Vid;  under 
cover  of  a  dense  fog  the  Turkish  masses  crossed  to  the  left 
bank  at  daybreak  over  the  main  bridge,  a  newly  constructed 
bridge  near  Opanetz,  and  several  fords.  The  Turkish  troops 
deployed  in  a  large  fold  of  the  terrain,  the  artillery  took  posi 
tion  on  the  high  ground  and  opened  fire,  and  at  7:30  a.  m.  the 
attack  began  in  the  direction  of  Gorni  Netropolie. 

A  dense  skirmish  line  was  closely  followed  by  small 
closed  bodies,  the  main  body  following  at  a  greater  distance; 
the  artillery,  keeping  up  its  tire,  advanced  abreast  of  the  in- 
fantry, the  guns  halting  to  fire  one  round  and  then  galloping 
forward  again. 

On  the  part  of  the  Russians  a  nine-pounder  battery 
posted  in  redoubt  No.  3  opened  fire;  General  Daniloff,  com- 
mander of  the  3d  Grenadier  Division,  ordered  the  Russia 
Minor  Regiment  closer  up  to  the  line  of  entrenchments  and 
also  directed  the  brigades  at  Gorni  Xetropolie  to  advance. 

Meanwhile  the  Turkish  masses,  projecting  a  terrible  hail 
of  bullets  to  their  front,  reached  the  Russian  position  about 
8:15  a.  m.     The  losses  of  the  6  companies  of  the  Siberia 


Thv  Fall  of  ricnia.  187 

Regiment,  which  held  redoubt  No.  l\  and  the  litle-tienches 
in  the  A'icinity,  were  very  great;  the  trenches  on  either  side 
of  the  redoubt  were  lost  first ;  the  battery  in  the  redoubt  had 
lost  nearly  all  its  men  and  horses;  and  when  the  redoubt 
had  to  be  abandoned,  but  2  guns  could  be  removed,  the  re- 
maining ()  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Turks. 

At  this  time — about  8 :3U  a.  m. — the  Turkish  attack  was 
directed  against  redoubt  No.  4,  which  was  held  by  the  rest 
of  the  Siberia  Regiment ;  the  nine-pounder  battery  posted  in 
the  redoubt  continued  to  tire  for  some  time;  but  when  the 
Turks,  after  the  capture  of  redoubt  N(>.  :i,  turned  the  right 
of  the  position  and  at  the  same  time  attacked  in  front,  the 
remnants  of  the  Siberia  Regiment  fell  back,  and  redoubt  No. 
4  with  the  adjoining  rifle-trenches  was  lost  with  2  guns, 
which  could  not  be  removed  because  the  teams  had  been 
killed. 

At  this  hour  the  Russia  Minor  Regiment  reached  the 
battle-field;  formed  in  two  lines  of  company  columns,  it  ad- 
vanced in  the  interval  between  the  redoubts  Xos.  :>  and  4  and 
checked  the  attack  of  the  Turks,  but  not  without  very  great 
losses;  within  a  few  minutes  all  three  battalion  commanders 
and  more  than  half  of  the  company  commandei-s  were  killed 
or  wounded. 

The  situation  (►f  Ihe  two  (Irenadier  regiments,  which, 
though  almost  annihilated,  were  alone  opposed  to  the  vigor- 
ous attack  of  the  hostile  masses,  was  very  critical.     About 

10:30  a.  m.  the  2d  Pwigade  of  the  3d  GrenadiiM-  Division  ar- 
rived from  Gorni  Netropolie  in  supi>ort  of  its  1st  llrigade. 


188       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

and  the  2d  Brigade  of  the  2d  Grenadier  Division  posted  in 
reserve  at  Dolni  Dubnik  approached  the  battle-lield.  The 
1st  Brigade  of  the  2d  Grenadier  Division  still  held  the  en- 
trenchments on  the  right,  east  of  Dolni  Duhnik. 

The  debris  of  the  Siberia,  and  Rnssia  Minor  Regiments 
joined  in  the  advance  of  the  Fanagoria  and  Astrachan  Regi- 
ments; the  attack  of  the  division  was  successful,  and  the 
two  redoubts  and  adjoining  rifle-trenches  were  recaptured, 
as  well  as  the  lost  guns;  the  Astrachan  Regiment,  moreover, 
captured  7  Turkish  guns  and  a  stand  of  colors. 

During  this  successful  attack  2  Wologda  battalions  ar- 
rived from  the  left  and  attacked  the  Turkish  right;  at  the 
same  time  the  Samogitia  Regiment  of  the  2d  Grenadier  Di- 
vision appeared  from  the  right  and  took  part  in  the  recap- 
ture of  the  lost  entrenchments,  taking  3  Turkish  guns. 

Having  recovered  all  the  lost  positions,  the  Russian  bat- 
talions halted  and  re-formed. 

It  was  about  noon  when  the  Turks  finally  gave  up  the 
attack  and  fell  back  toward  the  bank  of  the  Vid. 

All  the  batteries  of  the  3d  Grenadier  Artillery-  Brigade 
were  now  placed  in  the  front  line  with  the  infantry  and  cov- 
ered the  retreating  Turks  with  a  brisk  fire;  the  lost  and  re- 
captured guns  were  being  served  by  men  from  the  infantry. 

General  Danilolf  now  advanced  to  the  attack  with  the 
entire  3d  Grenadier  Division,  followed  on  the  left  by  the  1st 
Brigade  of  the  otli  Division  and  on  the  right  by  the  2d  Bri- 
gade of  the  2d  Grenadier  Division,  The  1st  Brigade  of  the 
latter  division,  heretofore  holding  the  entrenchments  of  the 


The  Fall  of  PIev)ia.  189 

right,  was  also  brought  forward  and  took  tlie  Turks  iu  left 
flank;  one  battalion  each  of  the  Taurida  and  Kieff  Regi- 
ments of  this  brigade  forded  the  Vid,  the  water  reaching  to 
their  waist-belts,  and  seized  the  height  of  Blasivatz;  the 
garrison  of  the  Turkish  redoubts  at  this  point  surrendered 
without  firing  a  shot. 

Upon  request  of  General  Ganetzki,  the  6  battalions  of 
the  3d  Infantry  Division  of  the  Guard  under  General  Kour- 
loff,  having  crossed  to  the  left  bank  by  a  pontoon  bridge, 
started  at  10  a.  m.  for  Dolni  Dubnik;  arriving  there,  the  bri- 
gade received  orders  to  advance  against  the  left  of  the 
Turks.  General  Skobeleff,  however,  who  arrived  at  this 
moment,  ordered  the  brigade  to  delay  its  advance  until  the 
arrival  of  the  brigade  of  the  16th  Division;  having  given 
the  order,  General  Skobeleft"  repaired  elsewhere.  Neither 
the  brigade  of  the  16th  Division  nor  further  orders  having 
arrived  by  2  p.  m.,  Kourloflt'  on  his  own  responsibility  ad- 
vanced along  the  highroad;  when  the  brigade  reached  the 
bridge  over  the  Vid,  the  battle  was  already  at  an  end. 

'4.     The  Events  on  the  Bight  Bank  of  the  \'i(I. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  of  the  9th-10th  of  December 
General  Skobeleff  was  informed  by  outposts  that  the  Kris- 
hin  works  had  been  abandoned  by  the  Turks.  A  party  of 
volunteers  was  dispatched  at  once  to  investigate,  and  found 
the  redoubts  and  trenches  in  rear  of  Krishin  empty;  they 
were  at  once  occupied  by  troops  of  the  30th  Infantry  Division. 

Simultaneously  with  the  report  of  the  occupation  of  the 


1 90       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Krisliin  works,  information  was  received  at  lieadquarters  at 
9  a.  m.  that  the  so-called  ''second  (irivitza  redoubt"  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  Turks  and  occupied  by  the  Roumanians. 
General  Todleben  immediately  ordered  all  the  troops  on  the 
east  front  of  Plevna  to  move  to  the  attack  on  the  Turkish 
works;  the  brigade  of  the  16th  Division,  which  was  still  on 
the  right  bank  in  the  fourth  sector,  as  well  as  the  3  rifle  bat- 
talions which  had  been  ordered  to  the  village  of  Grivitza, 
but  had  not  yet  reached  their  destination,  were  directed  to 
cross  to  the  left  bank  as  quickly  as  possible  and  to  place 
themselves  under  Skobeletf's  orders,  who,  we  know,  had 
been  sent  with  2  brigades  to  support  Ganetzki. 

Advancing  on  Plevna  from  all  directions,  the  troops 
found  a  large  portion  of  the  works  evacuated  by  the  Turks; 
others  were  held  weakly  to  deceive  the  enemy,  and  were 
easily  taken. 

The  Roumanians  approaching  from  the  north  found  the 
works  of  Opanetz  still  occupied;  after  a  brief  engagement, 
the  Turkish  garrison  of  2.000  men  surrendered;  3  guns  were 
captured  in  these  works. 

On  perceiving  the  withdrawal  of  the  Turks  toward  the 
river,  General  Kataley,  commander  of  the  fifth  sector,  led 
those  battalions  of  his  division  of  the  Guard  which  were  still 
on  the  right  bank  against  the  Turkish  entrenchments  to  the 
west  of  Krisliin;  by  1  p.  m.  all  the  works  of  the  entrenched 
camp  between  Plevna  and  the  river  were  in  his  hands:  1 
pasha,  120  officers,  3,600  men,  and  1  guns  were  captured  here 
by  the  Russians,  whose  losses  did  not  exceed  3  killed  and  15 
wounded. 


The  Fall  of  Phvmi.  191 

J.     The  Surrender. 

Crowded  together  from  all  sides  against  the  banks  of  the 
Vid,  and  helplessly  exposed  to  the  tire  of  the  Russian  guns, 
the  Turks  had  to  give  up  not  only  the  idea  of  renewing  the 
attack,  but  of  prolonging  the  resistance.  Osman  Pasha  dis- 
patched officers  in  all  directions  to  seek  the  Russian  com- 
mander-in-chief and  to  inform  him  of  the  cessation  of  resist- 
ance on  the  part  of  the  Turks. 

General  Gaiietzki,  riding  toward  the  bridge  over  the 
Vid,  met  Osmau's  chief-of-statT  and  demanded  the  uncondi- 
tional surrender  of  the  whole  army.  Osman,  who  was 
wounded,  having  acceded  to  the  demand,  the  Turkish  troops 
everj'where  laid  down  their  arms. 

Exclusive  of  20,000  sick  and  wounded,  the  army  surren- 
dering here  to  Russian  captivity  still  numbered  40,000  etfect- 
ives,  among  them  10  pashas,  12S  lield  officers,  and  2,000  of- 
ficers of  lower  grade;  77  gnus,  70,000  rifles,  and  a  great 
quantity  of  cartridges  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 
A  number  (about  30)  of  heavy  guns,  which  were  buried  by 
the  Turks  before  the  beginning  of  their  attempt  to  break 
through,  were  not  discovered  until  later. 

6.  Losses. 
The  losses  of  the  two  Russian  Gi-enadier  Divisions  were 
as  follows:  killed  2  field  officers,  7  compjiny  officers,  409 
men;  wounded,  1  general,  3  field  officers,  47  company  officers, 
and  1,2G3  men.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  thes(^  losses  fell 
on  the  Siberia  and   Russia  ]Minor   Regiments.     The   next 


192      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

greater  loss  was  suffered  by  the  Astraclian  Regiment:  1  of- 
ficer and  72  men  killed,  12  oflficers  and  346  men  wounded. 

The  1st  Brigade  of  the  5th  Division  last  1  officer  and  47 
men  wounded;  the  3d  Division  of  the  Guard  lost  3  men  killed 
and  15  wounded. 

The  losses  of  the  two  batteries  posted  in  the  redoubts 
which  were  for  some  time  in  the  hands  of  the  Turks  must 
have  been  heavy,  but  can  not  be  ascertained. 

The  loss  of  the  Roumanians  was  trifling.  The  Turks 
lost  about  6,000  men,  killed  and  wounded. 

Comments. 

1,  The  troops  available  for  the  investment  of  Plevna 
during  the  last  six  weeks  numbered  8  Russian  Infantry  Di- 
visions (3d  Division  of  the  Guard,  2d  and  3d  of  the  Grena- 
dier Corps,  2d,  5th,  16th,  30th,  and  31st  Infantry  Divisions) 
and  1st  rifle  brigade,  some  cavalry  and  Cossack  regiments, 
and  48  foot  and  3  horse  batteries;  total,  about  75,000  men 
with  400  field  guns,  to  which  should  be  added  25,000  Rouma- 
nians, The  total  strength  of  the  investing  army  was  there- 
fore 100,000  men  with  about  500  guns,  while  the  effectives  of 
the  Turkish  Army  during  the  last  few  weeks  may  be  put 
down  at  50,000  men  with  a  little  more  than  100  field  and 
position  guns.  The  Russian  line  of  investment  measured 
45  miles,  the  Turkish  line  of  defense  about  25  miles. 

A  brief  comparison  of  the  investment  of  Plevna  with 
the  successful  investment  of  Kars  by  the  Russians  under 
Muravieff  in  1855  is  not  without  interest.       The  Russian 


The  Fall  of  Plevna.  193 

Army  of  investment  numbered  30,000  men,  the  invested 
Turkish  Army  20,000  to  25,000  men;  the  length  of  the  Turk- 
ish line  of  defense  was  about  13  miles,  that  of  the  Russian 
line  of  investment  50  miles. 

The  methods  of  investment  pursued  in  these  two  sieges 
differ  materially.  General  Muravieff  posted  his  entire  in- 
fantry with  some  cavalry  south  of  Kars  on  the  line  of  com- 
munication with  Erzeroum,  and  the  investment  proper  was 
maintained  by  five  strong  detachments  of  cavalry  (consist- 
ing each,  of  one  or  two  cavalry  regiments  with  some  artil- 
lery), W'hich  were  posted  in  a  circle  around  Kars  and  kept 
up  communication  with  each  other.  After  an  investment  of 
several  weeks,  the  Turkish  Army  surrendered  on  account  of 
lack  of  provisions,  without  making  an  attempt  to  cut  its  way 
out. 

The  investment  of  Plevna  wa.s  of  nearly  equal  strength 
at  all  points;  the  greatest  importance  attaches  to  the  fourth 
and  sixth  sectors,  which  were  traversed  by  the  great  roads 
which  might  be  used  by  Osman  on  his  retreat. 

In  comparing  the  extent  of  the  line  of  investment  of 
Plevna  with  the  two  great  investments  of  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian War,  we  find  that  the  German  line  of  investment  of 
Metz  had  an  extent  of  25  miles,  that  of  Paris  of  53  miles. 
The  circumference  of  the  enceinte  of  Paris  measured  10  miles, 
the  line  connecting  the  forts  about  35  miles. 

2.  The  sixth  sector  of  the  line  of  investment  of  Plevna, 
embracing  the  left  bank  of  the  Vid.  was  geographically  the 
most  important  portion  of  the  line,  and  had.  from  Tyrnen  to 


194      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Dolni  Dubuik  and  fiom  (iorui  Netropolie  to  opposite  Bivolar, 
a  length  of  12  miles.  This  portion  of  the  line  was  held  by  2 
Grenadier  Divisions  which  had  not  yet  been  engaged,  1  bri- 
gade of  the  5th  Division  which  had  suffered  considerably, 
and  several  thousand  Roumanians;  total,  25,000  to  30,000 
infantry,  giving  about  5  men  for  every  3  yards  of  front. 

As  a  matter  of  comparison,  we  state  here  the  following: 

About  the  middle  of  November,  1870,  when  the  great 
sortie  from  I'aris  was  expected,  the  investment  was  so  ar- 
ranged that  the  III.  Army  guarded  the  left  bank  of  the  Seine, 
extending  15  miles,  with  100,000  infantry,  and  the  Meuse 
Army  guarded  the  right  bank,  which  measured  37  miles, 
with  80,000  infantry,  giving  to  the  III.  Army  about  13  men 
for  3  yards  of  front,  to  the  Meuse  Army  about  4  men  for  the 
same  front. 

3.  The  two  points  of  Dolni  Dubnik  and  Gorni  Netropo- 
lie, where  the  main  reserves  of  the  sector  were  posted,  were 
distant  6  and  4  miles  respectively  from  the  bridge  over  the 
Vid;  the  line  of  investment  consisting  of  redoubts  and  rifle- 
trenches  seems  to  have  been  2,000  or  3,000  yards  farther  to 
the  front. 

The  beginning  of  the  Turkish  attack  was  discovered  by 
the  Russians  about  7:30  a.  m.,  whereupon,  it  seems.  General 
Daniloff  at  once  issued  orders  for  the  two  rear  echelons  of 
his  division  to  move  up  to  the  line  of  defense  held  by  the 
Siberia  Regiment.  As  the  Russia  Minor  Regiment  did  not 
reach  the  fighting  line  before  9  a.  m.,  and  the  2d  Brigade 
coming  from  Gorni  Netropolie  not  before  10:30  a.  m.,  there 


TheFiiU  of  Plrnia.  195 

must  have  beeu  delays  whose  nature  eanuot  be  aseei'tained 
with  the  lights  before  us;  the  distance  was  not  such  as  to 
prevent  these  troops  from  arriving  much  earlier. 

Peculiar  ill  luck  also  seems  to  have  attached  to  the 
movements  of  the  troops  dispatched  under  Skobeleff  to  the 
left  bank  in  support  of  Ganetzki.  Since  both  brigades  were 
on  the  fui-ther  bank  of  the  Vid  by  7  a.  m.,  there  is  no  reason 
why  they  should  not  have  arrived  in  good  time  at  the  assailed 
front  either  in  direct  supjjort  or,  still  better,  have  advanced 
against  the  left  Hank  of  the  Turkish  attack;  but  it  seems 
that,  owing  to  some  misunderstanding,  the  brigade  of  the 
Kith  Division  never  reached  Dolni  Dubnik,  and  that  Kour- 
loflf's  brigade  of  the  Guard  was  held  at  Dolni  Dubnik  by  con- 
tradictory orders  during  the  decisive  hours, 

Skobeleff's  order  to  Kourlotf  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  the 
16th  Division  is  due  to  a  justifiable  desire  to  undertake  the 
decisive  attack  of  the  day,  not  with  an  isolated  brigade,  but 
with  all  his  available  troops.  On  the  other  hand,  Ganetzki's 
order  to  that  brigade  to  advance  along  the  highroad  was 
perfectly  proper,  for  he  was  in  position  to  know  that  the  at- 
tack of  even  a  comparatively  small  detachment  in  the  direc- 
tion indicated  would  no  longer  encounter  serious  resistance. 

4.  The  number  of  effectives  of  the  Turkish  Army  on 
the  morning  of  December  10th  must  be  set  down  at  45,000 
men,  and  the  strength  of  the  corps  led  to  the  attack  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Vid  at  80,000  to  85,000  men  with  GO  guns. 

The  passage  of  the  Vid  was  effected  before  dawn  with 
surprising    rapidity,  by  means  of  two  biidges  and    a  few 


11^ (J      TacHcal  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

fords;  the  deployment  oa  the  further  bank  was  also  effected 
with  great  rapiditj-,  so  that  the  attack,  made  in  dense, 
closed  formation,  oould  be  begun  at  7:30  a.  m. 

The  passage  as  well  as  the  deployment  for  the  attack 
challenge  an  interesting  comparison  with  similar  events  dur- 
ing the  investment  of  Metz. 

During  the  night  of  the  25th-26th  of  August  Marshal 
Bazaine  issued  the  necessary  orders  for  a  sortie  to  be  under- 
taken next  day  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  against  St. 
Barbe,  with  a  view  of  marching  thence  along  the  river  to 
Thionville.  The  troops  encamped  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Moselle  were  put  in  motion  at  5  a.  m.,  in  broad  daylight. 
Although  four  bridges  were  available  for  the  passage  of 
the  INloselle,  the  crossing  was  not  completed  until  3  p.  m. 
At  that  hour,  when  everybody  was  waiting  for  the  begin- 
ning of  the  attack,  Marshal  Bazaine  assembled  his  gener- 
als in  council,  and  it  was  decided,  after  protracted  consul- 
tation, to  defer  the  attack,  whereupon  the  troops  returned  to 
their  camping-grounds. 

The  events  of  the  31st  of  August  preceding  the  battle 
of  Noisseville  were  of  similar  nature.  Early  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  31st  Bazaine  ordered  the  army  to  deploy  in  front 
of  the  Forts  Queuleu  and  St.  Julien,  the  arrangements  dif- 
fering but  little  from  those  of  the  26th;  but  although  an  ad- 
ditional bridge  was  thrown  on  that  day  near  Fort  Queuleu, 
it  was  2  p.  m.  before  the  deployment  on  the  left  bank  was 
completed.     Again  Bazaine  assembled  his  lieutenants,  this 


The  Fall  of  Plevna.  197 

time  to  communicate  to  them   his   orders  for  the   attack; 
and  it  was  4  p.  m.  when  the  attack  began. 

Even  making  allowance  for  the  fact  that  the  number  of 
French  troops  crossing  the  Moselle  was  three  times  that  of 
the  Turks  crossing  the  Vid,  still  a  comparison  between 
the  two  leaders  and  the  two  armies,  with  reference  to  the 
point  under  discussion,  is  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  Turks. 

5.  The  Turks  attacked  the  Kussian  i)osition  with  a 
bravery  that  despised  death,  and  at  first  with  surprising 
success,  considering  that  the  Russians  must  have  been  more 
or  less  prepared  for  the  attack;  as  soon,  however,  as  the  first 
check  was  suflered  and  the  attack  brought  to  a  halt,  the 
heretofore  convulsive  tension  gave  way  to  a  total  relaxation. 
The  Turks  ceased  all  resistance  before  the  ea])itnla1i()n  was 
officially  concluded. 

The  feeble  action  of  the  garrisons  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Vid  is  hard  to  understand,  and  must  in  part  be  called 
shameful.  Though  not  strong  enough  to  permanently  hold 
their  works,  they  might  undoubtedly  have  checl^tMl  The  Rus- 
sians for  hours  and  inflicted  on  them  very  sensible  losses. 
If  those  30  guns,  instead  of  being  buried,  had  remained  in 
1he  works  on  the  right  bank,  they  would  certaiuly  have  paid 
for  their  ultimate  loss  many  times  over. 

().  Lastly,  a  negative  answer  must  be  giveu  to  the  (|ue;s- 
lion.  Did  the  Tui'kish  sortie  have  any  jtrosjiect  of  success? 

The  garrison  of  a  suiall  place  of  a  few  thousiiud  uieu, 
if  led  with  determination  and  ])rudence.  may  cut  its  way 
through  an  investing  enemy  by  ]>iercing"  the  line  of  invest- 


198      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

ment  by  sudden  attack  and  escaping  through  the  gap  (Me- 
nin,  1795;  Almedia,  1811).  This  method  of  escape,  however, 
without  assistance  from  without,  is  out  of  the  question  for 
an  invested  army,  A  merely  temporary  piercing  of  the  line 
of  investment  will  jnobably  in  most  cases  be  followed  by  a 
defeat  in  the  open  field;  escape  is  possible  only  if  the  invest- 
ing army  is  beaten.  On  that  eventuality  the  Turks  could 
under  no  circumstances  count;  for,  even  if  it  had  been  pos- 
sible to  overthrow  the  Kussian  troops  on  the  left  bank,  the 
Turks  would  beyond  a  doubt  have  been  surrounded  and 
crushed  within  twenty-four  or,  at  the  most,  forty-eight 
hours.  In  this  particular  there  is  considerable  similarity 
between  the  conditions  at  Metz  and  Plevna. 

As  long  as  a  so-called  relief  army  stood  at  Orkhanie,  Os- 
man's  retreat,  if  difficult,  was  possible;  but  the  fate  of  the 
army  of  Plevna  was  sealed  as  soon  as  Gourko's  bold  ojjera- 
tions  in  the  passes  of  the  Balkans  compelled  the  Turkish 
Army  at  Orkhanie  to  fall  back  to  Sophia. 


Comments.  919 


PART  XIII. 
COMMENTt^. 

1.     The  Operations. 

By  what  plan  of  operations  the  Russian  commander- 
in-chief  was  originall}'  guided  will  probably  never  be  known 
with  exactness — at  any  rate,  not  until  after  a  long  time. 
It  may  be  assumed  that  the  programme  of  the  campaign 
was  carried  out  up  to  the  passage  of  the  Danube. 

The  forcing  of  the  passage  of  the  Danube  with  compara- 
tively small  difficulty,  and  still  more,  Gourko's  unexpected 
passage  of  the  Balkans  undertaken  with  a  bold  appreciation 
of  the  situation,  impressed  upon  the  heretofore  prudent  and 
methodical  leadership  a  new  and  somewhat  liazardous  char- 
acter. It  appears  as  if  political  considerations  liad  previ- 
ously exercised  a  greater  influence  upon  the  conduct  of  the 
war  than  purely  military  considerations. 

The  low  estimation  placed  upon  the  opponent  led  to  a 
precipitate  advance  and  exacted  a  severe  penalty.  Suc- 
cesses easily  gained,  and  existing  more  in  appearance  than 
in  reality,  produced  a  complete  intoxication  which  made  the 
most  difficult  objectives  seem  t<>  be  within  easy  reach. 

It  is  interesting  to  draw  a.  rough  outline  of  llic  develop- 
ment things  might  have  taken,  with  a  high  degree  of  proba- 
bility, if  the  incident  of  Plevna  had  not  ]iai)pened. 


200      Tactical  Sttidies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Tlie  first  possibility  was  that  the  sudden  appearance 
of  the  Russians  south  of  the  Balkans  would  have  created 
such  consternation  in  Constantinople  as  to  cause  further 
resistance  to  be  abandoned  and  the  road  of  negotiations, 
attended  by  inevitable  sacrifices  on  the  part  of  the  Turks, 
to  be  entered  upon. 

Should  Turkey  have  made  far-reaching  concessions  and 
placed  the  execution  of  the  promised  reforms  in  the  hands 
of  a  European  commission,  Russia  would  tol  a  certain  de- 
gree have  been  disarmed.  The  object  for  which  Russia  had 
drawn  the  sword  would,  in  appearance  at  least,  have  been 
accomplished,  and  rivers  of  Russian  blood  would  not  have 
washed  out  the  peaceful  protestations  of  unselfish  and  hu- 
mane sentiments.  Perhaps  it  might  still  have  been  possi- 
ble to  allay  the  justifiable  impulsesi  of  Russian  self-confi- 
dence with  formal  concessions.  In  one  word,  the  solution 
of  the  Oriental  question,  that  bugbear  of  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope, might  again  have  been  postponed  for  a  shorter  or  a 
longer  period.  But  the  events  connected  with  the  name  of 
Plevna  removed  that  possibility  and  rendered  the  long- 
impending  Oriental  catastrophe  unavoidable.  Therein  lies 
the  great  political  importance  of  the  conflict  which  for  five 
months  raged  around  Plevna, 

A  second  possibility  is  that  of  the  war  continuing  after 
the  Russians  had  passed  the  Balkans,  when  they  might  have 
been  so  carried  away  by  the  intoxication  of  easily  gained 
successes  at  Ihe  beginning  as  to  transfer  the  center  of  their 


Comments.  201 

operations  beyond  tJie  Balkans  with  their  totally  inadequate 
forces. 

In  that  case  the  reverse  might  have  come  at  Sophia  or 
Adrianople,  instead  of  Plevna,  and  would  have  been  quite 
unavoidable. in  view  of  the  wholly  inadequate  Russian  forces 
and  the  Turkish  power  of  resistance,  which  surpassed  all 
expectations.  This  result  would  have  come  independently 
of  the  numerous  mistakes  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  on  tke 
part  of  the  Russians,  which  were  counterbalanced  by  equal- 
ly heavy  errors  on  the  part  of  the  Turks.  The  new  prepara- 
tions to  surmount  this  crisis,  which  entailed  on  the  Rus- 
sians such  unusual  difficulties  and  enormous  sacrifices  of 
treasure  and  blood  before  Plevna,  would  of  course  have  been 
more  difficult  on  account  of  the  greater  length  of  the  com- 
munications and  the  obstacle  presented  b}'  the  Balkans,  and 
it  seems  quite  possible  that  the  campaign  of  1877  might  have 
ended  with  a  failure  for  the  Russian  arms. 

The  great  strategic  importance  of  the  conflicts  around 
Plevna  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
Russians  to  the  impending  danger,  caused  them  in  good  time 
to  make  a  suitable  change  in  their  entire  plan,  and  forced 
them,  against  their  will,  to  employ  the  amount  of  force  indis- 
pensable for  decisive  success. 

The  question  then  would  be.  Whether  the  Turks  made  a 
mistake  in  fighting  at  Plevna?  since  tliat  campaign,  not- 
withstanding its  primary  disadvantages,  did  certainly  con- 
fer very  considerable  advantages  u]m)ii  I  he  Russian  cause. 
This  point  is  worthy  of  reflection. 

-13- 


202      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Upon  the  appearance  of  Osman  Pasha  on  the  right  flank 
of  the  Russians  the  strategic  situation  of  the  latter  was  de- 
cidedly unfavorable,  and  it  became  highly  dangerous  by 
Kriidener's  defeat  at  Plevna  on  July  30th, 

Had  Osman  Pasha  been  able  to  follow  up  his  victory 
with  an  immediate  and  vigorous  pursuit,  and  to  drive  Kriid- 
ener's morally  and  materially  weakened  troops  across  the 
Osma,  all  conditions  would  have  been  favorable,  in  case  of 
fairly  proper  and  combined  action  on  the  part  of  the  East 
and  West  Armies,  to  involve  the  Russian  Army  in  a  defeat 
which  was  bound  to  be  decisive  for  the  campaign  of  that 
year. 

In  that  case  the  detention  of  the  West  Army  at  Wid- 
din  and  its  subsequent  skillful  advance  on  the  decisive  point 
at  the  right  moment  would  justly  stand  as  a  brilliant  and 
successful  example  of  strategic  calculation,  and  old  Abdul 
Kerim  Pasha's  "secret  plan,"  often  derided  and  maligned 
to  the  extent  of  having  its  existence  denied,  would  have 
been  vindicated. 

Yet  these  claims  to  consider  the  advance  of  the  West 
Bulgarian  Army  from  Widdin  on  Plevna  as  the  efflux  of  a 
brilliant  strategic  reflection  are  seriously  weakened,  not  by 
the  ultimate  failure,  but  by  another  factor. 

The  above  described  decisive  role  could  not  be  played 
by  Osman's  army  except  by  way  of  the  most  vigorous  offens- 
ive. Osman's  inactivity  after  his  second  victory  at  Plevna 
on  July  30th  proves  that  his  army,  however  stout  on  the  de- 
fensive, must  have  lacked  every  trace  of  offensive  force.     A 


Comments.  203 

general  as  able  as  Osman  Pasha  would  not  have  allowed  the 
favorable  situation,  as  it  existed  at  the  beginning  of  August, 
to  slip  by  without  turning  it  to  account. 

If  Osman  Pasha  considered  his  army  capable  of  carry- 
ing the  offensive  to  the  point  of  seeking  a  decisive  battle, 
his  advance  from  Widdin  to  Plevna  was  a  well-planned  op- 
eration. If  he  did  not  credit  his  army  with  this  offensive  ca- 
pacity, his  advance  must  be  accounted  an  error.  In  spite  of 
all  defensive  successes  attributable  in  part  to  the  lack  of 
skill  of  the  Kussian  leading,  the  mere  stay  of  his  army  at 
Plevna  was  not  only  useless,  but  an  advantage  voluntarily 
conceded  to  the  Russians;  that  they  failed  to  turn  the  ad- 
vantage to  account  until  very  late  and  after  many  mistakes 
and  sacrifices,  and  that  the  tenacity  with  which  the  Turks 
held  out  at  Plevna  came  near  giving  the  whole  campaign  a 
turn  unfavorable  to  the  Russians,  was  due  to  circumstances 
which  were  beyond  Osman  Pasha's  control. 

2.  Combat;  Fire  of  Masses  and  Rifle-Trenches. 
The  great  wars  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centu- 
ries bear  to  a  certain  degree  a  peculiai'  character  in  which  the 
personality  of  one  or  several  leaders  is  strongly  impressed. 
To  be  sure,  a  long  series  of  improvements  has  been  made 
in  the  course  of  time,  pai-tly  in  armament  and  equipment, 
partly  in  tactical  arrangement  and  employment  of  troops; 
still,  grand  innovations  which  influence  the  character  of  the 
whole  method  of  fighting  do  not  appear,  and  the  technique 


204      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

of  fighting  has  remained  essentially  unchanged  for  a  long 
time. 

The  period  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  forms  the  tramsition 
from  the  period  just  mentioned  to  that  of  modem  wars.  It 
is  true  the  introduction  of  the  dispersed  order  of  battle 
brought  about  a  complete  modification  of  the  entire  fighting 
technique,  but  the  armament  and  equipment  of  Napoleon's 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  differed  in  nothing  from  the 
armament  and  equipment  of  his  opponents;  and,  leaving  out 
some  trifling  matters,  it  was  not  different  from  the  armament 
of  the  times  of  Frederick,  Eugene,  and  Turenne. 

An  entirely  different  picture  is  presented  by  the  great 
wars  of  the  quarter  of  a  centur}'  just  passed.  Compared  with 
former  times,  the  individuality  of  the  leaders,  though  still  de- 
cisive of  the  final  result  of  the  war,  is  placed  in  the  back- 
ground. On  the  other  hand,  each  of  the  great  wars  of  recent 
times  is  characterized  by  improvements  which  mark  an  epoch 
in  the  character  of  weapons,  and  a  resulting  transfonnation 
of  the  methods  of  fighting. 

The  Oriental  War  i)roduced  the  rifled  musket,  the  Ital- 
ian War  the  rifled  gun,  the  American  War  the  armored  ship 
and  monitor,  the  Austro-Prussian  War  the  breechloader 
with  moderate  rapidity  and  range,  the  Franco-Prussian  War 
the  chassepot,  a  far  superior  rival  of  the  old  breechloader; 
lastly,  the  Turko-Kussian  War  produced  the  new  systems  of 
rifles  of  surpassing  rapidity  of  fire  and  range,  up  to  the  re- 


Conuncnts.  205 

peater,  and,  as  a  result,  field  entrencliments  on  a  ^rand 
scale,*  which  are  now  not  the  exception,  but  the  lule. 

The  waste  of  ammunition  predicted  by  the  oi)ponents  of 
the  breechloader  on  its  first  introduction  was  happily  pre- 
vented by  the  firo  discipline  of  the  Prussian  troops.  The 
surprisingly  small  consumption  of  ammunition  -  millions) 
in  the  campaign  of  1866  proved  conclusively  that  the  capac- 
ity of  the  new  arm  as  regards  rapidity  of  fire  needed  to  be 
fully  utilized  only  in  exceptional  cases,  and  then  for  very 
brief  periods;  as  a  rule,  the  fire  delivered  was  aimed  tire  at 
short  range  and  of  moderate  rapidity. 

Quite  ditferent  was  the  use  made  in  1870  by  the  French 
Army,  after  a  brief  |)ea.ce  training,  of  the  rapid-firing,  long- 
range  arm.  Fire  was  opened  at  enormous  ranges,  in  part  be- 
fore the  opponent  came  in  full  view;  the  latter  sometimes 
suffered  considerable  losses  at  very  long  ranges,  but  a  real 
success  was  never  gained  by  this  kind  of  fire.  It  is  not  our 
intention  to  discuss  here  the  much-mooted  question  of  the 
l:)ng-range  fire  of  masses,  but  we  feel  safe  in  stating  that 
theprocedure  of  the  French  in  this  particiihir  was  ill-adapted, 
and  not  based  on  clear  refiection  and  calculaiioii.  but  chief- 


*It  is  surprising  that  a  military  writer  ot  Von  Trotha's  attainments  should 
speak  of  "field  entrenchments  on  a  grand  scale"  as  an  outgrowth  of  the  Turko- 
Russian  War.  Had  he  given  even  the  most  superficial  study  to  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion, he  would  have  known  that  the  great  armies  engaged  in  that  contest  made  a 
more  extended  use  of  field  entrenchments  than  was  made  by  the  Turks  more  than 
twelve  years  later.  The  battles  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  and.  indted,  the  entire  cam- 
paign from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta:  the  battles  of  The  Wilderness  and  Spoltsyl- 
vania,  and  the  long  struggle  at  Petersburg,  might  be  studied  with  profit  by  Von 
Trotha,  Clery.  and  other  European  critics  who  labor  under  the  delusion  that 
"field  entrenchments  on  a  grand  scale"  were  practically  unknown  until  the  Turks 
brought  them  to  the  attention  of  the  military  world.  Moreover,  the  American  War 
produced  a  breechloader  which  was  superior  in  range,  accuracy,  and  rapidity  of 
fire  to  the  Prussian  "needle-gun"  of  18(>ti,  and  whi^h  was  largely  used  by  the  Union 
troops,  especially  the  cavalrj-,  in  the  last  year  of  the  war. — A.  L.  W. 


206      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

ly  on  lack  of  fire  discipline  and  obscure  conceptions  of  the 
real  value  of  the  new  arm. 

After  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  long-range  fire  of 
masses  became  the  frequent  topic  of  theoretical  disquisitions 
and  ipractical  experiments  in  the  gireat  armies  of  Europe; 
but  while  the  contending  parties  were  still  deeply  engaged  in 
their  controversies  and  no  final  settlement  of  the  necessary 
transformation  of  fire  tactics  had  been  reached,  the  question 
had  been  very  simply  settled  in  Turkey,  without  much  previ- 
ous inquiry,  and  the  most  extreme  conclusions  had  been 
drawn  from  the  armament  with  long-range,  rapid-firing 
arms. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Turkish  Army  developed 
a  sj'stem  of  fire  tactics  complete  in  its  simplicity:  as  soon 
as  the  enemy  was  known  to  be  within  reach  of  the  rifle,  the 
space  supposed  to  be  occupied  or  about  to  be  traversed  by 
him  was  covered,  without  regard  to  distance  and  probability 
of  hitting  or  consumption  of  ammunition,  with  a  fire  whose 
severity  and  duration  were  without  example. 

Intimately  connected  with  this  system  of  fire  tactics  is 
the  use  of  field  entrenchments,  which  were  probably  never 
heretofore  employed  to  this  extent  or  in  this  manner. 

The  Turkish  method  of  fighting  in  this  war  rests,  there- 
fore, on  two,  to  a  certain  extent  new,  factors,  and  although 
many  objections  may  be  raised  or  improvements  suggested 
as  to  the  application  of  the  system  in  detail,  still  the  sound- 
ness of  these  new  factors  and  their  influence  on  any  change 
of  fighting  tactics  cannot  be  denied. 


Comments.  207 

In  tuming  now  to  the  active  factor  of  the  Turkish  tac- 
tics we  find  that  experience  has  silenced  those  objections 
which  were  formerly  frequently  raised  against  the  prac- 
ticability of  such  rapid  fire. 

The  new  and  complicated  systems  of  small-arms  have 
l»roven  efficient  in  the  hands  of  untrained  men,  nor  was  there 
any  difficulty  encountered  in  the  handling  of  the  magazine 
rifles  formerly  condemned  as  a  weapon  in  wai".  The  supply 
of  ammunition,  which  was  consumed  in  incredible  quanti- 
ties, was  effected  on  the  part  of  the  Turks  without  difficulty^ 
To  be  sure,  as  regards  the  latter  point,  the  Turks  were 
greatly  favored  by  the  fact  of  being  almost  everywhere  on 
the  tactical  defensive,  but  even  in  the  rare  cases  where  the 
Turkish  infantry  made  great  attacks,  the  thorough  organiza- 
tion of  the  ammunition  supply  can  be  traced  up  to  the  very 
firing  line. 

In  nearh-  all  the  Turkish  positions  which  the  Russians 
captured  enormous  supplies  of  cartridges  were  found,  fre- 
quentl}^  spread  out  in  shallow  boxes  for  convenient  use  be- 
tween the  prostrate  skirmishers.  It  was  not  at  all  rare  to 
find  200  to  300  empty  cartridge  shells  by  the  side  of  a  dead 
Turk.  Instances  occurred  when  individual  Turks  ex- 
pended as  many  as  500  rounds  in  a  single  action.  P'vcn  in 
tiiose  cases  where  the  Turks  moved  to  the  attack  (ui  ilio 
Russian  positions,  it  has  been  proved  that  some  Turkish 
skiruiisliers.  covering  llieniselves  in  front  of  llic  Russian 
line,  fired  nway  120  to  150  rounds  in  a  comparatively  short 
time.     \\e  may  supplement  this  by  the  assertion   of  the 


208       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

Russians  that  in  the  course  of  the  war  they  toolv  altogether 
in  the  captured  positions  and  in  the  several  surrenders  500 
millions  of  cartridges.  It  may  be  interesting  to  state  here 
that  the  total  supply  of  a  German  army  corps,  inclusive  of 
the  aiinniiMition  columns,  amounts  in  round  figures  to  4^ 
millions  of  cartridges. 

Nor  should  the  fact  be  overlooked  that  the  distances  in 
I'lont  of  the  Turkish  positions  were  frequently  measured  by 
pacing,  and  marked. 

We  now  turn  to  the  passive  factor  of  the  Turkish  tac- 
tics: the  employment  of  field  entrenchments. 

Here  we  have  to  do  with  two  things,  which,  though  inti- 
mately connected,  must  be  separately  considered:  the  con- 
struction of  entrenchments  proper  and  the  shelter  afforded 
by  rapidly  constructed  rifle-trenches. 

Wherever  the  Turkish  infantry  took  up  a  tactical  posi- 
tion, it  sought  cover  for  deployed  lines,  utilizing  to  the  full- 
est extent  any  advantages  offered  by  the  ground.  Where  it 
became  necessary,  a  shallow  rifle-trench  was  constructed. 
Wherever  tlie  ground  permitted,  tiers  of  fire  were  arranged 
for  several  lines  of  infantry  covering  themselves  at  short 
distances,  one  above  the  other,  on  more  or  less  steep  slopes. 

A 

The  Turkish  infantry  seems  to  have  possessed  great  skill  in 
the  construction  of  these  trenches ;  the  first  hasty  construc- 
tion was  accomplished  with  great  rapidity,  and  technical 
troops  were  not  employed  in  this  work.  Where  there  was 
ample  time,  the  shallow  trench  was  deepened  and  the  breast- 
work strengthened.     If  the  position  was  to  be  occupied  for 


Comments.  209 

several  days,  traverses  against  enfilading  fire  were  added 
and  shelter  for  part  of  the  men  constructed  by  digging  ob- 
liquely down  under  the  counterscarp,  thus  obtaining  better 
shelter,  whenever  the  garrison  of  the  trench  was  not  en- 
gaged. As  a  very  good  arrangement  we  commend  the  plac- 
ing of  numerous  vessels  filled  with  water  in  the  trenches, 
the  latter  in  some  cases  being  also  fully  supplied  with  pro- 
visions, so  that  neither  hunger  nor  thirst  would  compel  the 
men  to  leave  the  trenches  even  temporarily.  The  latter 
case  happened  several  times  on  the  Russian  side,  causing  in 
some  instances  tactical  disadvantages,  and  in  every  case  use- 
less losses. 

When  preparing  to  hold  a  position,  for  some  time,  the 
lines  just  described  were  strengthened  by  redoubts  con- 
structed at  the  highest  points  of  the  position  and  armed 
with  guns;  they  served  particularly  to  sweep  the  front  of  the 
trenches. 

In  preparing  the  line  of  entrenchments  great  care  was 
taken  that  the  advanced  line,  when  earned  by  the  enemy, 
gave  him  no  protection  from  the  lines  still  held  in  rear. 

Having  endeavored  to  give  a  brief  outline  of  the  two  new 
factors  of  modern  fighting — fire  of  masses  and  field  en- 
trenchments— We  will  snl)j(M-t  the  tactical  (Miiployiiicnt  of 
the  several  ai-ms  to  a  brief  consideration. 

3.     The  I II  I'd  lit  11/. 
The  Russian  infantry  on  the  Einoi)ean  theater  of  war 
is  organized  into  regiments  of  ;{  battalions  of  5  companies 


2  1 0       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

each;  the  fifth  company  of  eacli  battalion  is  styled  "rifle 
company"  and  intended  for  skirmishing,  although  differing 
neither  in  armament  nor  equipment  from  the  remaining 
companies.  The  regiments  of  the  Guard  liave  4  battalions 
of  4  companies  each;  the  rifle  battalion  has  4  companies. 
When  preparing  for  battle,  the  battalion  usually  forms  4  com- 
pany columns  in  two  lines  with  short  distances,  the  fifth 
("rifle")  company  being  deployed  in  front.  A  regiment 
formed  for  battle  usually  has  two  battalions  abreast  in  the 
formation  just  described,  and  the  third  battalion  is  held 
closed  in  mass  as  reserve  in  rear. 

From  the  description  of  the  several  actions  it  is  plain 
that  there  was  no  preparation  of  the  attack  by  the  fire  of  skir- 
mishers, and  that  all  preparation  w^as  left  to  the  a.rtiller3\ 

The  attack  was  mostly  undertaken  from  a  great  dis- 
tance— 1,000  paces  and  over — and  carried  out  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  the  skirmish  line,  the  two  lines  of  company  columns,, 
and  frequently  the  reserve  started  almost  at  the  same  time 
and  with  very  small  distances,  and  became  intermixed  in  the 
advance,  so  that  the  attack,  in  a  favorable  case,  approached 
the  eneni,y  in  the  shape  of  a  more  or  less  disordered  swarm. 

If  the  first  advance  failed  to  bring  the  troops  to  the  ene- 
my's position,  they  found  shelter  on  the  ground  and  opened 
a  lively,  but  for  the  most  part  ineffective,  fire;  the  tactical 
arrangement  was  greatly  loosened,  and  the  tactical  leading 
rendered  difficult,  frequently  impossible;  fresh  reserves 
were  required  to  get  the  halted  lines  again  in  motion. 

The  attacks  on  the  enemy's  positions  were  almost  invari- 


Comments.  211 

ably  frontal  and  attempts  to  turn  one  or  both  of  the  enemy's 
Hanks  rare. 

When  on  the  defensive,  the  Russian  infantry  frequently 
advanced  to  the  counter-attack  too  soon,  without  having 
fully  utilized  the  destructive  effect  of  rapid  fire  at  short 
range.  The  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy  also  was  some- 
times made  with  the  bayonet,  though  pursuit  by  fire  would 
have  been  far  more  effective. 

The  tactics  of  the  Turkish  infantry  on  the  defensive  has 
been  noticed  in  connection  with  the  discussion  of  the  Turkish 
fire  tactics.  In  addition  we  note  on  the  defensive  a  persist- 
ent holding  back  and  usually  a  skillful  employment  of  the 
reserves.  On  the  offensive  a  dense  skirmish  line  was  fol- 
lowed by  small  closed  detachments,  which  in  turn  were  fol- 
lowed by  larger  bodies  at  greater  distances.  They  opened 
a  terrible  fire  and  endeavored  to  utilize  the  terrain  in  deliver- 
ing the  decisive  blow  against  the  enemy.  In  most  cases  the 
flanks  of  the  advancing  infantry  were  (overed  by  more  or 
less  cavalry. 

A  few  words  more  on  the  armament  of  the  opi»()siii!4 
infantry. 

The  Russian  Guards  and  Rifles  were  armed  with  the 
Berdan  rifle,  the  remaining  infantry  on  the  European  theater 
with  the  Krenk  rifle;  and  the  Turks  with  the  Teabody- 
Martini  and  partly  with  the  Snider, 

The  following  table  gives  a  comparison  of  the  diflerent 
arms:  . 


212       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Flecna. 


Berdan. 

Krenk. 

Peabo  dy- 
Ma  rtini. 

Snider. 

Weight    of  rifle   and 

10.27  pounds. 

10.84  pounds. 

14.30  pounds. 

11  pounds. 

Weight  of  rifle  with- 
out bayonet 

9.37  pounds. 

9.9;  pounds. 

9.5  pounds. 

9.9  pounds. 

Caliber 

.42  inch. 

.60  inch. 

■  .44  inch. 

Weight  of  cartridge. . 

6C8  grains. 

841  grains. 

636  grains. 

70S  grains. 

Initial  velocitj- 

1450  feet  per 
second 

1082  feet   per 
second. 

l.'?49  feet  per 
second. 

1163  feet  per 
second. 

Dangerous  spaces  for 

infantry. 
At     WlO  paces 

170  paces. 
46  paces. 
25  paces. 

75  paces. 

28  paces. 

Disappears. 

135  paces. 
45  paces. 
20  paces. 

100  paces. 

36  paces. 

Disappears. 

At  1200  paces 

At  1600  pacts 

In  coiiiiection  with  fit-Id  entrenchriients  which  wo  have 
discussed  above  and  which'  have  gained  greatly  in  import- 
ajice,  and  more  particularly  in  connection  with  entrench- 
ments thrown  up  in  the  course  of  the  action,  the  entrenching 
tool  comes  to  the  fore  as  a  point  in  the  infantry  equipment. 

In  the  actions  here  described  one  becomes  painfully 
aware  of  the  frequent  lack  of  entrenching  tools  on  the  part 
of  the  Russians;  it  is  partially  explained  by  the  fact  that  in 
many  cases  the  Russian  foot  soldier  threw  away  his  entrench- 
ing tool  as  a  troublesome  burden,* — ^but,  leaving  this  out  of 
consideration,  the  equipment  of  the  Russian  Army  with  en- 
trenching tools  seems  to  have  been  too  small  to  satisfy  the 
requirements  of  modern  combat. 

-'After  the  bitter  lessons  of  Plevna,  the  throwing  away  of  entrenching  tools 
by  the  Russian  soldiers  seems  to  have  ceased.  Referring  to  the  march  of  Skobe- 
leff's  division  from  Plevna  to  Constantinople,  Greene  says:  "Every  man  carried 
an  implement  of  some  kind,  about  85  per  cent  being  spades  or  shovels,  10  per  cent 
picks,  and  the  rest  axes,  etc.  His  division  marched  with  these  on  their  backs  from 
Plevna  to  Constantinople:  they  were  slung  over  the  back,  the  handle  projecting 
above  the  left  shoulder  and  the  spade  below  the  right  hip,  and  were  attached  to  the 
shoulder  with  a  piece  of  string,  a  strap,  a  piece  of  old  tent,  or  anything  else  that 
was  available;  they  were  heavy  (weigiiing  over  5  pounds),  they  were  uncomforta- 
ble, they  were  in  every  way  inconvenient,  l)ut  each  man  had  learned  by  hard  expe- 
rience to  feel  that  his  individual  life  depended  upon  his  musket  and'his  spade — 
and  he  took  good  care  to  lose  neither  the  one  nor  the  other." — A.  L.  W. 


Comments.  213 

Several  means  are  available  fur  baviiij;  the  requisite 
entrenebing  tools  on  hand  at  the  decisive  moment:  by  an 
addition  of  special  troops;  by  atrrying  the  tools  on  wagons 
and  issuing  them  to  the  troops  as  required;  and  lastly,  by 
maldng  the  entrenching  tool  a  permanent  part  of  the  in- 
fantry equipment. 

The  detail  of  special  troops  for  thi'  const ruelion  of  sueh 
works  would  seem  to  be  inadequate  on  account  of  the  great 
extent  to  which  hasty  entrenchments  have  been  and  will  be 
employed  in  modern  war,  and  on  account  of  the  intimate 
connection  of  tliese  works  with  the  tactical  action  of  in- 
fantry, ir^ome  one  in  the  Russian  Army  has  proposed  to 
equip  a  company  of  each  regiment  with  entrenching  tools 
and  to  compensate  the  company  for  the  extra  weight  by  re- 
duction in  another  direction — in  other  words,  to  give  each 
regiment  a.  pioneer  company  and  to  enornionsly  increase  the 
special  troops.  Aside  from  many  disadvantages  entailed, 
this  plan  would  still  fall  short  of  its  aim. 

It  is  wholly  impracticable  to  carry  the  tools  on  wagons, 
issue  them  to  the  infantry  before  the  action,  and  to  have 
them  turned  in  afterwtyd — so  that  nothing  remains  but  1o 
permanent!}'  equip  the  infantry  with  such  a  supply  of  en- 
trenching tools  as  to  enable  it  to  meet  any  demands  of  bat- 
tle; a  supply  of  entrenching  tools  would  of  course  have  to 
be  carried  on  wagons  as  a  reserve  and  for  the  construction  of 
extensive  works.  The  infantry  should  be  wholly  independ- 
ent of  the  assistance  of  special  troo]»s  in  the  execution  of  all 
purely  tactical  trench  work;    and  the  Tmkisli  infantry,  in 


2 1 4      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

spite  of  its  defective  training,  has  shown  that  this  is 
feasible. 

Some  voices  in  the  Kussian  Army  oppose  the  permanent 
equipment  of  infantry  with  entrenching  tools,  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  too  heavy  and  are  sure  to  be  thrown  away. 
Yet,  a  tool,  suitably  contrived  and  carried,  aided  by  proper 
instruction  of  the  men  in  the  great  value  of  the  tool,  supple- 
mented by  historical  examples,  would  for  the  most  part  de- 
prive these  objections  of  their  force. 

It  is  a  fact  that  the  Russians  were  deficient  in  entrench- 
ing tools  before  Plevna. 

Unfortunately,  the  author  has  no  means  for  ascertain- 
ing what  the  supply  of  entrenching  tools  in  the  hands  of  the 
troops  was,  but  the  number  must  have  been  very  small. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  great  artillery  attack  in  the  early 
days  of  September,  when  emplacements  for  more  than  100 
guns  had  to  be  constructed,  as  well  as  advanced  rifle-trenches 
and  other  trenches  in  rear  as  cover  for  6  divisions,  there 
were  issued  to  the  troops  from  the  field  engineer  park  1,600 
small  spades,  and  several  hundred  large  spades  and  picks. 
But  the  tools  issued  from  the  field  engineer  park  formed  the 
bulk  of  the  tools  on  hand,  for  Skobeleflf's  three  brigades, 
which  received  none  of  these  tools,  were  almost  completely 
destitute  of  entrenching  tools. 

As  a  matter  of  comparison,  we  will  state  here  that  in  ad- 
dition to  the  tools  carried  by  the  cavalry,  ai'tillery,  and 
trains,  the  Gennan  arm}'  corps  of  25  battalions  has  imme- 
diately on  hand  for  entrenching  purposes  5,000  small  spades, 
3,000  large  spades,   1,000  picks  and  pickaxes,   and  2,500 


Oomments.  2 1 5 

hatchets  and  axes;  the  5,000  small  spades  and  part  of  the 
liatchets  are  permanently  carried  by  the  infantry. 

Jf.     The  Cavalry. 

Some  adverse  criticisms,  commenting  with  some  justifi- 
cation on  the  defective  work  of  the  cavalry  in  the  first  part 
of  the  campaign,  remark  that  the  work  of  the  cavalry  was  all 
the  more  unintelligible,  since  the  Russian  cavalrj'  was  not 
only  proportionately  strong,  but  also  superior  to  the  weak 
Turkish  cavali*y.     Both  of  these  assumptions  are  wrong. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  proportion  of  cavalry  to 
infantry  in  the  army  of  operation  was  1  to  6,  which  is  about 
the  normal  proportion  in  the  Grerman  Army  and  may  be 
deemed  sufficient,  and  not  unusually  large.  The  reinforce- 
ments brought  to  the  theater  of  war  in  the  course  of  the  cam- 
paign amounted  to  10  infantry  divisions,  numbering  at  least 
100,000  men.  The  chivalry  of  the  Guard  and  Cossacks — 
numbering  not  more  than  8,000  men — changed  the  above 
I)roportion  very  much  in  favor  of  the  infantry. 

It  is  wrong  to  speak  of  a  great  numerical  superiority 
of  the  Russian  over  the  Turkish  cavalry.  The  so-called  regu- 
lar Turkish  cavalry,  to  be  sure,  was  not  more  tluui  8,000 
strong,  but  20,000  Tcherkesses  formed  not  only  the  most 
numerous,  but  also  decidedly  the  best  portion  of  the  Turkisli 
cavalry.  The  relative  strength  of  the  Russian  and  Turkish 
cavalry  is  therefore  approximately  the  same,  and  at  first 
slightly  in  favor  of  the  Turks,  subsequently  slightly  in  favor 
of  the  Russians. 

Aside  from  the  cavalrv  of  tlie  Guard,  which  had  a  special 


2 1 6         Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

formation,  the  entire  Russian  ciivalrv  of  tlie  line  and  the  20 
Don  Cossack  regiments  in  service  were,  under  the  most  re- 
cent organization,  formed  in  15  permanent  divisions:  14 
divisions  were  composed  each  of  one  Dragoon,  one  Lancer^ 
one  Hussar,  and  one  Cossack  regiment.  Two  Cossack  regi- 
ments did  not  form  part  of  the  divisions.  In  view  of  the  ex- 
perieuces  of  the  German  Army  in  1866  and  1870,  it  was 
deemed  advisable  not  to  organize  larger  bodies.  The  divis- 
ions were  to  be  used  independently  and  closed  in  one  body, 
and  their  tactical  training  corresponded  thereto.  The  ser- 
vice with  the  infantry  divisions  was  to  be  performed  by  Don 
Cossack  regiments,  which  did  not  belong  to  any  cavalry 
division. 

These  principles  were,  however,  soon  deviated  from. 
At  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  15  cavalry  divisions  were 
distributed  among  the  fifteen  corps,  so  that  each  cavalry 
division  became  an  integral  par-t  of  an  army  corps  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  all  independence  and  the  strategic  usefulness 
of  the  cavalry  divisions. 

At  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  army  of  operation 
numbered  seven  army  corps  and  as  many  cavalry  divisions, 
besides  a  Caucasian  Cossack  brigade  and  10  Don  Cossack 
regiments,  which  latter,  not  belonging  to  any  higher  unit, 
were  intended  to  perform  the  service  of  divisional  cavalry. 

Immediately  upon  the  passage  of  the  Danube  the  divis- 
ional organization  was  wantonly  destroyed  for  the  purpose 
of  forming  a  new  and*  larger  unit  for  General  Gourko's  ad- 
vance across  the  Balkans. 

The  Caucasian  Brigade  and  3  combined  brigades  formed 


Oomments.  217 

this  corps:  the  Dragoon  Brigade,  composed  of  the  2  Dragoon 
regiments  of  the  8th  and  9th  Divisions;  the  so-called  com- 
bined brigade,  consisting  of  the  Hussar  regiment  of  the  9th 
Division  and  a  Don  regiment ;  lastly,  the  Don  Brigade,  con- 
sisting of  2  regiments. 

Three  of  the  10  Don  regiments  were  thus  taken  up;  and 
but  7  Cossack  regiments  remained  for  the  14  infantry  divis- 
ions. This  number  of  course  proved  inadequate  at  once;  a 
large  number  of  regiments  belonging  to  cavalry  di\lsions 
were  thereupon  taken  from  their  divisions  and  attached  to 
individual  infantrj^  divisions  and  brigades. 

The  cavalry  divisions  soon  disappeared  in  name  also  and 
their  commanders  were  assigned  according  to  rank  to  the 
command  of  mixed  bodies  of  troops. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  large  cavalry  corps  imder  Krylotf 
was  formed  at  the  beginning  of  September  for  the  pnr]»(»se  of 
investing  Plevna  from  the  west. 

The  strategic  task  of  this  corps  was  manifold:  it  was  to 
observe  the  army  of  Plevna,  reconnoiter  the  country  to  the 
west  and  south,  and  oppose  any  relief  coming  from  these 
directions  as  far  away  from  Plevna  as  possible. 

The  task  necessitated  a  repeated  division  of  I  lie  corps 
and  proved  that  this  clumsy  mass-forniation  would  have 
entailed  difficulties  of  leading,  even  had  tlic  hmcr  bct'u 
more  vigorous  and  appropriate  than  it  was. 

Two  or  three  independent  cavalry  divisiiuis  willi  special 
instructions  directly  from  the  comuuuider-in-chief  of  the 
West  Army  might  perhaps  have  been  bctici-  able  n>  accoiii- 
plish  the  object  contemplated  by  the  supreme  ciinniaiul. 


i^l8       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

The  idea  of  repulsing  by  cavalry  alone  any  relief  coming 
from  the  south  or  west  implies  an  overestimation  of  the 
fighting  capacity  of  the  cavalry  unsupported  by  infantry, 
and  although  in  our  above  discussion  we  were  bound  to  find 
fault  with  Kryloflf's  retreat  with  so  little  fighting,  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  the  cavalry  could  have  succeeded  in  keeping  an 
infantry  corps  of  10,000  men  permanently  from  Plevna. 
None  of  the  faces  or  statements  point  to  any  plan  of  giving 
Krylofi"s  cavalry  timely  support  by  infantry.  The  tasks 
imposed  on  the  German  cavalry  in  1870-71  never  implied 
the  carrying  through  of  a  decisive  action  against  large 
bodies  of  the  enemy's  infantry. 

At  this  point  the  following  reflection  is,  perhaps,  not 
out  of  place: 

The  attitude  of  Osman  Pasha  at  Plevna  in  July  and 
August  may  have  convinced  the  Russian  leaders  that  Os- 
man's  army  was  incapable  of  a  sustained  vigorous  offensive; 
it  was  therefore  desirable  for  the  Russians  to  entice  the 
Turks  in  some  way  to  leave  the  entrenchments  of  Plevna  and 
fight  the  Russians  in  the  open  field 

Supposing  the  Russian  West  Army  took  post  in  Septem- 
ber, not  to  the  east,  but  to  the  west  of  Plevna,  with  two  strong 
bridge-heads  on  the  right  bank  above  and  below  Plevna, 
perhaps  at  Medivan  and  Riben,  while  1,000  or  5,000  cavalry 
were  watching  the  east  side,  the  fi)llowing  would  have  been 
the  situation : 

No  relief  army,  coming  either  from  the  west  (Widdin) 
or  from  the  south  (Orkhanie),  could  join  hands  with  the  army 


Comments.  219 

ill  Plevna  without  first  defeating  the  Russian  Army ;  but  the 
latter,  wholly  aside  from  proper  entrenchments  and  a  far 
superior  artillery,  was  strong  enough  to  repulse  a  simultane- 
ous attack  by  the  relief  army  and  the  army  inside  Plevna- 
Should  Osman  turn  this  position  of  the  Russian  West  Army 
to  account  in  order  to  march  suddenly  eastward  and  threaten 
the  line  of  the  Jantra,  there  was  the  greatest  probability  that 
he  would  be  overtaken  by  the  main  body  of  the  Russian  West 
Army  before  reaching  the  Osma  and  forced  to  give  battle  in 
the  open  field  under  very  unfavorable  conditions. 

Returning  to  the  actual  conditions  before  IMevna,  we 
find  that  the  investment  on  the  west  side  did  not  become 
effective  until  General  Gourko  took  command  and  consid- 
erable forces  of  infantry  had  reinforced  the  cavalry. 

Lastly,  in  casting  a  glance  over  the  tactical  employment 
of  cavalry,  we  notice  the  exaggerated  us^  of  dismounted 
fighting.  Its  modern  role  will  certainly  place  cavalry  often 
in  positions  where  it  must  fight  dismounted,  and  on  that 
account  it  should  be  trained  correspondingly;  still  dis- 
mounted fighting  will  and  must  be  an  unwelcome  expedient 
and  more  or  less  opposed  to  the  nature  of  the  arm. 

Not  so  in  the  Russian  cavalry:  dismouulcd  tighiiiig 
there  has  become  a  perfect  mania;  it  is  used  on  almost  every 
occasion  and  even  without  cogent  reasons.  This  is  no  doubt 
due  to  the  peace  training  of  the  Russian  cavalry,  in  whicli  an 
exaggerated  value  seems  to  be  i)laced  on  dismounted  tjgli  ting; 
for  exaggerated  it  must  be  called  considering  tliat   in  liie 


220      Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

grand  maneuvers  of  1876  more  than  once  entire  cavalry  regi 
ments  dismounted  for  village  fighting,  and  that  cavalry 
assaulted  considerable  towns  held  by  strong  infantry 
garrisons. 

The  Dragoons  are  still  looked  ujjon  in  Russia  as  real 
"double  fighters"  as  in  the  days  of  Emperor  ^'icholas,  who 
sought  to  realize  the  "centaur  combination"  of  infantry  and 
cavalry  in  the  creation  of  his  "Dragoon  Corps."  Although 
this  creation  of  the  Dragoon  Corps  failed  completely  at  the 
first  test — in  the  Oriental  War — still  the  underlying  idea 
has,  within  narrower  limits,  been  preserved  in  the  Russian 
Army  up  to  this  day. 

The  Dragoon  regiment  of  each  normal  Russian  cavalry 
division  is  to  represent  in  a  certain  sense  the  infantry  ele- 
ment of  that  division. 

Dismounted  fighting  of  the  Russian  cavalry  is  an  essen- 
tial factor  of  its  action;  the  dismounted  fighting  of  the  Ger- 
man cavalry  is  never  more  than  an  expedient.  The  Russian 
cavalry  division — viewed  from  the  ideal  standpoint — is  in- 
tended to  be  a  combination  of  all  three  arms,  capable  of  any 

> 

kind  of  action  and  equipped  for  the  greatest  possible  celer- 
ity of  movement;  the  German  cavalry  is  meant  to  accomplish 
all  that  is  possible  for  cavalrj-  proper,  while  as  a  single  arm 
it  must  renounce  complete  independence  in  battle. 

These  latter  requirements  are  decidedly  more  in  keep- 
ing witli  tlie  law  of  the  equal  division  of  labor,  which  is  be- 
coming more  and  more  predominant  in  every  sphere,  and 
which  results  in  an  increased  efficiency  of  the  whole.     Many 


Comments.  221 

features  of  war  which  according  to  our  ideas  are  surprising 
and  bewildering  may  be  exphiined  by  the  difference  in  prin- 
ciple just  stated,  between  the  Russian  and  German  cavalry. 

5.     The  Artillenj. 

The  Russian  field  artillery  was  armed  with  breech-load- 
ing guns  of  two  calibers:  the  so-called  four-pounder  had  a 
caliber  of  3.4  inches  and  fired  a  projectile  of  11  pounds,  the 
barrel  weighed  G14  pounds,  the  limber  contained  18  rounds, 
and  there  were  2  ammunition-wagons  for  every  gun;  the  so- 
called  nine-pounder  bad  a  caliber  of  4  2  inches,  the  projectile 
weighed  22  pounds,  the  barrel  weighed  1,260  pounds,  the 
limber  contained  12  rounds,  and  there  were  3  ammunition- 
wagons  for  ever^'  gun.  Both  these  Russian  guns  surpassed 
the  corresponding  calibers  of  the  German  field  artillery  as  re- 
gards weight  of  projectile  and  barrel;  as  regards  weight  of 
projectile,  the  nine-pounder  was  but  little  inferior  to  the  Ger- 
man 4.7-inch  gun.  The  entire  field  artillery  was  provided 
with  wrought-iron  carriages. 

A  gun  was  drawn  by  6  horses  ;  the  batteries  of 
the  foot  artillery  consisted  of  8  giins,  half  of  them  four-,  the 
other  half  nine-pounders;  the  horse  artillery  had  four- 
pounders  only  and  6  guns  to  the  battery. 

A  brigade  of  6  batteries  with  48  guns  was  permanently 
attached  to  each  infantry  division;  there  were  4  guns  for 
each  infantry  battalion,  slightly  more  than  provided  in  the 
normal  strength  of  the  German  army  corps.  Each  cavalry 
division  had  2  horse  batteries  with  12  guns. 


222       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

In  view  of  the  great  numerical  superiority  of  the  Rus- 
sian over  the  Turkish  artilleiy,  it  was  to  be  expected  that 
its  influence  in  action,  would  be  dominant  and  that  its  effect 
would  vigorously  prepare  and  support  the  attack  of  the  in- 
fantry, but  we  find  little  of  the  sort;  most  actions  give  the 
impression  that  the  cooperation  of  the  artillery'  had  no  in- 
fluence on  their  course  worth  mentioning. 

There  are  two  reasons  for  this:  first,  the  method  of  its 
tactical  employment;  second,  the  tasks  devolving  upon  it  in 
this  wai'  as  compared  with  its  inadequate  effect. 

In  glancing  back  over  the  tactical  employment  of  the 
artillery  in  the  actions  described,  we  find  the  following: 

1.  The  available  batteries  were  mostly,  from  the  very 
beginning,  evenly  distributed  over  the  line  of  battle;  part 
of  the  artillery  was  not  held  back  for  the  purpose  of  using  it 
en  masse  at  a  certain  point  of  the  line  of  battle  in  the  sense 
of  a  corps  artillery. 

2.  Fire  was  opened  on  the  enemy's  position  at  very 
long  ranges  and  was  almost  invai'iably  frontal;  seldom  do 
we  find  an  endeavor  to  flank  a  position.  An  exception  is  the 
position  of  the  artillery  taken  by  Skobeleff.'s  orders  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Tutchenitza  ravine  for  the  purpose  of  enfilad- 
ing the  Turkish  position  on  the  "third  knoll." 

3.  In  most  cases  the  numerically  inferior  Turkish  artil- 
lery soon  gave  up  the  fight  against  the  Russian  artillery 
and  withdrew  to  cover,  only  to  reappear  in  efficient  condi- 
tion the  moment  the  Russian  infantry  moved  to  the  attack. 


Comments.  '  223 

4.  The  frontal  position  of  the  artillei'}'  compelled  it  to 
cease  firing  as  soon  as  the  infantry  attack  began. 

5.  Those  cases  are  exceptions  where  batteries  followed 
the  attacking  infantry  and  endeavored  to  support  it  from 
positions  in  front;  the  artillery  remained  for  the  most  part 
in  its  original  position  and  played  an  inferior  role  in  the  sec- 
ond phase  of  the  action,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  in- 
ferior Turkish  artillery  was  very  much  in  evidence  in  that 
second  phase.  A  vigorous  advance  of  the  artillery  to  sup- 
port the  infantry  attack  is  seldom  found  except  under  Sko- 
beleff's  direction;  the  battery  attached  to  the  Kostroma 
Regiment  on  July  20th  furnishes  an  example  of  that  kind,  and 
so  do  some  batteries  of  the  Russian  left  under  Shakofskoi  on 
July  30th. 

The  batteries  which  advanced  with  the  infantry  under 
the  enemy's  infantry  fire  suffered  such  losses  in  men  and 
horses  as  to  be  put,  entirely  or  in  part,  out  of  action  in  a 
short  space  of  time. 

If  we  investigate  the  material  effect  of  the  Russian  ar- 
tillery, we  fail  to  find  any  thorough  and  successful  effect  in 
any  of  the  actions  excepting  that  of  Telis  on  October  28th. 

The  Russian  artillery  seldom  found  an  opportunity  to 
fire  on  troops  not  under  cover;  the  fire  was  mostly  directed 
against  lines  of  infantry  under  natural  cover,  against  rifle- 
trenches  or  more  or  less  regular  entrenchments,  and  the  fir« 
had  hardly  any  effect.  Despite  its  preparation,  continued 
for  hours,  by  the  fire  of  a  formidable  mass  of  artillery,  the  in 
fantry  attack  invariably  encountered  an  unshaken  opponent. 


224       Tactical  Studies  on  the  Battles  Around  Plevna. 

It  is  a  fact  that  the  small  effect  of  the  Russian  field  artil- 
lery in  the  actions  of  July  and  August,  against  the  sheltered 
and  entrenched  Turkish  position,  shook  the  confidence  of  the 
troops  in  their  field  artillery  so  severely  that  20  twenty-four- 
pounders  from  the  siege  park  were  used  in  the  preparation 
of  the  great  attack  on  Plevna  in  September ;  but  the  latter 
were  likewise  unable  to  produce  a  result  in  any  way  satis- 
factory. 

The  first  fire  was  opened  at  an  average  range  of  2,500 
yards,  at  which  distance  the  four-pounders  were  deemed  in- 
efficient and  nine-pounders  alone  were  used  by  the  side  of  the 
heavy  guns.  Upon  approaching  to  within  1,600  yards  of  the 
enemy's  position  some  of  the  four-pounder  batteries  took 
part  in  the  firing.  The  result  of  the  bombardment  of  the 
Turkish  position,  which  was  carried  on  for  several  days  with 
great  energy,  was  almost  nd,  unless  the  fact  of  the  Kus- 
sian  gun  carriages  becoming  unserviceable  is  considered  a 
negative  and  doubtful  result. 

The  effect  produced  October  24th  by  the  concentric  fire 
of  60  guns  on  the  redoubt  of  Gorni  Dubnik  can  not  be  con- 
sidered satisfactory;  one  would  have  thought  that  such  an 
overwhelming  fire — 60  guns  against  4 — would  speedily 
break  any  resistance.  Having  withstood  this  seemingly 
terrible  fire  for  several  hours,  the  garrison  of  the  redoubt 
was  still  able  to  repulse  several  assaults  made  by  superior 
numbers. 

The  surrender  of  the  redoubt  of  Telis  is  the  one  success 
that  is  to  be  credited  to  the  artillery  alone. 


Comments.  2  25 

Presuming-  that  in  the  future  extensive  field  entrench- 
ments will  pla}'  the  same  role  as  in  the  Kusso-Turkish  War, 
the  following  demands  may  be  made  on  the  artillery: 

First:  An  appreciable  portion  of  the  field  artillery  must 
consist  of  considerably  heavier  calibers  than  are  at  present 
numbered  among  the  field  artillery,  in  order  to  sufficiently 
destroy  the  enemy's  cover  at  greater  ranges. 

Second:  The  light  calibers  of  the  field  artillery  will  be 
employed  not  so  much  in  rearward  positions  as  in  direct 
connection  with  the  attacking  infantry.  The  task  of  the 
light  artillery  is  partly  to  accompany  the  assaulting  infantry 
in  small  bodies,  partly  by  skillful  and  bold  nianeuv(n-ing  in 
larger  bodies  to  take  important  points  of  the  enemy's  position 
under  a  massed  fire  during  a  brief  space  of  time. 

In  fulfilling  these  tasks  great  losses  in  men  and  horses, 
perhaps  even  of  guns,  become  unavoidable,  but  the  responsi- 
ble leader,  if  aiming  at  decisive  results,  will  not  shrink  from 
such  losses. 

A  battery  which  fires  at  the  decisive  point  with  destruc- 
tive effect  for  five  minutes — or  even  for  one  minute — and  is 
then  lost,  has  done  better  service  to  the  whole  command 
than  ten  batteries  which  from  well-chosen  rearward  posi- 
tions have  maintained  a  well-aimed,  but  in  the  end  rather 
useless,  fire. 

6.     Fortresses  and  Field  Entrrnrhinnifs. 
Ardalian,  Nikopolis,  and  Kars,  all  ainuMl  wiili  nuiucroMs 
guns   of   the   heaviest   caliber,   succumbed   te  the  open   at- 
tack; the  field  entrenchments  of  Plevna,  built  in  the  fac<'  of 


226       Tactk'ul  Stiuhcs  un  the  Battles  Around  rienia. 

the  enemy  and  partly  under  his  fire,  armed  witli  compara- 
tively few  guns  of  small  caliber,  held  out  for  five  months  and 
ultimately  succumbed  to  hunger  alone.  That  contrast  is 
naturally  the  first  thought  engendered  by  this  war  relative 
to  fortifications. 

To  be  sure,  Ardahan,  Nikopolis,  and  Kars  did  not  fall  so 
quickly  because  they  were  real  fortresses,  but  in  spite  of  that 
fact;  Plevna  did  not  offer  such  protracted  resistance  because 
its  works  were  field  entrenchments,  but  notwithstanding 
that  fact;  and  lastly,  these  instances  but  serve  to  furnish 
additional  proof  of  the  old  established  fact,  that  a  fortifica- 
tion receives  its  importance  and  value  from  its  defenders 
alone.  It  cannot  be  denied  that,  as  compared  with  for- 
tresses, field  entrenchments  played  a  more  important  role  in 
this  war  than  formerly,  and  that  the  same  condition  will 
probably  obtain  in  the  next  few  wars.  The  principle  of  for- 
tresses and  entrenchments  is  the  same — that  is,  to  form  a 
battle-ground  strengthened  by  all  available  means;  the  dif- 
ference lies  in  the  means  available  in  each  case. 

In  the  construction  of  fortresses  the  limits  of  these 
means  are  fixed  by  considerations  of  finance;  in  the  con- 
struction of  field  entrenchments  circumstances  vary  each 
case,  the  amount  of  available  time  being  a  very  important 
item. 

It  is,  of  course,  impracticable  to  convert  into  fortresses 
all  points  of  a  country  which  under  certain  circumstances 
may  become  decisive  in  the  conduct  of  a  war;  that  is  ren- 
dered impossible  not  only  by  financial  considerations,  but  by 


Comments.  22  7 

many  other  conditions,  military  and  non-military.  Such 
places  alone  as  possess  a  permanent  strategic  value  under  all 
circumstances  can  be  taken  into  account,  and  it  is  left  to 
field  fortification  to  supplement  this  skeleton  of  defense 
formed  by  the  fortresses,  by  additional  fortifications  closely 
conforming  to  the  situation  of  the  moment. 

Greater  demands  than  formerly  are  made  on  all  fortifi- 
cations in  consequence  of  the  great  improvements  in  weapons 
and  means  of  transportation,  rendering  it  possible  to  rap- 
idly bring  up  comparatively  heavy  guns  and  enormous  sup- 
plies of  ammunition.  In  the  construction  of  fortresses,  in 
peace  the  element  of  time  can  easily  be  satisfied  by  utilizing 
all  imaginable  technical  means;  but  in  the  construction  of 
field  entrenchments  there  will  invariably  be  a  dearth  of 
time  and  in  most  cases  one  of  hands,  and  it  will  become  a 
question  what  preparations  will  best  facilitate  a  suitable 
and  rapid  construction  of  field  entrenchments  when  the 
moment  for  so  doing  arrives.  These  preparatory  measures 
may  be  divided  into  two  classes:   intellectual  and  material. 

To  the  former  belong  the  preparations  of  plans  of  forti- 
fication for  all  such  points  as  may  easily  become  important 
in  certain  situations,  and  the  practicing  of  troops  in  the  con- 
struction of  large  fortifications;  the  material  measures 
consist  in  a  sufficient  equipment  of  the  aimy  with  entrench- 
ing tools  and  the  preparation  of  all  wood  constructions  re- 
quired in  such  works,  as  block-houses,  powder  magazines, 
gun  platforms,  revetting  material,  bridges,  ramps,  and  can- 
tonments, the  component  parts  of  which  should  be  kept  in 
store  in  the  great  fortresses  ready  for  shipment. 


J-  J-  JUST  COMPLETED— A  REVISED 
EDITION  (THE  THIRX)), ENLARGED 
AND  WITH  NEW  ILLUSTRATIONS. 


The  Service  of  Security  and  Information 

(THIRD    EDITION) 

By  ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER, 

Captain.  Sixth  Infantrj',  U.  S.  Army  ;    Instructor  in  Art  of  War  at  the 
U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 

CONTENTS : 

Chapter      I.— Introduction.  Chapter    VII.— Spies 

Chapter    II. — Advance  Guards.  Chapter  VIII. — Orientation  and  MapRead- 

Chapter  III.— Outposts.  ing. 

Chapter  IV.  — Reconnaissance.  Chapter     IX.— Indian  Scouting. 

Chapter     V. — The  Cavalry  Screen.  Appendix     I. — .\dvance  Guard  Drill. 

Chapter  VI.— Rear  Guards.  Appendix   II.— Questions   for   General    Re- 

view. 
Illustrated  with  Fifteen  Plates. 

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This  book  has  beeu  officially  adopted  by  the  War  Department  as  a  stand- 
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has  also  been  officially  adopted  as  a  text-book  in  the  U.  S.  Ailillery  vSchool, 
Fort  Monroe;  the  U.  S.  Infantrv  and  Cavalry  School,  Fort  Leavenworth;  the 
U.  S.  Cavalry  and  Light  Artillery  School,  Fort  Riley. 

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A  Catechism  of  Outpost  Duty 

including 

ADVANCE  GUARD,   REAR  GU.\RD,  AND 

RECONNAISSANCE. 

By  ARTHUR  L.   WAGNER, 

Captain.  Sixth  Infantry.  U.  S.  .\rmy  :   Instructor  in  .\rt  of  War  at  the 
U.  S.  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 

This  book  is  a  careful  abridgment,  in  the  form  of  questions  and  answers, 
of  Captain  Wagner's  "Service  of  Securitv  and  Information,"  which  has 
been  officially  sanctioned  by  the  War  Department  as  a  standard  in  tlie  exam- 
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Military  Letters  and 
Essays 


International 

Military  Series 

No.  1 


By  CAPTAIN  F.  N.  MAUDE,  RE., 

Author  of  "Letters  on  Tactics  and  Organization,' 
OF  Modern  Drill-Books,"  Ktc. 


"The  Evolution 


II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X. 

XI. 
XII. 


CONTENTS: 

statistics   of   the    Franco-German  XIV. 

War.  XV. 

Smokeless  Powder.  XVI. 
Conditions  of  Modern  Warfare. 

Cost  of  Modern  War.  XVII. 
German  Cavalry  Maneuvers. 

Independent  Patrols.  XVIII. 

A  Modern  Battle.  XIX. 

A  Study  of  a  Modern  Battle.  XX. 

Attack  or  Defence.  XXI. 

The    Origin   of   Extended-Order  XXII. 

Fighting.  XXIII. 

The  Legend  of  St.  Privat.  XXIV. 
Von  Wedell's  Brigade  at  Mars-la- 

Tour.  XXV. 

Present  Tactical  Tendencies  in  the  XXVI. 

German  Army. 


The  Physique  of  European  Armies. 

The  Weapon  or  the  Man. 

The  Minor  Tactical  Day  at  Alder- 
shot. 

The  Volunteer  Field  Day  at  Alder- 
Shot. 

P'ield  Day  at  Aldershot. 

Notes  on  the  French  Maneuvers. 

The  German  Army. 

Marching  Through  Thuringia. 

The  Panics  at  Gravelotte. 

Moltke's  Work. 

The   Spirit   of  the   New   German 
Infantry  Regulations. 

Notes  in  Germany,  1839. 

Blank  vs.  Ball  Cartridge  Tactics. 


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THE    GERMAN  CAVALRY  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  VIONVILLE— MARS- 
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